A permissions issue was addressed with improved redaction of sensitive information. This issue is fixed in tvOS 17, iOS 17 and iPadOS 17, macOS Sonoma 14. An app may be able to read sensitive location information.

CVE-2023-40384: About the security content of iOS 17 and iPadOS 17

A permissions issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in tvOS 17, iOS 17 and iPadOS 17, watchOS 10, macOS Sonoma 14. An app may be able to access sensitive user data.

Released September 18, 2023

**App Store**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: A remote attacker may be able to break out of Web Content sandbox

Description: The issue was addressed with improved handling of protocols.

CVE-2023-40448: w0wbox

**Apple Neural Engine**

Available for devices with Apple Neural Engine: Apple Watch Series 9 and Apple Watch Ultra 2

Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2023-40432: Mohamed GHANNAM (@\_simo36)

CVE-2023-41174: Mohamed GHANNAM (@\_simo36)

CVE-2023-40409: Ye Zhang (@VAR10CK) of Baidu Security

CVE-2023-40412: Mohamed GHANNAM (@\_simo36)

**Apple Neural Engine**

Available for devices with Apple Neural Engine: Apple Watch Series 9 and Apple Watch Ultra 2

Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges

Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management.

CVE-2023-41071: Mohamed GHANNAM (@\_simo36)

**Apple Neural Engine**

Available for devices with Apple Neural Engine: Apple Watch Series 9 and Apple Watch Ultra 2

Impact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2023-40399: Mohamed GHANNAM (@\_simo36)

**Apple Neural Engine**

Available for devices with Apple Neural Engine: Apple Watch Series 9 and Apple Watch Ultra 2

Impact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory

Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation.

CVE-2023-40410: Tim Michaud (@TimGMichaud) of Moveworks.ai

**AuthKit**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data

Description: The issue was addressed with improved handling of caches.

CVE-2023-32361: Csaba Fitzl (@theevilbit) of Offensive Security

**Bluetooth**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An attacker in physical proximity can cause a limited out of bounds write

Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-35984: zer0k

**bootp**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information

Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data redaction for log entries.

CVE-2023-41065: Adam M., and Noah Roskin-Frazee and Professor Jason Lau (ZeroClicks.ai Lab)

**CFNetwork**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may fail to enforce App Transport Security

Description: The issue was addressed with improved handling of protocols.

CVE-2023-38596: Will Brattain at Trail of Bits

**CoreAnimation**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: Processing web content may lead to a denial-of-service

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2023-40420: 이준성(Junsung Lee) of Cross Republic

**Dev Tools**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to gain elevated privileges

Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-32396: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

**Game Center**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access contacts

Description: The issue was addressed with improved handling of caches.

CVE-2023-40395: Csaba Fitzl (@theevilbit) of Offensive Security

**Kernel**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An attacker that has already achieved kernel code execution may be able to bypass kernel memory mitigations

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2023-41981: Linus Henze of Pinauten GmbH (pinauten.de)

**Kernel**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2023-41984: Pan ZhenPeng (@Peterpan0927) of STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd.

**Kernel**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data

Description: A permissions issue was addressed with improved validation.

CVE-2023-40429: Michael (Biscuit) Thomas and 张师傅(@京东蓝军)

**libpcap**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: A remote user may cause an unexpected app termination or arbitrary code execution

Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-40400: Sei K.

**libxpc**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to delete files for which it does not have permission

Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional restrictions.

CVE-2023-40454: Zhipeng Huo (@R3dF09) of Tencent Security Xuanwu Lab (xlab.tencent.com)

**libxpc**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access protected user data

Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state management.

CVE-2023-41073: Zhipeng Huo (@R3dF09) of Tencent Security Xuanwu Lab (xlab.tencent.com)

**libxslt**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: Processing web content may disclose sensitive information

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2023-40403: Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of PK Security

**Maps**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information

Description: The issue was addressed with improved handling of caches.

CVE-2023-40427: Adam M., and Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

**MobileStorageMounter**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: A user may be able to elevate privileges

Description: An access issue was addressed with improved access restrictions.

CVE-2023-41068: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

**Passcode**

Available for: Apple Watch Ultra (all models)

Impact: An Apple Watch Ultra may not lock when using the Depth app

Description: An authentication issue was addressed with improved state management.

