The Slider Hero WordPress plugin before 8.4.4 does not escape the slider Name, which could allow high-privileged users to perform Cross-Site Scripting attacks.

CVE-2022-3074

The SEO Smart Links WordPress plugin through 3.0.1 does not sanitise and escape some of its settings, which could allow high privilege users such as admin to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks even when the unfiltered_html capability is disallowed (for example in multisite setup)

CVE-2022-3135

The Simple Bitcoin Faucets WordPress plugin through 1.7.0 does not have any authorisation and CSRF in an AJAX action, allowing any authenticated users, such as subscribers to call it and add/delete/edit Bonds. Furthermore, due to the lack of sanitisation and escaping, it could also lead to Stored Cross-Site Scripting issues

CVE-2022-3024

The Bitcoin / Altcoin Faucet WordPress plugin through 1.6.0 does not have any CSRF check when saving its settings, allowing attacker to make a logged in admin change them via a CSRF attack. Furthermore, due to the lack of sanitisation and escaping, it could also lead to Stored Cross-Site Scripting issues

CVE-2022-3025

The Simple File List WordPress plugin before 4.4.12 does not escape parameters before outputting them back in attributes, leading to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

CVE-2022-3062

The WP Popup Builder WordPress plugin through 1.2.8 does not sanitise and escape a parameter before outputting it back in the page, leading to a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

CVE-2022-2404

The SVG Support WordPress plugin before 2.5 does not properly handle SVG added via an URL, which could allow users with a role as low as author to perform Cross-Site Scripting attacks

CVE-2022-1755

The WordLift WordPress plugin before 3.37.2 does not sanitise and escape its settings, allowing high privilege users such as admin to perform cross-Site Scripting attacks even when the unfiltered_html capability is disallowed.

CVE-2022-3069

Issue still yet to be patched, but workarounds are available

Ben Dickson 26 September 2022 at 13:06 UTC  
Updated: 26 September 2022 at 14:37 UTC

Issue still yet to be patched, but workarounds are available

  

Java templating engine Pebble was vulnerable to a bug that could allow attackers to bypass its security mechanisms and conduct command injection attacks against host servers.

Pebble Templates is convenient because of its easy-to-use templating system for web applications, internationalization capabilities, and security features such as auto-escaping and a block-list method access validator that prevents command execution attacks.

However, according to the findings of a security researcher, Pebble’s command execution defense can be bypassed with carefully crafted code and template files.

**Bypassing Pebble security**

The bypass works when Pebble is used in combination with Spring, a popular Java application framework. Many Spring classes are registered as beans, which enables them to be loaded dynamically at runtime.

Using the Java beans engine, the attacker can load one of the Spring objects that supports class loading.

It then uses the Jackson, a data-parsing library, to read an XML file that contains the specification of a class to instantiate and a function to run. This provides the attacker with a window to run arbitrary code on the server.

In a proof of concept, the researcher used a Pebble template to load an XML file from the web and instantiate a Java class that supports running system commands on the server.

**No easy fix yet**

The bug report has sparked conversation on GitHub. Since the vulnerability has been assigned a CVE, it is triggering security alerts in corporate systems that depend on the current version of Pebble.

The developers are working on a fix, but since it is a community-driven project, it is not clear when it will be released. The maintainers have provided a few workarounds to secure projects in the meantime.

It is worth noting that to exploit the bug, an attacker would need to have a way to upload a malicious Pebble template on the server. Therefore, one defense measure would be to harden security checks on user-provided content and restrict template uploads.

The Daily Swig has reached out to the maintainers of Pebble and will update this post if and when we hear back.

RECOMMENDED Netlify vulnerable to XSS, SSRF attacks via cache poisoning

Java template framework Pebble vulnerable to command injection

ieGeek IG20 hipcam RealServer V1.0 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. The algorithm used to generate device IDs (UIDs) for devices that utilize Shenzhen Yunni Technology iLnkP2P suffers from a predictability flaw that allows remote attackers to establish direct connections to arbitrary devices.

