Tag
#js
Payload uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for authentication. After log out JWT is not invalidated, which allows an attacker who has stolen or intercepted token to freely reuse it until expiration date (which is by default set to 2 hours, but can be changed). This issue has been fixed in version 3.44.0 of Payload.
A malicious user may submit a specially-crafted complex payload that otherwise meets the default request size limit which results in excessive memory and CPU consumption of Vault. This may lead to a timeout in Vault’s auditing subroutine, potentially resulting in the Vault server to become unresponsive. This vulnerability, CVE-2025-6203, is fixed in Vault Community Edition 1.20.3 and Vault Enterprise 1.20.3, 1.19.9, 1.18.14, and 1.16.25.
### Impact When visiting a specific URL, an anonymous user could cause the NodeJS server part of Volto to quit with an error. ### Patches The problem has been patched and the patch has been backported to Volto major versions down until 16. It is advised to upgrade to the latest patch release of your respective current major version: - Volto 16: [16.34.0](https://github.com/plone/volto/releases/tag/16.34.0) - Volto 17: [17.22.1](https://github.com/plone/volto/releases/tag/17.22.1) - Volto 18: [18.24.0](https://github.com/plone/volto/releases/tag/18.24.0) - Volto 19: [19.0.0-alpha4](https://github.com/plone/volto/releases/tag/19.0.0-alpha.4) ### Workarounds Make sure your setup automatically restarts processes that quit with an error. This won't prevent a crash, but it minimises downtime. ### Report The problem was discovered by FHNW, a client of Plone provider kitconcept, who shared it with the Plone Zope Security Team (security@plone.org).
Cybersecurity firm Netcraft has discovered a new task scam cluster that has stolen over $1 million in crypto.…
## Summary Malicious versions of the [`nx` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/nx), as well as some supporting plugin packages, were published to npm, containing code that scans the file system, collects credentials, and posts them to GitHub as a repo under user's accounts. ## Affected Versions of `nx` - 21.5.0 - Published at 6:32 PM - 20.9.0 - 20.10.0 - 21.6.0 - 20.11.0 - 21.7.0 - 21.8.0 - 20.12.0 - Published at 8:37 PM These versions have since been removed from NPM as of 10:44 PM EDT ## Affected Versions of `@nx/devkit`, `@nx/js`, `@nx/workspace`, `@nx/node` - 21.5.0 - Published at 6:32 PM - 20.9.0 - Published at 8:42 PM ## Affected Versions of `@nx/eslint` - 21.5.0 - Published at 6:32 PM These versions have since been removed from NPM as of 10:44 PM EDT ## Affected Versions of `@nx/key` and `@nx/enterprise-cloud` - 3.2.0 only - Published at 6:32 PM These versions have since been removed from NPM as of 6:20 AM EDT ## Attack Vector At this time, we bel...
## 1. `devalue.parse` allows `__proto__` to be set A string passed to `devalue.parse` could represent an object with a `__proto__` property, which would assign a prototype to an object while allowing properties to be overwritten: ```js class Vector { constructor(x, y) { this.x = x; this.y = y; } get magnitude() { return (this.x ** 2 + this.y ** 2) ** 0.5; } } const payload = `[{"x":1,"y":2,"magnitude":3,"__proto__":4},3,4,"nope",["Vector",5],[6,7],8,9]`; const vector = devalue.parse(payload, { Vector: ([x, y]) => new Vector(x, y) }); console.log("Is vector", vector instanceof Vector); // true console.log(vector.x) // 3 console.log(vector.y) // 4 console.log(vector.magnitude); // "nope" instead of 5 ``` ## 2. `devalue.parse` allows array prototype methods to be assigned to object In a payload constructed with `devalue.stringify`, values are represented as array indices, where the array contains the 'hydrated' values: ```js devalue.stringify({ message: 'hel...
### Summary Using idlelib.debugobj.ObjectTreeItem.SetText, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.debugobj.ObjectTreeItem.SetText function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilDebugobjSetText: def __reduce__(self): from idlelib.debugobj import ObjectTreeItem # ObjectTreeItem(..., setfunction=print).SetText(cmd) return ObjectTreeItem("label", None, print).SetText, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')",) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the im...
### Impact User control of the first argument of the addImage method results in CPU utilization and denial of service. If given the possibility to pass unsanitized image data or URLs to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful PNG file that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service. Other affected methods are: `html`. Example payload: ```js import { jsPDF } from "jpsdf" const payload = new Uint8Array([117, 171, 90, 253, 166, 154, 105, 166, 154]) const doc = new jsPDF(); const startTime = performance.now(); try { doc.addImage(payload, "PNG", 10, 40, 180, 180, undefined, "SLOW"); } finally { const endTime = performance.now(); console.log(`Call to doc.addImage took ${endTime - startTime} milliseconds`); } ``` ### Patches The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.2. Upgrade to jspdf@>=3.0.2. In jspdf@>=3.0.2, invalid PNG files throw an Error instead of causing very long running loops. ### Workarounds Sanitize image data or URLs before passing it to the a...
A denial of service vulnerability exists in the JSONReader component of the run-llama/llama_index repository, specifically in version v0.12.37. The vulnerability is caused by uncontrolled recursion when parsing deeply nested JSON files, which can lead to Python hitting its maximum recursion depth limit. This results in high resource consumption and potential crashes of the Python process. The issue is resolved in version 0.12.38.
At Microsoft, securing the ecosystem means more than just fixing bugs—it means proactively hunting for variant classes, identifying systemic weaknesses, and working across teams to protect customers before attackers ever get the chance. This blog highlights one such effort: a deep dive into the risks of misconfigured postMessage handlers across Microsoft services and how MSRC worked with engineering teams to mitigate them.