#perl

Ubuntu Security Notice 7056-1 - Multiple security issues were discovered in Firefox. If a user were tricked into opening a specially crafted website, an attacker could potentially exploit these to cause a denial of service, obtain sensitive information across domains, or execute arbitrary code. Masato Kinugawa discovered that Firefox did not properly validate javascript under the "resource://pdf.js" origin. An attacker could potentially exploit this issue to execute arbitrary javascript code and access cross-origin PDF content.

Ever heard of a "pig butchering" scam? Or a DDoS attack so big it could melt your brain? This week's cybersecurity recap has it all – government showdowns, sneaky malware, and even a dash of app store shenanigans. Get the scoop before it's too late! ⚡ Threat of the Week Double Trouble: Evil Corp & LockBit Fall: A consortium of international law enforcement agencies took steps to arrest four

The building management system suffers from an unauthenticated arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. Input passed through the 'logFile' GET parameter via the 'logYumLookup.php' script is not properly verified before being used to download log files. This can be exploited to disclose the contents of arbitrary and sensitive files via directory traversal attacks.

ABB Cylon Aspect version 3.07.02 suffers from an authenticated arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. Input passed through the file GET parameter through the downloadDb.php script is not properly verified before being used to download database files. This can be exploited to disclose the contents of arbitrary and sensitive files via directory traversal attacks.

Ubuntu Security Notice 7053-1 - It was discovered that ImageMagick incorrectly handled certain malformed image files. If a user or automated system using ImageMagick were tricked into opening a specially crafted image, an attacker could exploit this to cause a denial of service or potentially leak sensitive information. These vulnerabilities included heap and stack-based buffer overflows, memory leaks, and improper handling of uninitialized values.

Ubuntu Security Notice 7054-1 - It was discovered that unzip did not properly handle unicode strings under certain circumstances. If a user were tricked into opening a specially crafted zip file, an attacker could possibly use this issue to cause unzip to crash, resulting in a denial of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code.

The building management system suffers from an authenticated arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. Input passed through the 'file' GET parameter through the 'downloadDb.php' script is not properly verified before being used to download database files. This can be exploited to disclose the contents of arbitrary and sensitive files via directory traversal attacks.

### Summary A user with admin permission can read arbitrary file and directory names on the filesystem by calling the `admin/build-mobile-app/result?build_dir_name=` endpoint. The `build_dir_name` parameter is not properly validated and it's then used to construct the `buildDir` that is read. The file/directory names under the `buildDir` will be returned. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L2884-L2893 ```js router.get( "/build-mobile-app/result", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { build_dir_name } = req.query; // [1] source const rootFolder = await File.rootFolder(); const buildDir = path.join( rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", build_dir_name // [2] ); const files = await Promise.all( fs .readdirSync(buildDir) // [3] sink .map(async (outFile) => await File.from_file_on_disk(outFile, buildDir)) ); [...] }) ); ``` ...

### Summary A user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to `res.download` API. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682 ```js router.get( "/auto-backup-download/:filename", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source [...] if ( !isRoot || !(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) && filename.endsWith(".zip")) // [2] ) { res.redirect("/admin/backup"); return; } const auto_backup_directory = getState().getConfig("auto_backup_directory"); res.download(path.join(auto_backup_directory, filename), filename); // [3] sink }) ); ``` ### Steps to reproduce (PoC) - create a file with `.zip` extension under `/tmp` folder: ``` echo "secret12345" > /tmp/secret.zip ``` - log...

For years, securing a company’s systems was synonymous with securing its “perimeter.” There was what was safe “inside” and the unsafe outside world. We built sturdy firewalls and deployed sophisticated detection systems, confident that keeping the barbarians outside the walls kept our data and systems safe. The problem is that we no longer operate within the confines of physical on-prem