*   ieGeek IG20 Issues/Vulnerabilities
    *   UID Weakness CWE-340
    *   Unauthenticated / Default auth access to camera stream via RTSP protocol CWE-284
*   Default P2P Camera feed activated and sent to a server in plaintext CWE-284
    *   Access to files stored on the camera CWE-284
*   Admin Panel – Basic Authentication in use / Weak Password Requirements CWE-521 / CWE-287
*   JavaScript injection (DOM-based) CWE-79
*   HTTP Response Header Injection/Splitting CWE-644
*   Device NMAP scan
*   The Listing On Amazon
*   Update 01 Sep 2022 – Product Still Listed On Amazon
*   Update: 01 Sep 2022
*   Consumer Recommendations
*   Q&A
    *   Are ieGeek cameras secure?
    *   What are the real risks of ieGeek cameras?
*   Cheap CCTV Invites Outside Threats Into Your Home\[4\]
*   References
    *   Please login to bookmark
    *   Don’t miss:

**_Amazon’s “highly rated” ieGeek brand continues to present a number of security vulnerabilities._**

On the 19th of Aug 2022 I set out to purchase a CCTV Camera from Amazon, I read over the reviews of the ieGeek IG20, and it seemed great, the value too. For just £29.99 I’d get myself a great looking CCTV Camera, packed full of features. It has night vision, Smartphone access, Motion Detection, Plug & Play, It’s waterproof and it can connect via WiFi or Ethernet. Great, I was sold. However, I failed to do any research on the brand specifically.

The camera arrived the following day, and later that day I got around to setting it up. I first noticed that on the back of the camera, there was a sticker with a UID printed, along with a Factory default Username & Password combination, consisting of admin/admin.

**UID Weakness CWE-340**

The UID appears to be predictable.The UID in our case, will look like this: **_AAFF-123456-ABCDE_** – depending on the make and model.

*   **UID p1**: _Same 4 letters at the start._
*   **UID p2:** _6 numbers at random in the middle._
*   **UID p3**: _5 random letters at the end._

Evidently, having just this basic knowledge of the UID and using the default credentials, the camera feed could be accessed using the software provided by ieGeek from their website by testing each UID value. This can leave a number of IP cameras vulnerable to unauthorised viewing with the privacy of users at risk.

Below are some more vulnerable prefixes running the same crappy firmware.

AAAA

AABB

AACC

AAES

AIPC

AAFF

BBBB

CAM

CAMERA

CCCC

DDDD

DEAA

EEEE

ELSA

ELSO

ESCM

ESN

ESS

EUA

EYE

FCARE

FDTAA

FFFF

FOUS

GCAM

GCMN

GGGG

GKW

HHHH

HRXJ

HSL

HVC

HWAA

HZD

HZDA

HZDB

HZDC

HZDN

HZDX

HZDY

HZDZ

IIII

ISRP

JWEV

MCI

MDI

MEIA

MMMM

MSE

MSI

MTE

NIP

NNNN

NTP

OBJ

PHP

PISR

POLI

PPCN

PPPP

PTP

QSHV

ROSS

SECRUI

SPCN

SSAA

SSSS

SURE

SXH

TTTT

UUUU

VIEW

VSTA

VSTB

VSTC

VSTD

VSTF

WCAM

WGKJ

WHI

WNR

WNS

WNV

WWWW

WXH

WXO

XCPTP

XHA

XLT

XWL

ZLD

ZZZZ

AVA

**Unauthenticated / Default auth access to camera stream via RTSP protocol CWE-284**

By default, one can easily access the camera’s stream externally or internally depending on your router/network configuration, with our without means of Authentication.

*   **Zero Authentication:** rtsp://+IP+/11
*   **Default Auth:** rtsp://admin:\[email protected\]+IP+/11

_**Replace +IP+ with your local or external IP**_.

