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It might surprise some that a security company would choose WordPress as the backbone of its digital content operations. Here's what we considered when choosing it.

### Impact The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`). The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via `DOCUMENT` or `PlatformLocation` tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent **relative HTTP requests** made during the SSR process (e.g., using `HttpClient.get('a...

## Executive Summary **Product:** LibreNMS **Vendor:** LibreNMS **Vulnerability Type:** Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) **CVSS Score:** 4.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) **Affected Version:** 25.8.0 (latest at time of discovery) **POC File:** [Download POC](https://trendmicro-my.sharepoint.com/:u:/p/kholoud_altookhy/EQYQOiGddUtOtz6739YUFU4B5FkNob_TvKBYEA8P6lSRQw?e=lDOR5W) **Ticket:** ZDI-CAN-28105: LibreNMS Alert Rules Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability ## Vulnerability Details ### Description Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative has identified a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in LibreNMS. The vulnerability exists in the Alert Rules functionality where the alert rule name is not properly sanitized, allowing injection of HTML code. ### Technical Details **Version Tested:** 25.8.0 **Installer File:** 25.8.0.tar.gz **Download Link:** https://github.com/librenms/librenms/archive/refs/tags/25.8.0.tar.gz **Platform:** N/A ### Attack Vector When browsing to **Alerts ...

## Summary Strapi's password hashing implementation using bcryptjs lacks maximum password length validation. Since bcryptjs truncates passwords exceeding 72 bytes, this creates potential vulnerabilities such as authentication bypass and performance degradation. ## POC Create an admin user with a password exceeding 72 characters like 85, Log in using only the first 72 characters of the password. Authentication is successful, confirming the issue. Proposed Solution Based on discussions: Add a maximum password length validation (72 characters) during password creation and updates for both Admin and U&P users. Truncate passwords exceeding 72 bytes on the server before passing them to bcryptjs during login. Optionally, issue a warning to users with passwords longer than 72 bytes during login, informing them of truncation. ## Impact This issue affects all Strapi installations using bcryptjs for password hashing. Until resolved, it can lead to: Authentication Bypass: Users may unknowing...

Input passed to the GET parameter 'error' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

Strapi uses JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for authentication. After logout or account deactivation, the JWT is not invalidated, which allows an attacker who has stolen or intercepted the token to freely reuse it until its expiration date (which is set to 30 days by default, but can be changed). The existence of /admin/renew-token endpoint allows anyone to renew near-expiration tokens indefinitely, further increasing the impact of this attack. This issue has been fixed in version 5.24.1.

Cisco Talos has uncovered a new attack linked to Famous Chollima, a threat group aligned with North Korea (DPRK).

### Summary The mitigation proposed in GHSA-37j7-fg3j-429f for disabling eval/Function when executing untrusted code in happy-dom does not suffice, since it still allows prototype pollution payloads. ### Details The untrusted script and the rest of the application still run in the same Isolate/process, so attackers can deploy prototype pollution payloads to hijack important references like "process" in the example below, or to hijack control flow via flipping checks of undefined property. There might be other payloads that allow the manipulation of require, e.g., via (univeral) gadgets (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-shcherbakov.pdf). ### PoC Attackers can pollute builtins like Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty() to obtain important references at runtime, e.g., "process". In this way, attackers might be able to execute arbitrary commands like in the example below via spawn(). ```js import { Browser } from "happy-dom"; const browser = new Browser({settings: {enab...

### Summary `sveltekit-superforms` v2.27.3 and prior are susceptible to a prototype pollution vulnerability within the `parseFormData` function of `formData.js`. An attacker can inject string and array properties into `Object.prototype`, leading to denial of service, type confusion, and potential remote code execution in downstream applications that rely on polluted objects. ### Details Superforms is a SvelteKit form library for server and client form validation. Under normal operation, form validation is performed by calling the the `superValidate` function, with the submitted form data and a form schema as arguments: ```js // https://superforms.rocks/get-started#posting-data const form = await superValidate(request, your_adapter(schema)); ``` Within the `superValidate` function, a call is made to `parseRequest` in order to parse the user's input. `parseRequest` then calls into `parseFormData`, which in turn looks for the presence of `__superform_json` in the form parameters. If `_...

### Summary An HTML injection vulnerability in plaintext emails generated by Mailgen has been discovered. Projecta are affected if the `Mailgen.generatePlaintext(email)` method is used and passed in user-generated content. The issue was discovered and reported by Edoardo Ottavianelli (@edoardottt). ### Details The following function (inside index.js) is intended to strip all HTML content to produce a plaintext string. ```javascript // Plaintext text e-mail generator Mailgen.prototype.generatePlaintext = function (params) { // Plaintext theme not cached? if (!this.cachedPlaintextTheme) { throw new Error('An error was encountered while loading the plaintext theme.'); } // Parse email params and get back an object with data to inject var ejsParams = this.parseParams(params); // Render the plaintext theme with ejs, injecting the data accordingly var output = ejs.render(this.cachedPlaintextTheme, ejsParams); // Definition of the <br /> tag ...