CVE-2023-40418: serkan Gurbuz

**Photos Storage**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access edited photos saved to a temporary directory

Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-40456: Kirin (@Pwnrin)

CVE-2023-40520: Kirin (@Pwnrin)

**Safari**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to identify what other apps a user has installed

Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-35990: Adriatik Raci of Sentry Cybersecurity

**Safari**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: Visiting a website that frames malicious content may lead to UI spoofing

Description: A window management issue was addressed with improved state management.

CVE-2023-40417: Narendra Bhati From Suma Soft Pvt. Ltd.

**Sandbox**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to overwrite arbitrary files

Description: The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks.

CVE-2023-40452: Yiğit Can YILMAZ (@yilmazcanyigit)

**Share Sheet**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive data logged when a user shares a link

Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-41070: Kirin (@Pwnrin)

**Simulator**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to gain elevated privileges

Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-40419: Arsenii Kostromin (0x3c3e)

**StorageKit**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to read arbitrary files

Description: This issue was addressed with improved validation of symlinks.

CVE-2023-41968: Mickey Jin (@patch1t) and James Hutchins

**TCC**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data

Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.

CVE-2023-40424: Arsenii Kostromin (0x3c3e), Joshua Jewett (@JoshJewett33), and Csaba Fitzl (@theevilbit) of Offensive Security

**WebKit**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: Processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution

Description: A use-after-free issue was addressed with improved memory management.

WebKit Bugzilla: 249451  
CVE-2023-39434: Francisco Alonso (@revskills), and Dohyun Lee (@l33d0hyun) of PK Security

**WebKit**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: Processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution

Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.

WebKit Bugzilla: 256551  
CVE-2023-41074: 이준성(Junsung Lee) of Cross Republic and me Li

**WebKit**

Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later

Impact: Processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution

Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

WebKit Bugzilla: 239758  
CVE-2023-35074: Abysslab Dong Jun Kim(@smlijun) and Jong Seong Kim(@nevul37)

CVE-2023-40429: About the security content of watchOS 10

A permissions issue was addressed with improved redaction of sensitive information. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14. An app may be able to access sensitive user data.

CVE-2023-23495: About the security content of macOS Sonoma 14

A use-after-free vulnerability exists in the footerr functionality of Hancom Office 2020 HWord 11.0.0.7520. A specially crafted .doc file can lead to a use-after-free. An attacker can trick a user into opening a malformed file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-32541: TALOS-2023-1759 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

Service inspectors are an evolution of Snort 2's preprocessors, providing access to additional built-in rules that look for protocol-level abnormalities.

ICS protocol coverage using Snort 3 service inspectors

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the create_png_object functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-32614: TALOS-2023-1749 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the pictwread functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-35002: TALOS-2023-1760 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the allocate_buffer_for_jpeg_decoding functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

CVE-2023-40163: TALOS-2023-1836 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the tif_processing_dng_channel_count functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**SUMMARY**

A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the tif\_processing\_dng\_channel\_count functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS**

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Accusoft ImageGear 20.1

**PRODUCT URLS**

ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/

**CVSSv3 SCORE**

5.6 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

**CWE**

CWE-121 - Stack-based Buffer Overflow

**DETAILS**

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

A specially crafted TIFF file can lead to a stack-based buffer overflow in tif_processing_dng_channel_count, due to a missing bounds check.

Trying to load a malformed TIFF, we end up in the following situation:

    (c74.ec0): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
    First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
    This exception may be expected and handled.
    eax=00000010 ebx=0ec9efe0 ecx=000003c8 edx=0ec9e000 esi=0ec9efe0 edi=001a0000
    eip=6f579a03 esp=0019faf4 ebp=0019fb34 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
    cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010206
    igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x2d8e3:
    6f579a03 f3ab            rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]
    

As we can see below the stack is overwritten with some constant value 0x10:

    0:000> kb
     # ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child              
    WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
    00 0019fb34 00000000 00000010 00000010 00000010 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x2d8e3
    

The crash is happening in the function tif_processing_dng_channel_count with the following pseudo code at LINE36:

