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Criminals don’t need to be clever all the time; they just follow the easiest path in: trick users, exploit stale components, or abuse trusted systems like OAuth and package registries. If your stack or habits make any of those easy, you’re already a target. This week’s ThreatsDay highlights show exactly how those weak points are being exploited — from overlooked

### Summary An authenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the member assignment data retrieval functionality of Admidio. Any authenticated user with permissions to assign members to a role (such as an administrator) can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL commands. This can lead to a full compromise of the application's database, including reading, modifying, or deleting all data. The vulnerability is present in the latest version, 4.3.16. ### Details The vulnerability is located in the `adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php` script. This script handles an AJAX request to fetch a list of users for role assignment. The `filter_rol_uuid` GET parameter is not properly sanitized before being used in a raw SQL query. **File:** `adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php` ```php // ... // The parameter is retrieved from the GET request without sufficient sanitization for SQL context. $getFilterRoleUuid = admFuncVariableIs...

The safe function `any_as_u8_slice` can create byte slices that reference uninitialized memory when used with types containing padding bytes. The function uses `slice::from_raw_parts` to create a `&[u8]` covering the entire size of a type, including padding bytes. According to Rust's documentation, `from_raw_parts` requires all bytes to be properly initialized, but padding bytes in structs are not guaranteed to be initialized. This violates the safety contract and causes undefined behavior.

The advice didn't change for decades: use complex passwords with uppercase, lowercase, numbers, and symbols. The idea is to make passwords harder for hackers to crack via brute force methods. But more recent guidance shows our focus should be on password length, rather than complexity. Length is the more important security factor, and passphrases are the simplest way to get your users to create

The safe function `create_ring_buffer` allocates a buffer using `Vec::with_capacity` followed by `set_len`, creating a `Box<[T]>` containing uninitialized memory. This leads to undefined behavior when functions like `write_slices` create typed slices (e.g., `&mut [bool]`) over the uninitialized memory, violating Rust's validity invariants. The issue has been confirmed using Miri. Fixed in version 0.2.2 by using `resize_with` to properly initialize the buffer with `T::default()`, adding a `T: Default` bound to ensure sound initialization.

### Impact In versions 0.9.4 and earlier of uv, tar archives containing PAX headers with file size overrides were not handled properly. As a result, an attacker could contrive a source distribution (as a tar archive) that would extract differently when installed via uv versus other Python package installers. The underlying parsing differential here originates with astral-tokio-tar, which disclosed this vulnerability as CVE-2025-62518. In practice, the impact of this vulnerability is **low**: only source distributions can be formatted as tar archives, and source distributions execute arbitrary code at build/installation time by definition. Consequently, a parser differential in tar extraction is strictly less powerful than the capabilities already exposed to an attacker who has the ability to control source distributions. However, this particular source of malleability in source distributions is unintentional and not operating by design, and therefore we consider it a vulnerability...

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 7.7 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: RUGGEDCOM ROS Devices Vulnerabilities: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions, Protection Mechanism Failure 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, cause denial of service, compromise encrypted communications, and gain unauthorized access to devices until a reboot occurs. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS Siemens reports that the following products are affected: RUGGEDCOM i800: All versions (CVE-2023-52236...

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 8.7 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU V1/V2 Devices Vulnerabilities: Improper Input Validation, Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger functions by record and playback of legitimate network communication, or place the controller in stop/defect state by causing a communications error. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS Siemens reports that the following products are affected: SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU V1 family (incl. SIPLUS variants): All version...

Artificial intelligence (AI) holds tremendous promise for improving cyber defense and making the lives of security practitioners easier. It can help teams cut through alert fatigue, spot patterns faster, and bring a level of scale that human analysts alone can’t match. But realizing that potential depends on securing the systems that make it possible. Every organization experimenting with AI in

Cisco Talos has observed increased activity by malicious actors leveraging Direct Send as part of phishing campaigns. Here's how to strengthen your defenses.