#redis

The internet never stays quiet. Every week, new hacks, scams, and security problems show up somewhere. This week’s stories show how fast attackers change their tricks, how small mistakes turn into big risks, and how the same old tools keep finding new ways to break in. Read on to catch up before the next wave hits. Unauthenticated RCE risk Security Flaw in Redis

Fortinet has released updates to fix a critical security flaw impacting FortiSIEM that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to achieve code execution on susceptible instances. The operating system (OS) injection vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-64155, is rated 9.4 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system. "An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS command

Explore how cybercrime markets turn stolen data into laundered funds using dollar‑pegged assets, mixers and exchanges-and why tracking BTC USDT price and stablecoin flows now matters for security, fraud and AML teams.

### Summary A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability allows a user to exceed the set number of active tunnels in their subscription plan. ### Details Affected conponent: `apps/web/src/routes/api/tunnel/register.ts` - `/tunnel/register` endpoint code-: ```ts // Check if tunnel already exists in database const [existingTunnel] = await db .select() .from(tunnels) .where(eq(tunnels.url, tunnelUrl)); const isReconnection = !!existingTunnel; console.log( `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Org: ${organizationId}, Tunnel: ${tunnelId}`, ); console.log( `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Is Reconnection: ${isReconnection}`, ); console.log( `[TUNNEL LIMIT CHECK] Plan: ${currentPlan}, Limit: ${tunnelLimit}`, ); // Check limits only for NEW tunnels (not reconnections) if (!isReconnection) { // Count active tunnels from Redis SET ...

### Summary The user-provided string `repository` in the `helmv3` manager is appended to the `helm registry login` command without proper sanitization. ### Details Adversaries can provide a maliciously crafted `Chart.yaml` in conjunctions with a tweaked Renovate configuration file to trick Renovate to execute arbitrary code. The value for both uses of the `repository` variable in [lib/modules/manager/helmv3/common.ts](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/blob/b69416ce1745f67c9fc1d149738e2f52feb4f732/lib/modules/manager/helmv3/common.ts) are not being escaped using the `quote` function from the `shlex` package. This lack of proper sanitization has been present in the product since version 31.51.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/f372a68144a4d78c9f7f418168e4efe03336a432), released on January 24 of 2022. ### PoC 1. Create a git repo with the following content: `renovate.json5`: ```json5 { $schema: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json", customDatasou...

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust Redis connections by repeatedly opening and closing browser tabs on any NiceGUI application using Redis-backed storage. Connections are never released, leading to service degradation when Redis hits its connection limit. **NiceGUI continues accepting new connections - errors are logged but the app stays up with broken storage functionality.** ### Details When a client disconnects, tab_id is cleared at https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/client.py#L307 before delete() is called at https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/client.py#L319. By then tab_id is None, so there's no way to find the RedisPersistentDict and call https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/blob/main/nicegui/persistence/redis_persistent_dict.py#L92. Each tab creates a RedisPersistentDict with a Redis client connection and a pubsub subscription. These are never closed, accumulating until Redis maxclients is reached. ### PoC #### Test ...

Chainguard, the trusted source for open source, has a unique view into how modern organizations actually consume open source software and where they run into risk and operational burdens. Across a growing customer base and an extensive catalog of over 1800 container image projects, 148,000 versions, 290,000 images, and 100,000 language libraries, and almost half a billion builds, they can see

It’s getting harder to tell where normal tech ends and malicious intent begins. Attackers are no longer just breaking in — they’re blending in, hijacking everyday tools, trusted apps, and even AI assistants. What used to feel like clear-cut “hacker stories” now looks more like a mirror of the systems we all use. This week’s findings show a pattern: precision, patience, and persuasion. The

## Summary The download service (`download_service.py`) makes HTTP requests using raw `requests.get()` without utilizing the application's SSRF protection (`safe_requests.py`). This can allow attackers to access internal services and attempt to reach cloud provider metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), as well as perform internal network reconnaissance, by submitting malicious URLs through the API, depending on the deployment and surrounding controls. **CWE**: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) --- ## Details ### Vulnerable Code Location **File**: `src/local_deep_research/research_library/services/download_service.py` The application has proper SSRF protection implemented in `security/safe_requests.py` and `security/ssrf_validator.py`, which blocks: - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8) - Private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) - AWS metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) - Link-local addresses However, `download_service.py` bypasses this protection by using ra...

Hacktivists have scraped almost 100% of the content available on Spotify. Is there anything users need to worry about?