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### Summary The NodeJS version of HAX CMS uses an insecure default configuration designed for local development. The default configuration does not perform authorization or authentication checks. ### Details If a user were to deploy haxcms-nodejs without modifying the default settings, ‘HAXCMS_DISABLE_JWT_CHECKS‘ would be set to ‘true‘ and their deployment would lack session authentication.  #### Affected Resources - [package.json:13](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs/blob/a4d2f18341ff63ad2d97c35f9fc21af8b965248b/package.json#L13) ### PoC To reproduce this vulnerability, [install](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs) HAX CMS NodeJS. The application will load without JWT checks enabled. ### Impact Without security checks in place, an unauthenticated remote attacker could access, modify, and delete all site information.

### Summary form-data uses `Math.random()` to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker: 1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and 2. can control one field of a request made using form-data Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request. This is largely the same vulnerability as was [recently found in `undici`](https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312) by [`parrot409`](https://hackerone.com/parrot409?type=user) -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to giv...

Fake npm website used in phishing attack to steal maintainer token, leading to malware in popular JavaScript packages like eslint-config-prettier.

### Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in the `@translated/lara-mcp` MCP Server. The vulnerability is caused by the unsanitized use of input parameters within a call to `child_process.exec`, enabling an attacker to inject arbitrary system commands. Successful exploitation can lead to remote code execution under the server process's privileges. The server constructs and executes shell commands using unvalidated user input directly within command-line strings. This introduces the possibility of shell metacharacter injection (`|`, `>`, `&&`, etc.). ### Details The MCP Server exposes tools to interact with Lara Translate API. An MCP Client can be instructed to execute additional actions for example via indirect prompt injection in handling (untrusted) sources. Below some example of vulnerable code and different ways to test this vulnerability including an example of indirect prompt injection that can lead to arbitrary command injection. ### Vulnerable code The follo...

### Summary The `version` parameter of the `/docs` endpoint is vulnerable to a Reflected XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) attack. ### PoC 1. Setup a minimal app following the quickstart guide: https://docs.cadwyn.dev/quickstart/setup/ 2. Click on the following PoC link: http://localhost:8000/docs?version=%27%2balert(document.domain)%2b%27 ### Impact Refer to this [security advisory](https://github.com/Visionatrix/Visionatrix/security/advisories/GHSA-w36r-9jvx-q48v) for an example of the impact of a similar vulnerability that shares the same root cause. This XSS would notably allow an attacker to execute JavaScript code on a user's session for any application based on `Cadwyn` via a one-click attack. A CVSS for the average case may be: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L ### Details The vulnerable code snippet can be found in the 2 functions `swagger_dashboard` and `redoc_dashboard`: https://github.com/zmievsa/cadwyn/blob/main/cadwyn/applications.py#L387-L413 The implementation...

### Summary A **remote script-inclusion / stored XSS** vulnerability in **@nuxtjs/mdc** lets a Markdown author inject a `<base href="https://attacker.tld">` element. The `<base>` tag rewrites how all subsequent relative URLs are resolved, so an attacker can make the page load scripts, styles, or images from an external, attacker-controlled origin and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the site’s context. ### Details - **Affected file** : `src/runtime/parser/utils/props.ts` - **Core logic**  : `validateProp()` inspects * attributes that start with `on` → blocked * `href` or `src` → filtered by `isAnchorLinkAllowed()` Every other attribute and every **tag** (including `<base>`) is allowed unchanged, so the malicious `href` on `<base>` is never validated. ``` export const validateProp = (attribute: string, value: string) => { if (attribute.startsWith('on')) return false if (attribute === 'href' || attribute === 'src') { return isAnchorLinkAllowed(value) } retur...

eslint-config-prettier 8.10.1, 9.1.1, 10.1.6, and 10.1.7 has embedded malicious code for a supply chain compromise. Installing an affected package executes an install.js file that launches the node-gyp.dll malware on Windows.

### Summary The `ConfigCommentParser#parseJSONLikeConfig` API is vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack in its only argument. ### Details The regular expression at [packages/plugin-kit/src/config-comment-parser.js:158](https://github.com/eslint/rewrite/blob/bd4bf23c59f0e4886df671cdebd5abaeb1e0d916/packages/plugin-kit/src/config-comment-parser.js#L158) is vulnerable to a quadratic runtime attack because the grouped expression is not anchored. This can be solved by prepending the regular expression with `[^-a-zA-Z0-9/]`. ### PoC ```javascript const { ConfigCommentParser } = require("@eslint/plugin-kit"); const str = `${"A".repeat(1000000)}?: 1 B: 2`; console.log("start") var parser = new ConfigCommentParser(); console.log(parser.parseJSONLikeConfig(str)); console.log("end") // run `npm i @eslint/plugin-kit@0.3.3` and `node attack.js` // then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage ``` ### Impact This is a Regular Expression Denial of Serv...

It was discovered that the SBOM files generated by melange in apks had file system permissions mode 666: ``` $ apkrane ls https://packages.wolfi.dev/os/x86_64/APKINDEX.tar.gz -P hello-wolfi --full --latest | xargs wget -q -O - | tar tzv 2>/dev/null var/lib/db/sbom drwxr-xr-x root/root 0 2025-06-23 14:17 var/lib/db/sbom -rw-rw-rw- root/root 3383 2025-06-23 14:17 var/lib/db/sbom/hello-wolfi-2.12.2-r1.spdx.json ``` This issue was introduced in commit 1b272db ("Persist workspace filesystem throughout package builds (#1836)") ([v0.23.0](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/releases/tag/v0.23.0)). ### Impact This potentially allows an unprivileged user to tamper with apk SBOMs on a running image, potentially confusing security scanners. An attacker could also perform a DoS under special circumstances. ### Patches This issue was addressed in melange in e29494b ("fix: tighten up permissions for written SBOM files and signature tarballs (#2086)") ([v0.29.5](https://github...

Mattermost versions 10.8.x <= 10.8.1, 10.7.x <= 10.7.3, 10.5.x <= 10.5.7, 9.11.x <= 9.11.16 fail to sanitize input paths of file attachments in the bulk import JSONL file, which allows a system admin to read arbitrary system files via path traversal.