    LINE1   dword tif_processing_dng_channel_count
    LINE2                   (HIGEAR higear,int param_2,int param_3,int *param_4,int param_5)
    LINE3   {
    LINE4     int max_loop;
    LINE5     double *pdVar1;
    LINE6     int iVar2;
    LINE7     uint uVar3;
    LINE8     dword dVar4;
    LINE9     int iVar5;
    LINE10    int iVar6;
    LINE11    short *psVar7;
    LINE12    void **ppvVar8;
    LINE13    int iVar9;
    LINE14    int iVar10;
    LINE15    AT_INT *p_loc_at_int;
    LINE16    double dVar11;
    LINE17    double dVar13;
    LINE18    int local_28;
    LINE19    int local_24;
    LINE20    int local_20;
    LINE21    void **local_1c;
    LINE22    AT_INT _local_at_int [2];
    LINE23    double local_10;
    LINE24    uint local_8;
    LINE25    undefined auVar12 [16];
    LINE26    
    LINE27    local_8 = DAT_10319e74 ^ (uint)&stack0xfffffffc;
    LINE28    max_loop = get_channel_count(higear);
    LINE29    local_1c = (void **)0x0;
    LINE30    _local_at_int[0] = 0;
    LINE31    _local_at_int[1] = 0;
    LINE32    local_10 = 0.0;
    LINE33    if (0 < max_loop) {
    LINE34      p_loc_at_int = _local_at_int;
    LINE35      for (iVar5 = max_loop; iVar5 != 0; iVar5 = iVar5 + -1) {
    LINE36        *p_loc_at_int = 0x10;
    LINE37        p_loc_at_int = p_loc_at_int + 1;
    LINE38      }
    LINE39    }
    LINE40    iIG_image_channel_depths_change(higear,_local_at_int,1);
        [...]
    LINE148 }
    

This is a for loop with a bound size controlled by the variable max_loop LINE35. The pointer p_loc_at_int is pointing to a stack variable _local_at_int, which is a table of two integers.  
The max_loop is returned by the function get_channel_count LINE28, which is a wrapper, and returns a value directly read and controlled from the file. This can happen under specific circumstances with some malformed tags BitsPerSample, the max_loop corresponds to the SamplesPerPixel value. The presence of some other tags like DNGVersion and SubIFDs is a prerequisite to make this happen.  
As the loop is arbitrarily controlled and has no bounds checks, the command at LINE36 would write out-of-bounds on the stack, leading to memory corruption.

**Crash Information**

    0:000> !analyze -v
    *******************************************************************************
    *                                                                             *
    *                        Exception Analysis                                   *
    *                                                                             *
    *******************************************************************************
    
    *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for Fuzzme.exe
    
    KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
    
        Key  : AV.Fault
        Value: Write
    
        Key  : Analysis.CPU.Sec
        Value: 1
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPP
        Value: Create: 8007007e on DESKTOP-I6GKV78
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugData
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugModel
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Analysis.Elapsed.Sec
        Value: 1
    
        Key  : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
        Value: 93
    
        Key  : Analysis.System
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
        Value: 1280404
    
        Key  : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
        Value: 101
    
    
    NTGLOBALFLAG:  2100000
    
    PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0
    
    PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS:  0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
    
    EXCEPTION_RECORD:  (.exr -1)
    ExceptionAddress: 6f579a03 (igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0002d8e3)
       ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
      ExceptionFlags: 00000000
    NumberParameters: 2
       Parameter[0]: 00000001
       Parameter[1]: 001a0000
    Attempt to write to address 001a0000
    
    FAULTING_THREAD:  00000ec0
    
    PROCESS_NAME:  Fuzzme.exe
    
    WRITE_ADDRESS:  001a0000 
    
    ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
    
    EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  c0000005
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1:  00000001
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2:  001a0000
    
    STACK_TEXT:  
    0019fb34 00000000 00000010 00000010 00000010 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x2d8e3
    
    
    STACK_COMMAND:  ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
    
    SYMBOL_NAME:  igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+2d8e3
    
    MODULE_NAME: igCore20d
    
    IMAGE_NAME:  igCore20d.dll
    
    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igCore20d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set
    
    OS_VERSION:  10.0.19041.1
    
    BUILDLAB_STR:  vb_release
    
    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x86
    
    OSNAME:  Windows 10
    
    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {fe8f80f8-683f-d41f-7c33-712a409d5fb5}
    
