#nginx

### Impact The Apollo Router is a configurable, high-performance graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph that uses Apollo Federation. Affected versions are subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability. When receiving compressed HTTP payloads, affected versions of the Router evaluate the `limits.http_max_request_bytes` configuration option after the entirety of the compressed payload is decompressed. If affected versions of the Router receive highly compressed payloads, this could result in significant memory consumption while the compressed payload is expanded. ### Patches Router version 1.40.2 has a fix for the vulnerability. ### Workarounds If you are unable to upgrade, you may be able to implement mitigations at proxies or load balancers positioned in front of your Router fleet (e.g. Nginx, HAProxy, or cloud-native WAF services) by creating limits on HTTP body upload size.

Services that are running and bound to the loopback interface on the Artica Proxy version 4.50 are accessible through the proxy service. In particular, the tailon service is running as the root user, is bound to the loopback interface, and is listening on TCP port 7050. Using the tailon service, the contents of any file on the Artica Proxy can be viewed.

The Minnesota-based Internet provider U.S. Internet Corp. has a business unit called Securence, which specializes in providing filtered, secure email services to businesses, educational institutions and government agencies worldwide. But until it was notified last week, U.S. Internet was publishing more than a decade's worth of its internal email -- and that of thousands of Securence clients -- in plain text out on the Internet and just a click away for anyone with a Web browser.

P11-kit is an integral component to enable Hardware Security Module (HSM) and related technologies around PKCS#11. Over the years, its focus had mostly been on the library, with the bundled command-line tools not receiving much attention. When the user wanted to perform operations on the HSM or smartcard, they typically had to use tools from other packages. The most popular ones include p11tool from GnuTLS, modutil from NSS, and pkcs11-tool from OpenSC.With p11-kit 0.25.1 release, the p11-kit command-line tool bundled with p11-kit has been extended with a handful of utilities, to make it possi

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-0733-03 - An update is now available for Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4. Issues addressed include an information leakage vulnerability.

Today we are releasing Grafana 8.3.5 and 7.5.15. This patch release includes MEDIUM severity security fix for Cross Site Request Forgery for Grafana. Release v.8.3.5, only containing security fixes: - [Download Grafana 8.3.5](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/8.3.5) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-8-3-5/) Release v.7.5.15, only containing security fixes: - [Download Grafana 7.5.15](https://grafana.com/grafana/download/7.5.15) - [Release notes](https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/release-notes/release-notes-7-5-15/) ## CSRF ([CVE-2022-21703](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21703)) ### Summary On Jan. 18, security researchers [jub0bs](https://twitter.com/jub0bs) and [abrahack](https://twitter.com/theabrahack) contacted Grafana to disclose a CSRF vulnerability which allows anonymous attackers to elevate their privileges by mounting cross-origin attacks against authenticated high-privilege Grafana us...

### Summary Improperly configuring static resource resolution in aiohttp when used as a web server can result in the unauthorized reading of arbitrary files on the system. ### Details When using aiohttp as a web server and configuring static routes, it is necessary to specify the root path for static files. Additionally, the option 'follow_symlinks' can be used to determine whether to follow symbolic links outside the static root directory. When 'follow_symlinks' is set to True, there is no validation to check if a given file path is within the root directory.This can lead to directory traversal vulnerabilities, resulting in unauthorized access to arbitrary files on the system, even when symlinks are not present. i.e. An application is only vulnerable with setup code like: ``` app.router.add_routes([ web.static("/static", "static/", follow_symlinks=True), # Remove follow_symlinks to avoid the vulnerability ]) ``` ### Impact This is a directory traversal vulnerability with CWE I...

### Summary Fix bypass to the following bugs - https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-pxmr-q2x3-9x9m - https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-8r25-68wm-jw35 Allowing to inject directly in the `app.ini` via CRLF to change the value of `test_config_cmd` and `start_cmd` resulting in an Authenticated RCE ### Impact Authenticated Remote execution on the host

### Summary The Import Certificate feature allows arbitrary write into the system. The feature does not check if the provided user input is a certification/key and allows to write into arbitrary paths in the system. https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/api/certificate/certificate.go#L72 ``` func AddCert(c *gin.Context) { var json struct { Name string `json:"name"` SSLCertificatePath string `json:"ssl_certificate_path" binding:"required"` SSLCertificateKeyPath string `json:"ssl_certificate_key_path" binding:"required"` SSLCertificate string `json:"ssl_certificate"` SSLCertificateKey string `json:"ssl_certificate_key"` ChallengeMethod string `json:"challenge_method"` DnsCredentialID int `json:"dns_credential_id"` } if !api.BindAndValid(c, &json) { return } certModel := &model.Cert{ Name: json.Name, SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath, SSLCer...

### Summary Users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports. ### Details Creating a private message report by POSTing to `/api/v3/private_message/report` does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message. At least lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only. The API response when creating a report contains the `private_message_report_view` with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported: <details> <summary>Example response</summary> ...