Here is a screenshot of the Default RTSP settings, requiring Zero authentication.

**Default P2P Camera feed activated and sent to a server in plaintext CWE-284**

The cloud function of the camera uses the P2P protocol to send and make requests back to a server based in China in plaintext. It was found that all connections back to this were made in plaintext regardless of protocol, this includes the viewing of the camera’s stream and control. HTTPS was not found to be implemented anywhere on the camera.

**Access to files stored on the camera CWE-284**

The following directories can be viewed using the default login:

*   http://+IP+/tmpfs
*   http://+IP+/js
*   http://+IP+/lib
*   http://+IP+/log
*   http://+IP+/resources
*   http://+IP+/sd
*   http://+IP+/swfs

The number of links discovered showed that the SD card, log files and website front-end code were accessible from the web interface. This includes any footage that has been recorded by the device and stored on the external SD card.

I decided to check out shodan.io and searched for “hipcam realserver”. Shodan is a Google like database of Connected Devices, if you like. It produced 93,312 results of addresses that had port 554 exposed to the internet. As I browsed these I also discovered a number of addresses that also had Port 80 exposed, hosting the same ‘IP Camera’ front page with login. With what I have discovered it is possible for each of these devices to be accessed via default credentials, or if the admin credentials are changed, Using VLC player, I could potentially connect to each of these camera streams without the need to authenticate.

**Admin Panel – Basic Authentication in use / Weak Password Requirements CWE-521 / CWE-287**

When the camera is booted up, a web server is spawned and requires a login to gain access. Default credentials were then used to gain access and there was no setup to force change of the default password in place. Burpsuite caught this login process; the session was found to be using HTTP Basic Authentication to handle the username and password. The Base64 translates to admin:admin.

**JavaScript injection (DOM-based) CWE-79**

Data is read from **document.cookie** and passed to **eval()**

    
    var strCookie=document.cookie;
    var arrCookie=strCookie.split('; ');
    var arr=arrCookie[i].split('=');
    return unescape(arr[1]);
    var cooktype=getcookie('cookmun');
    var string = eval("'cgi-bin/hi3510/param.cgi?cmd=setimageattr&-image_type="+cooktype+"&-default=on'");

Using various different methods of escaping. Stored XSS was also prevalent in many places within the admin panel that used user input. Example: FTP Upload settings.

**HTTP Response Header Injection/Splitting CWE-644**

The web application is also evidently vulnerable to HTTP response header injection, see PoC below. This also led me to discover i was able to break out of the response.

Your options for exploitation vary depending on the type of response you’re injected into and also where in the response you’re placed!

Here we’ve added a “malicious cookie” which will be set in the browser. As mentioned earlier i was also able to break into the body, or out of the headers through double CRLFs (%0d%0a%0d%0a) **_see below_**.

When user input is insecurely inserted into the headers of server responses, HTTP Header Injection vulnerabilities are created. They are based on the theory that an attacker can make the server generate a response that contains carriage-return and line-feed characters (or, respectively, %0D and %0A in their URI encoded forms), within the server response header, and/or that the attacker may be able to add specially created headers. Attacks like response splitting, session fixation, cross-site scripting, and malicious redirection are all possible using header injection.

Often, the injection of headers is not the main attack; rather, it is merely a method for accessing or exploiting another flaw. For instance, if a hacker is able to inject a payload through HTTP header injection, they may target a website that is susceptible to cross-site scripting in the Referer header or in a cookie value etc.

**Device NMAP scan**

    Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-08-28 00:42 BST
    Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.116
    Host is up (0.0088s latency).
    Not shown: 996 closed ports
    PORT     STATE SERVICE
    80/tcp   open  http Hipcam RealServer/V1.0
    554/tcp  open  rtsp
    1935/tcp open  rtmp Real-Time Messaging Protocol
    8080/tcp open  http-proxy ONVIFservice
    MAC X (Shenzhentong BO Weitechnology) SHENZHEN TONG BO WEI TECHNOLOGY Co.,LTD
    Device type: general purpose
    Running: Linux 2.6.X|3.X
    OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3
    OS details: Linux 2.6.32 - 3.10
    Network Distance: 1 hop
     

Anyway, I decided enough is enough with this trash device and unplugged it from my network, packaged it back up and arranged a return with Amazon.

