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# Description There is a flaw in the hidden file protection feature of Vert.x Web’s `StaticHandler` when `setIncludeHidden(false)` is configured. In the current implementation, only files whose final path segment (i.e., the file name) begins with a dot (`.`) are treated as “hidden” and are blocked from being served. However, this logic fails in the following cases: - **Files under hidden directories**: For example, `/.secret/config.txt` — although `.secret` is a hidden directory, the file `config.txt` itself does not start with a dot, so it gets served. - **Real-world impact**: Sensitive files placed in hidden directories like `.git`, `.env`, `.aws` may become publicly accessible. As a result, the behavior does not meet the expectations set by the `includeHidden=false` configuration, which should ideally protect all hidden files and directories. This gap may lead to unintended exposure of sensitive information. # Steps to Reproduce ```bash 1. Prepare test environment # Create di...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a coordinated spear-phishing campaign dubbed PhantomCaptcha targeting organizations associated with Ukraine's war relief efforts to deliver a remote access trojan that uses a WebSocket for command-and-control (C2). The activity, which took place on October 8, 2025, targeted individual members of the International Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee

### Improper Authorization in Hono (JWT Audience Validation) Hono’s JWT authentication middleware did not validate the `aud` (Audience) claim by default. As a result, applications using the middleware without an explicit audience check could accept tokens intended for other audiences, leading to potential cross-service access (token mix-up). The issue is addressed by adding a new `verification.aud` configuration option to allow RFC 7519–compliant audience validation. This change is classified as a **security hardening improvement**, but the lack of validation can still be considered a vulnerability in deployments that rely on default JWT verification. ### Recommended secure configuration You can enable RFC 7519–compliant audience validation using the new `verification.aud` option: ```ts import { Hono } from 'hono' import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt' const app = new Hono() app.use( '/api/*', jwt({ secret: 'my-secret', verification: { // Require this API to only accep...

### Summary: A bypass was discovered in the `Koa.js` framework affecting its back redirect functionality. In certain circumstances, an attacker can manipulate the Referer header to force a user’s browser to navigate to an external, potentially malicious website. This occurs because the implementation incorrectly treats some specially crafted URLs as safe relative paths. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow attackers to perform phishing, social engineering, or other redirect-based attacks on users of affected applications. This vulnerability affects the code referenced in GitHub Advisory GHSA-jgmv-j7ww-jx2x (which is tracked as CVE‑2025‑54420). ### Details: The patched code attempts to treat values that `startWith('/')` as safe relative paths and only perform origin checks for absolute URLs. However, protocol‑relative URLs (those beginning with //host) also start with '/' and therefore match the startsWith('/') branch. A protocol‑relative referrer such as `//evil.com` with trai...

### Summary In some Notification types (e.g., Webhook, Telegram), the `send()` function allows user-controlled renderTemplate input. This leads to a Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability that can be exploited to read arbitrary files from the server. ### Details The root cause is how Uptime Kuma renders user-controlled templates via `renderTemplate()`. The function instantiates a Liquid template engine and parses the `template` argument without sanitization: ```js async renderTemplate(template, msg, monitorJSON, heartbeatJSON) { const engine = new Liquid(); const parsedTpl = engine.parse(template); // ... } ``` In some Notification flows, the `send()` implementation passes user-editable fields directly into `renderTemplate()`: ```js // webhook.js if (notification.webhookContentType === "form-data") { const formData = new FormData(); formData.append("data", JSON.stringify(data)); config.headers = formData.getHeaders(); data = formData; } ...

### Summary Files denied by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny) were sent if the URL ended with `\` when the dev server is running on Windows. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - running the dev server on Windows ### Details `server.fs.deny` can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.{crt,pem}` as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(`\`). The root cause is that `fs.readFile('/foo.png/')` loads `/foo.png`. ### PoC ```shell npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ cat "secret" > .env npm install npm run dev curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173 ``` <img width="1593" height="616" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/36212f4e-1d3...

### Summary The GoCardless components in Actualbudget in are logging responses to STDOUT in a parsed format using `console.log`and `console.debug` (Which in this version of node is an alias for `console.log`). This is exposing sensitive information in log files including, but not limited to: - Gocardless bearer tokens. - Account IBAN and Bank Account numbers. - PII of the account holder. - Transaction details (Payee bank information, Recipient account numbers, Transaction IDs)... ### Details Whenever GoCardless responds to a request, the payload is printed to the debug log: https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/blob/36c40d90d2fe09eb1f25a6e2f77f6dd40638b267/packages/sync-server/src/app-gocardless/banks/integration-bank.js#L25-L27 This in turn logs the following information to Docker (all values removed here. These fields are possibly dependent on what is returned by each institution so may differ): ```json { "account": { "resourceId": "", "iban": "", "bban": "", ...

### Impact Prototype pollution potential with the utility function `rollbar/src/utility`.`set()`. No impact when using the published public interface. If application code directly imports `set` from `rollbar/src/utility` and then calls `set` with untrusted input in the second argument, it is vulnerable to prototype pollution. POC: ```js const obj = {}; require("rollbar/src/utility").set(obj, "__proto__.polluted", "vulnerable"); console.log({}.polluted !== undefined ? '[POLLUTION_TRIGGERED]':''); ``` ### Patches Fixed in version 2.26.5 and 3.0.0-beta5. ### Workarounds If application code directly imports `set` from `rollbar/src/utility`, ensure that the second argument does not receive untrusted input. ### References https://github.com/rollbar/rollbar.js/issues/1333#issuecomment-3353720946

### Summary The JS implementation for copying button labels to the sticky header in the Citizen skin unescapes HTML characters, allowing for stored XSS through system messages. ### Details In the `copyButtonAttributes` function in `stickyHeader.js`, when copying the button labels, the `innerHTML` of the new element is set to the `textContent` of the old element: https://github.com/StarCitizenTools/mediawiki-skins-Citizen/blob/f4cbcecf5aca0ae69966b23d4983f9cb5033f319/resources/skins.citizen.scripts/stickyHeader.js#L29-L41 This unescapes any escaped HTML characters and causes the contents of the system messages to be interpreted as HTML. ### PoC 1. Edit any of the affected messages (`citizen-share`, `citizen-view-history`, `citizen-view-edit`, `nstab-talk`) to the following payload: `<img src="" onerror="alert('Sticky Header Button XSS')">`. 2. Visit any mainpage article in the wiki using the Citizen skin. <img width="495" height="228" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachme...

### Description In the FlightServer class of the pyquokka framework, the do_action() method directly uses pickle.loads() to deserialize action bodies received from Flight clients without any sanitization or validation, which results in a remote code execution vulnerability. The vulnerable code is located in pyquokka/flight.py at line 283, where arbitrary data from Flight clients is directly passed to pickle.loads(). Even more concerning, when FlightServer is configured to listen on 0.0.0.0 (as shown in the provided server example at line 339), this allows attackers across the entire network to perform arbitrary remote code execution by sending malicious pickled payloads through the set_configs action. In addition, the functions cache_garbage_collect, do_put, and do_get also contain vulnerability points where pickle.loads is used to deserialize untrusted remote data. Please review and fix these issues accordingly. This report uses the set_configs action as an example. ### Proof of ...