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# pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass ### Summary A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during `pnpm install`, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks `postinstall` scripts via the `onlyBuiltDependencies` mechanism, git dependencies can still execute `prepare`, `prepublish`, and `prepack` scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval. ### Details pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default ([PR #8897](https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/8897)). This is implemented by setting `onlyBuiltDependencies = []` when no build policy is configured: **File:** `pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts` (lines 290-291) ```typescript if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDepend...

## Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments. ## Affected Components - **Package**: pnpm - **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality - **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function - **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution ## Technical Details ### Vulnerability Chain 1. **Environment Variable Substitution** - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()` 2. **loadToken Execution** - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })` - Only validates absolute path existence 3. **Attack Flow** ``` .npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelpe...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of yet another maximum-severity security flaw in n8n, a popular workflow automation platform, that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain complete control over susceptible instances. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-21858 (CVSS score: 10.0), has been codenamed Ni8mare by Cyera Research Labs. Security researcher Dor Attias has been

A weakness has been identified in carboneio carbone up to fbcd349077ad0e8748be73eab2a82ea92b6f8a7e. This impacts an unknown function of the file lib/input.js of the component Formatter Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack can be launched remotely. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. Upgrading to version 3.5.6 will fix this issue. This patch is called 04f9feb24bfca23567706392f9ad2c53bbe4134e. You should upgrade the affected component. A successful exploitation can "only occur if the parent NodeJS application has the same security issue".

## Summary A **Path Traversal (Zip Slip)** vulnerability exists in MONAI's `_download_from_ngc_private()` function. The function uses `zipfile.ZipFile.extractall()` without path validation, while other similar download functions in the same codebase properly use the existing `safe_extract_member()` function. This appears to be an implementation oversight, as safe extraction is already implemented and used elsewhere in MONAI. **CWE:** CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) --- ## Details ### Vulnerable Code Location **File:** `monai/bundle/scripts.py` **Lines:** 291-292 **Function:** `_download_from_ngc_private()` ```python # monai/bundle/scripts.py - Lines 284-293 zip_path = download_path / f"{filename}_v{version}.zip" with open(zip_path, "wb") as f: f.write(response.content) logger.info(f"Downloading: {zip_path}.") if remove_prefix: filename = _remove_ngc_prefix(filename, prefix=remove_prefix) extract_path = download_path / f"{filename...

Users of the "@adonisjs/bodyparser" npm package are being advised to update to the latest version following the disclosure of a critical security vulnerability that, if successfully exploited, could allow a remote attacker to write arbitrary files on the server. Tracked as CVE-2026-21440 (CVSS score: 9.2), the flaw has been described as a path traversal issue affecting the AdonisJS multipart

### Impact For sites that allow users to supply untrusted user input, malicious use of an internal function (not part of the [public API](https://vega.github.io/vega/docs/expressions/)) could be used to run unintentional javascript (XSS). ### Patches Fixed in vega-functions `6.1.1` ### Workarounds There is no workaround besides upgrading. Using `vega.expressionInterpreter` as described in [CSP safe mode](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/) does not prevent this issue. ### Exploit Proof of Concept Vega's expression `modify()` [function](https://github.com/vega/vega/blob/d8add5819346e5af597d82ef8253742acc0283ba/packages/vega-functions/src/functions/modify.js#L40), used by setdata, allows attacker to control both the method called and the values supplied, which results to XSS . This was a previous POC: ```json { "$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v6.json", "data": [ { "name": "table", "values": [ {"category": "A", "amount": 2...

## Impact Applications meeting these two conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if "safe mode" [expressionInterpreter](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/) is used. 1. Use `vega` in an application that attaches both `vega` library and a `vega.View` instance similar to the Vega [Editor](https://github.com/vega/editor) to the global `window`, or has any other satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope 2. Allow user-defined Vega `JSON` definitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code) ## Patches - With Vega v6, use `vega-selections@6.1.2` (requires ESM) - With Vega v5, use `vega-selections@5.6.3` (No ESM needed) ## Workarounds - Do not attach `vega` or `vega.View` instances to global variables or the window as the editor used to do [here](https://github.com/vega/editor/blob/e102355589d23cdd0dbfd607a2cc5f9c5b7a4c55/src/components/renderer/renderer.tsx#L239) . This is a development-only debugging practice that should n...

### Impact The primary impact is allowing users to fetch data from a remote URL. This data can be then injected into Spinnaker pipelines via helm or other methods to extract things LIKE idmsv1 authentication data. This ALSO includes calling INTERNAL Spinnaker API's via a get and similar endpoints. Further, depending upon the artifact configuration, auth data may be exposed to arbitrary endpoints (e.g. GitHub auth headers) leading to credentials exposure. To trigger this, a Spinnaker installation MUST have: * An artifact enabled that allows user input. This includes GitHub file artifacts, BitBucket, GitLab, HTTP artifacts and similar artifact providers. JUST enabling the http artifact provider will add a "no-auth" http provider that could be used to extract link local data (e.g. AWS Metadata information). * A system that can consume the output of these artifacts. E.g. Rosco helm can use this to fetch values data. K8s account manifests if the API returns JSON can be used to in...

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK versions up to and including 1.25.1 contain a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the UriTemplate class when processing RFC 6570 exploded array patterns. The dynamically generated regular expression used during URI matching contains nested quantifiers that can trigger catastrophic backtracking on specially crafted inputs, resulting in excessive CPU consumption. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a malicious URI that causes the Node.js process to become unresponsive, leading to a denial of service.