**The Listing On Amazon**

At the time of writing, the listing is still available, however, I reached out to Amazon and made them fully aware of everything, including my intention to publish this article, and they advised me that the product listing would be “temporarily” removed today, **28th Aug 2022**, pending further Investigation.  
The listing can be seen here **_\[if still available\]_**

It has to be worth noting, that there was an investigation by Which.co.uk see reference \[3\] in July 2021, that details a line of similar flaws, consequently, Amazon removed the said ieGeek branded camera from sale on its website. The which? investigation revealed another device from the same manufacturer can be easily hacked by cybercriminals.

> The £40 camera, which was labelled Amazon’s Choice, had more than 8,500 reviews (as of June 22 2021), including 68% giving the full five stars.
> 
> If you own the ieGeek Security Outdoor Camera 1080p, you should change its default password immediately, or better still, stop using it.
> 
> https://www.which.co.uk/news/article/iegeek-security-camera-removed-from-sale-following-which-investigation-ajW4t0g7bnGj

So the question remains, why do Amazon allow Manufacturers to list products irrelevant of the manufacturer having been Flagged, and Delisted in the past? A better system needs to be in place. Yes, I understand there can be a new line of products/models but surely amazon should be seen to be doing more to prevent devices like this from appearing on their website. The privacy and security of their customers should be paramount.

**Update 01 Sep 2022 – Product Still Listed On Amazon**

We’ve noted that the product is still available to purchase on Amazon, despite us being told that it would be removed, pending an investigation. We figured we’d add a screenshot, just for clarity.

Here is the screenshot of a mail I received from the Amazon Representative on the 28th of August, this email states the item “may be temporarily unavailable”, which contradicts what she told me on the telephone. This email arrived in my mailbox very shortly after I had a call with the same lady, Roxy.

**Update: 01 Sep 2022**

We’ve been made aware of another article from Which.co.uk, this second article was published in late 2021, after the earlier-mentioned article. Their second write-up clearly paints a very different picture, one could easily say it’s misleading given what has been uncovered in this report. It has to be worth mentioning that my ieGeek device, and probably many many others, was still running the same vulnerability-ridden firmware that Which.co.uk spoke out against in their first write-up, as has been verified by the team here at risec and elsewhere. There was no obvious offer of any firmware upgrade, at least to my knowledge. Anyway, see some quotes from the second write-up below.

> **Millions of CamHi wireless cameras made more secure after hacking risk**
> 
> Following a change by HiChip, all CamHi app devices when installed now must have their default password changed by the user.
> 
> HiChip has agreed to enforce a strong password policy, particularly blocking generic terms such as ‘password’ and ‘admin’.
> 
> For CamHi devices that are already set up in people’s homes, the app will remind them to change the default password and warn them if what they have chosen is weak
> 
> **_MISLEADING_**: https://www.which.co.uk/news/article/millions-of-camhi-wireless-cameras-made-more-secure-after-hacking-risk-aezzW2u2ELsl

**_We have reached out to Which.co.uk and have yet to receive any notable response._**

**Consumer Recommendations**

If you value your privacy, and security as much as we do, please remove the device from service. It is simply unfit for purpose. If you bought it from Amazon, go and arrange a return as this device is in clear breach of their merchant conditions.

Research each device thoroughly before buying, and check it’s security reputation.