    Followup:     MachineOwner
    ---------
    

**VENDOR RESPONSE**

Release notes from the vendor can be found here:

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Windows/DLL/webframe.html#release-notes.html

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Linux/webframe.html#release-notes.html

**TIMELINE**

2023-04-20 - Vendor Disclosure  
2023-09-20 - Vendor Patch Release  
2023-09-25 - Public Release

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

CVE-2023-28393: TALOS-2023-1742 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the tiff_planar_adobe functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**SUMMARY**

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the tiff\_planar\_adobe functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 20.1. A specially crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

**CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS**

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Accusoft ImageGear 20.1

**PRODUCT URLS**

ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/

**CVSSv3 SCORE**

8.1 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**CWE**

CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

**DETAILS**

The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.

A specially crafted TIFF file can lead to a heap-based buffer overflow in tiff_planar_adobe, due to a missing bounds check.

Trying to load a malformed TIFF, we end up in the following situation:

    0:000> r
    eax=00000000 ebx=0b086ff0 ecx=00000010 edx=0b087000 esi=0b9d0fb8 edi=00000044
    eip=6e86d4a3 esp=0019da24 ebp=0019da38 iopl=0         nv up ei ng nz ac pe cy
    cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010297
    igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11383:
    6e86d4a3 8802            mov     byte ptr [edx],al          ds:002b:0b087000=??
    

When we look at the edx memory allocation we can see the buffer allocated is quite small, only 10 bytes:

    0:000> !heap -p -a edx
        address 0b087000 found in
        _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 4dc1000
        in busy allocation (  DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:         UserAddr         UserSize -         VirtAddr         VirtSize)
                                     b270bfc:          b086ff0               10 -          b086000             2000
        6ebaa8b0 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000240
        773df29e ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000039
        77347170 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000f0
        77346ecc ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x0000104c
        77345e6e ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000003e
        6ea11fa6 igCore20d!IG_GUI_page_title_set+0x0003e4d6
        6ea104aa igCore20d!IG_GUI_page_title_set+0x0003c9da
        6e8646ba igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0000859a
        6e826c86 igCore20d!IG_comm_is_comp_exist+0x000048f6
        6e825f75 igCore20d!IG_comm_is_comp_exist+0x00003be5
        6e8604c4 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000043a4
        6e86588e igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0000976e
        6e80c7f2 igCore20d!GPb_image_associate+0x00000092
        6e86d050 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00010f30
        6e84929e igCore20d!IG_cpm_profiles_reset+0x0000dfae
        6e96fc93 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00113b73
        6e969b9b igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0010da7b
        6e8315b9 igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0x00000b29
        6e8708bc igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x0001479c
        6e870239 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014119
        6e805bc7 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x00000047
        00402399 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000019
        004026c0 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000340
        00408407 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00006087
        75bf0099 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x00000019
        77367b6e ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000002f
        77367b3e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000001b
    

The call stack will indicate where this is happening:

    STACK_TEXT:  
    WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
    0019da38 6e84a238 00000001 0b9d0fb8 0b086ff0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11383
    0019da54 6e96b904 0019fc3c 0b9d0fb8 00000000 igCore20d!IG_cpm_profiles_reset+0xef48
    0019f678 6e96fdb4 0019fc3c 10000021 0019f6d0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10f7e4
    0019f6a0 6e969b9b 0019fc3c 10000021 09046d68 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x113c94
    0019fbb4 6e8315b9 0019fc3c 09046d68 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10da7b
    0019fbec 6e8708bc 00000000 09046d68 0019fc3c igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
    0019fe68 6e870239 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x1479c
    0019fe88 6e805bc7 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14119
    0019fea8 00402399 05281fe0 0019febc 75befb60 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x47
    0019fec0 004026c0 05281fe0 0019fef8 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
    0019ff28 00408407 00000005 051d6f98 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x340
    0019ff70 75bf0099 0023a000 75bf0080 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x6087
    0019ff80 77367b6e 0023a000 6666f0ed 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
    0019ffdc 77367b3e ffffffff 77388ca1 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
    0019ffec 00000000 0040848f 0023a000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
    

The crash is happening in the function tiff_planar_adobe with the following pseudo code at LINE63:

