#nodejs

North Korea’s Lazarus Group deploys a new BeaverTail variant to steal credentials and crypto using fake job lures, dev tools, and smart contracts.

A flaw was found in Nodemailer. This vulnerability allows a denial of service (DoS) via a crafted email address header that triggers infinite recursion in the address parser.

Mattermost Desktop App versions < 6.0.0 fail to sanitize sensitive information from Mattermost logs and clear data on server deletion which allows an attacker with access to the users system to gain access to potentially sensitive information via reading the application logs. A fix is available for direct download via the [Mattermost Desktop](https://github.com/mattermost/desktop/releases/tag/v6.0.0) repository, but it has not been uploaded to the npm registry at time of publication.

## Summary The `fsSize()` function in `systeminformation` is vulnerable to **OS Command Injection (CWE-78)** on Windows systems. The optional `drive` parameter is directly concatenated into a PowerShell command without sanitization, allowing arbitrary command execution when user-controlled input reaches this function. **Affected Platforms:** Windows only **CVSS Breakdown:** - **Attack Vector (AV:N):** Network - if used in a web application/API - **Attack Complexity (AC:H):** High - requires application to pass user input to `fsSize()` - **Privileges Required (PR:N):** None - no authentication required at library level - **User Interaction (UI:N):** None - **Scope (S:U):** Unchanged - executes within Node.js process context - **Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability (C:H/I:H/A:H):** High impact if exploited > **Note:** The actual exploitability depends on how applications use this function. If an application does not pass user-controlled input to `fsSize()`, it is not vulnerable. ...

## Summary The `/__vite_rsc_findSourceMapURL` endpoint in `@vitejs/plugin-rsc` allows **unauthenticated arbitrary file read** during development mode. An attacker can read any file accessible to the Node.js process by sending a crafted HTTP request with a `file://` URL in the `filename` query parameter. **Severity:** High **Attack Vector:** Network **Privileges Required:** None **Scope:** Development mode only (`vite dev`) --- ## Impact ### Who Is Affected? - **All developers** using `@vitejs/plugin-rsc` during development - Projects running `vite dev` with the RSC plugin enabled ### Attack Scenarios 1. **Network-Exposed Dev Servers:** When developers run `vite --host 0.0.0.0` (common for mobile testing), attackers on the same network can read files. 2. ~**XSS-Based Attacks:**~ ~If the application has an XSS vulnerability, malicious JavaScript can fetch sensitive files and exfiltrate them.~ 3. ~**Malicious Dependencies:** ~ ~A compromised npm package could incl...

> Note that this vulnerability is only present when using `experimental_caller` / `experimental_nextAppDirCaller`. ## Summary A Prototype Pollution vulnerability exists in `@trpc/server`'s `formDataToObject` function, which is used by the Next.js App Router adapter. An attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` by submitting specially crafted FormData field names, potentially leading to authorization bypass, denial of service, or other security impacts. ## Affected Versions - **Package:** `@trpc/server` - **Affected Versions:** >=10.27.0 - **Vulnerable Component:** `formDataToObject()` in `src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/formDataToObject.ts` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The `set()` function in `formDataToObject.ts` recursively processes FormData field names containing bracket/dot notation (e.g., `user[name]`, `user.address.city`) to create nested objects. However, it does **not** validate or sanitize dangerous keys like `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`. #...

### Summary After adding private posts (followers, direct) that you do not have permission to view to your favorites or clips, you can export them to view the contents of the private posts. ### PoC 1. Create an account (X) for testing and an account (Y) for private posts on the same server. 2. Send appropriate content from Y using "Follow" 3. Send appropriate content to any user using "Nominate" from Y 4. Obtain the URLs for the two posts above using Y's account. 5. Query the URLs for the two posts using X and add them to your favorites or clips. 6. Export your favorites or clips using X. 7. Check the exported data. Note: Verified in v2025.11.1 ### Impact This could allow an attacker to view the contents of private posts. If you have pinned private posts, this could be a real problem, as the ID of the private post can be obtained by viewing the user page on the original server.

The Preset configuration feature of Vuetify is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to the internal 'mergeDeep' utility function used to merge options with defaults. Using a specially-crafted, malicious preset can result in polluting all JavaScript objects with arbitrary properties, which can further negatively affect all aspects of the application's behavior. This can lead to a wide range of security issues, including resource exhaustion/denial of service or unauthorized access to data. If the application utilizes Server-Side Rendering (SSR), this vulnerability could affect the whole server process. This issue affects Vuetify versions greater than or equal to 2.2.0-beta.2 and less than 3.0.0-alpha.10. Note: Version 2.x of Vuetify is End-of-Life and will not receive any updates to address this issue. For more information see here https://v2.vuetifyjs.com/en/about/eol/ .

Improper neutralization of the title date in the 'VDatePicker' component in Vuetify, allows unsanitized HTML to be inserted into the page. This can lead to a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss  attack. The vulnerability occurs because the 'title-date-format' property of the 'VDatePicker' can accept a user created function and assign its output to the 'innerHTML' property of the title element without sanitization. This issue affects Vuetify versions greater than or equal to 2.0.0 and less than 3.0.0. Note: Version 2.x of Vuetify is End-of-Life and will not receive any updates to address this issue. For more information see here https://v2.vuetifyjs.com/en/about/eol/ .

### Impact `@vitejs/plugin-rsc` vendors `react-server-dom-webpack`, which contained a vulnerability in versions prior to 19.2.3. See details in React repository's advisory https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-7gmr-mq3h-m5h9 ### Patches Upgrade immediately to `@vitejs/plugin-rsc@0.5.7` or later.