_**Be Aware**_**_:_** _Endless numbers of IP cameras of other Brands also use the Hipcam RealServer service; I am unable to check the configuration of these devices specifically, but one would be led to believe they are all implemented similarly. Sadly, there doesn’t seem to be a method to warn anyone utilising these IP Cameras that they are exposed._

On a final note, take amazon’s reviews with a pinch of salt, and always do your homework. Next time your about to purchase a connected device, IoT(Internet-of-Things), do a quick google query, something like, “vulnerable BRAND” or “exploit BRAND”

**Q&A****Are ieGeek cameras secure?**

According to our research, and many others, ieGeek cameras are not secure. The devices they seem to be pushing out in 2022 are vulnerable in a number of ways as detailed in this article. Fundamentally, they lack proper encryption, and, are shipped to consumers riddled with security holes. One can only ask themselves, is it intentional? _**tldr; Given the research of the team here at RiSec, and research conducted elsewhere, we can categorically say ieGeek’s cameras are not secure in 2022.**_

**What are the real risks of ieGeek cameras?**

By using these devices that lack proper safety and security standards, your private data is at serious risk of being exposed, **a bad actor may able to gain complete control of the cameras**. This fundamentally opens up your entire network to further attack, making it much easier for a bad actor to reach an end goal.

Cheap CCTV cameras tend to be vulnerable to at least one of the following types of hacking:

1.  They have a weak default password and username setting, which can be easily discoverable. If the user doesn’t change those settings, it’s very easy for hackers to find their way into your camera control system, in every case, there is no prompt in the Admin panel when logging in, advising you to chase any password.
2.  They don’t encrypt your data so that your home router password input is un-encrypted and accessible to any cyber attacker, or themselves.., same applies with any SMTP email info provided, along with any FTP info provided to the device. By using the home router password, they can gain access to other devices on your home network, can monitor your Internet history and any stored data on connected devices.
3.  They let external users gain root access to the device itself, allowing hackers to take control, launch attacks from your device, and exfiltrate data.

**Cheap CCTV Invites Outside Threats Into Your Home\[4\]**

> There are three main security issues you need to look for when buying your CCTV camera. Popular wireless security camera brands that are sold on online marketplaces like Amazon, but also eBay share common security flaws.
> 
> As a rule of thumb, brands that are not well-known outside of the online market should be avoided at all cost. Affordable CCTV solutions from Shenzhen-based factories in China sometimes fail to meet wireless safety standards.
> 
> Brands that have been tested for vulnerability and that you should avoid are the following; ieGeek, Sricam, SV3C, and Vstarcam. All come with a friendly price tag, but they are quick to join the list of CCTV cameras that put your privacy and security at risk.
> 
> Tested by a professional security lab, Context Information Security, “cheap CCTV cameras show that they fail to prioritise customers’ security even those that are bestsellers in online marketplaces”
> 
> \[4\]

Update: **_21/09/2022_** – After some back-and-forth correspondence with the vendor, **_ieGeek_**, they have disputed that the ieGeek IG20 is an insecure device, despite our evidence to the contrary, they also cited an invalid misleading Which.co.uk\[5\] post as seen above.

**CVE Approved:** **_CVE-2022-38970_**\[6\]

**_Got some crazy story? thoughts on this article? We’d love to hear from you below!_**

_Coming up next, I will be covering a Chinese “Mini-PC” that was shipped to me loaded with Malware._

Ciao, for now.

**_References_**

Amazon product listing\[1\]

IG20 ieGeek store page\[2\]

Which investigation ieGeek\[3\]

Cheap CCTV Sold With Known Vulnerabilities\[4\]

Which.co.uk Misleading\[5\]

**_CVE-2022-38970_**\[6\]

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Hello! I'm Steve, an independent security researcher, and analyst from Scotland, UK.

I've had an avid interest in Computers, Technology and Security since my early teens. 20 years on, and, it's a whole lot more complicated...

I've assisted Governments, Individuals and Organizations throughout the world. Including; US DOJ, NHS UK, GOV UK.

I'll often reblog infosec-related articles that I find interesting. On the RiSec website, You'll also find a variety of write-ups, tutorials and much more!

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