    LINE1   BOOLEAN tiff_planar_adobe(HIGEAR lpHigear,BYTE *raster_buffer,BYTE *at_pixpos,int size_raster_buffer
    LINE2                            ,int loop_sample_per_pixel)
    LINE3   {
    LINE4     undefined4 uVar1;
    LINE5     LPCHAR pCVar2;
    LINE6     AT_INT AVar3;
    LINE7     BOOLEAN BVar4;
    LINE8     int bits_per_channel;
    LINE9     int sample_per_pixel;
    LINE10    int max_loop;
    LINE11    int bit_depth_sums;
    LINE12    undefined4 *_dest_buffer;
    LINE13    undefined2 *puVar5;
    LINE14    int loop_cnt;
    LINE15    BYTE *oobw;
    LINE16    uint uVar6;
    LINE17    HIGEAR hiGear;
    LINE18    
    LINE19    hiGear = *(HIGEAR *)lpHigear->valid_image;
    LINE20    if (lpHigear->lpfnDIBGet != 0) {
    LINE21      uVar1 = getHeight(hiGear);
    LINE22      pCVar2 = (LPCHAR)(*(code *)lpHigear->lpfnDIBGet)(lpHigear->IGDIBRunEnds,at_pixpos,uVar1);
    LINE23      if (pCVar2 == (LPCHAR)0x0) {
    LINE24        AVar3 = getHeight(hiGear);
    LINE25        AF_err_record_set("..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Io\\dfltldcb.c",0x20d,-0x841,0,(AT_INT)at_pixpos,
    LINE26                          AVar3,pCVar2);
    LINE27        BVar4 = AF_error_check();
    LINE28        return BVar4;
    LINE29      }
    LINE30    }
    LINE31    bit_depth_sums = getWidth(hiGear);
    LINE32    bits_per_channel = get_ptr_bits_per_channel_table(hiGear);
    LINE33    sample_per_pixel = get_sample_per_pixel_table(hiGear);
    LINE34    max_loop = size_raster_buffer / ((int)((bits_per_channel >> 0x1f & 7U) + bits_per_channel) >> 3);
    LINE35    if (bit_depth_sums < max_loop) {
    LINE36      max_loop = bit_depth_sums;
    LINE37    }
    LINE38    at_pixpos = GPb_image_row_pointer_get(hiGear,(AT_PIXPOS)at_pixpos);
    LINE39    if (bits_per_channel == 8) {
    [...]
    LINE57      }
    LINE58      else {
    LINE59        oobw = at_pixpos + loop_sample_per_pixel;
    LINE60        loop_cnt = 0;
    LINE61        if (0 < max_loop) {
    LINE62          do {
    LINE63            *oobw = raster_buffer[loop_cnt];
    LINE64            oobw = oobw + sample_per_pixel;
    LINE65            loop_cnt = loop_cnt + 1;
    LINE66          } while (loop_cnt < max_loop);
    LINE67        }
    LINE68      }
    LINE69    }
    [..]
    LINE105 }
    

This is a do-while loop with a bound size controlled by the variable max_loop LINE66. The max_loop is computed at LINE34 and derived from two variables: size_raster_buffer and bits_per_channel. In our case bits_per_channel equals ‘8’, forcing max_loop to be controlled directly by size_raster_buffer

size_raster_buffer passed in argument to tiff_planar_adobe is computed earlier in function DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_get with following pseudo code :

    LINE106 uint DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_get(HIGDIBINFO hdib)
    LINE107 
    LINE108 {
    LINE109   void *local_10;
    LINE110   undefined *puStack_c;
    LINE111   undefined4 local_8;
    LINE112   
    LINE113   puStack_c = &LAB_10261950;
    LINE114   local_10 = ExceptionList;
    LINE115   ExceptionList = &local_10;
    LINE116   local_8 = 0;
    LINE117   if (hdib->nUnits != 1) {
    LINE118     wrapper_thow_exception
    LINE119               ((undefined *)0xfffffe6f,(char *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,(undefined *)0x0,
    LINE120                (undefined **)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Core\\c_DIB.cpp",(undefined *)0x23b);
    LINE121   }
    LINE122   ExceptionList = local_10;
    LINE123   return hdib->size_X + 0x1f >> 3 & 0xfffffffc;
    LINE124 }
    

At LINE123 we can see size_raster_buffer is derived from hdib->size_X, which corresponds to the value read from the file in TIFF tag ImageWidth.

