#php

We discovered several methods used to generate random numbers in ZF1 that potentially used insufficient entropy. These random number generators are used in the following method calls: ``` Zend_Ldap_Attribute::createPassword Zend_Form_Element_Hash::_generateHash Zend_Gdata_HttpClient::filterHttpRequest Zend_Filter_Encrypt_Mcrypt::_srand Zend_OpenId::randomBytes ``` In each case, the methods were using rand() or mt_rand(), neither of which can generate cryptographically secure values. This could potentially lead to information disclosure should an attacker be able to brute force the random number generation. Moreover, we discovered a potential security issue in the usage of the [openssl_random_pseudo_bytes()](http://php.net/manual/en/function.openssl-random-pseudo-bytes.php) function in Zend_Crypt_Math::randBytes, reported in PHP BUG [#70014](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=70014), and the security implications reported in a discussion [on the random_compat library.](https://github.com/...

In Zend Framework, `Zend_Captcha_Word` (v1) and `Zend\Captcha\Word` (v2) generate a "word" for a CAPTCHA challenge by selecting a sequence of random letters from a character set. Prior to this advisory, the selection was performed using PHP's internal `array_rand()` function. This function does not generate sufficient entropy due to its usage of rand() instead of more cryptographically secure methods such as `openssl_pseudo_random_bytes()`. This could potentially lead to information disclosure should an attacker be able to brute force the random number generation.

The implementation of the ORDER BY SQL statement in Zend_Db_Select of Zend Framework 1 contains a potential SQL injection when the query string passed contains parentheses. For instance, the following code is affected by this issue: ``` $db = Zend_Db::factory( /* options here */ ); $select = $db->select() ->from(array('p' => 'products')) ->order('MD5(1); drop table products'); echo $select; ``` This code produce the string: ``` SELECT "p".* FROM "products" AS "p" ORDER BY MD5(1);drop table products ASC ``` instead of the correct one: ``` SELECT "p".* FROM "products" AS "p" ORDER BY "MD5(1);drop table products" ASC ``` The SQL injection occurs because we create a new Zend_Db_Expr() object, in presence of parentheses, passing directly the value without any filter on the string.

Using the Consumer component of ZendOpenId (or Zend_OpenId in ZF1), it is possible to login using an arbitrary OpenID account (without knowing any secret information) by using a malicious OpenID Provider. That means OpenID it is possible to login using arbitrary OpenID Identity (MyOpenID, Google, etc), which are not under the control of our own OpenID Provider. Thus, we are able to impersonate any OpenID Identity against the framework. Moreover, the Consumer accepts OpenID tokens with arbitrary signed elements. The framework does not check if, for example, both openid.claimed_id and openid.endpoint_url are signed. It is just sufficient to sign one parameter. According to https://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#positive_assertions, at least op_endpoint, return_to, response_nonce, assoc_handle, and, if present in the response, claimed_id and identity, must be signed.

A regex expression in ua-parser/uap-php could lead to a ReDoS vulnerability in versions prior to 3.8.0.

The package zendframework/zend-developer-tools provides a web-based toolbar for introspecting an application. When updating the package to support PHP 7.3, a change was made that could potentially prevent toolbar entries that are enabled by default from being disabled.

zend-diactoros (and, by extension, Expressive), zend-http (and, by extension, Zend Framework MVC projects), and zend-feed (specifically, its PubSubHubbub sub-component) each contain a potential URL rewrite exploit. In each case, marshaling a request URI includes logic that introspects HTTP request headers that are specific to a given server-side URL rewrite mechanism. When these headers are present on systems not running the specific URL rewriting mechanism, the logic would still trigger, allowing a malicious client or proxy to emulate the headers to request arbitrary content.

zend-diactoros (and, by extension, Expressive), zend-http (and, by extension, Zend Framework MVC projects), and zend-feed (specifically, its PubSubHubbub sub-component) each contain a potential URL rewrite exploit. In each case, marshaling a request URI includes logic that introspects HTTP request headers that are specific to a given server-side URL rewrite mechanism. When these headers are present on systems not running the specific URL rewriting mechanism, the logic would still trigger, allowing a malicious client or proxy to emulate the headers to request arbitrary content.

zend-diactoros (and, by extension, Expressive), zend-http (and, by extension, Zend Framework MVC projects), and zend-feed (specifically, its PubSubHubbub sub-component) each contain a potential URL rewrite exploit. In each case, marshaling a request URI includes logic that introspects HTTP request headers that are specific to a given server-side URL rewrite mechanism. When these headers are present on systems not running the specific URL rewriting mechanism, the logic would still trigger, allowing a malicious client or proxy to emulate the headers to request arbitrary content.

In mid-March, 2010, the Dojo Foundation issued a Security Advisory indicating potential security issues with specific files in Dojo Toolkit. Details of the advisory may be found on the Dojo website: http://dojotoolkit.org/blog/post/dylan/2010/03/dojo-security-advisory/ In particular, several files in the Dojo tree were identified as having potential exploits, and the Dojo team also advised disabling or removing any PHP scripts in the tree when deploying to production.