The presence of some other tags like Planar and Compression is a prerequisite to trigger this issue.  
As the loop is arbitrarily controlled and has no bounds checks, the command at LINE63 would write out-of-bounds on the stack, leading to memory corruption.

**Crash Information**

    0:000> !analyze -v
    *******************************************************************************
    *                                                                             *
    *                        Exception Analysis                                   *
    *                                                                             *
    *******************************************************************************
    
    
    KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
    
        Key  : AV.Fault
        Value: Write
    
        Key  : Analysis.CPU.Sec
        Value: 2
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugAnalysisProvider.CPP
        Value: Create: 8007007e on DESKTOP-I6GKV78
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugData
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Analysis.DebugModel
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Analysis.Elapsed.Sec
        Value: 16
    
        Key  : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
        Value: 93
    
        Key  : Analysis.System
        Value: CreateObject
    
        Key  : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
        Value: 1946223
    
        Key  : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
        Value: 765
    
    
    NTGLOBALFLAG:  2100000
    
    PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0
    
    PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS:  0
    
    APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
    
    EXCEPTION_RECORD:  (.exr -1)
    ExceptionAddress: 6e86d4a3 (igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00011383)
       ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
      ExceptionFlags: 00000000
    NumberParameters: 2
       Parameter[0]: 00000001
       Parameter[1]: 0b087000
    Attempt to write to address 0b087000
    
    FAULTING_THREAD:  00001a58
    
    PROCESS_NAME:  Fuzzme.exe
    
    WRITE_ADDRESS:  0b087000 
    
    ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
    
    EXCEPTION_CODE_STR:  c0000005
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1:  00000001
    
    EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2:  0b087000
    
    STACK_TEXT:  
    WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
    0019da38 6e84a238 00000001 0b9d0fb8 0b086ff0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x11383
    0019da54 6e96b904 0019fc3c 0b9d0fb8 00000000 igCore20d!IG_cpm_profiles_reset+0xef48
    0019f678 6e96fdb4 0019fc3c 10000021 0019f6d0 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10f7e4
    0019f6a0 6e969b9b 0019fc3c 10000021 09046d68 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x113c94
    0019fbb4 6e8315b9 0019fc3c 09046d68 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x10da7b
    0019fbec 6e8708bc 00000000 09046d68 0019fc3c igCore20d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
    0019fe68 6e870239 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x1479c
    0019fe88 6e805bc7 00000000 05281fe0 00000001 igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14119
    0019fea8 00402399 05281fe0 0019febc 75befb60 igCore20d!IG_load_file+0x47
    0019fec0 004026c0 05281fe0 0019fef8 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
    0019ff28 00408407 00000005 051d6f98 051ddf40 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x340
    0019ff70 75bf0099 0023a000 75bf0080 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x6087
    0019ff80 77367b6e 0023a000 6666f0ed 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
    0019ffdc 77367b3e ffffffff 77388ca1 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
    0019ffec 00000000 0040848f 0023a000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
    
    
    STACK_COMMAND:  ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
    
    SYMBOL_NAME:  igCore20d!IG_mpi_page_set+11383
    
    MODULE_NAME: igCore20d
    
    IMAGE_NAME:  igCore20d.dll
    
    FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_AVRF_c0000005_igCore20d.dll!IG_mpi_page_set
    
    OS_VERSION:  10.0.19041.1
    
    BUILDLAB_STR:  vb_release
    
    OSPLATFORM_TYPE:  x86
    
    OSNAME:  Windows 10
    
    FAILURE_ID_HASH:  {fe8f80f8-683f-d41f-7c33-712a409d5fb5}
    
    Followup:     MachineOwner
    ---------
    

**VENDOR RESPONSE**

Release notes from the vendor can be found here:

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Windows/DLL/webframe.html#release-notes.html

https://help.accusoft.com/ImageGear/v20.3/Linux/webframe.html#release-notes.html

**TIMELINE**

2023-05-24 - Vendor Disclosure  
2023-09-20 - Vendor Patch Release  
2023-09-25 - Public Release

Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.

Tag

#cisco