#samba

An information leak flaw was found in the way SMB1 protocol was implemented by Samba. A malicious client could use this flaw to dump server memory contents to a file on the samba share or to a shared printer, though the exact area of server memory cannot be controlled by the attacker.

All versions of Samba from 4.0.0 onwards are vulnerable to a denial of service attack when the RPC spoolss service is configured to be run as an external daemon. Missing input sanitization checks on some of the input parameters to spoolss RPC calls could cause the print spooler service to crash.

Samba before versions 4.6.1, 4.5.7 and 4.4.11 are vulnerable to a malicious client using a symlink race to allow access to areas of the server file system not exported under the share definition.

The __oom_reap_task_mm function in mm/oom_kill.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.4 mishandles gather operations, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service (TLB entry leak or use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a copy_to_user call within a certain time window.

drivers/input/serio/i8042.c in the Linux kernel before 4.12.4 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact because the port->exists value can change after it is validated.

The HMAC implementation (crypto/hmac.c) in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 does not validate that the underlying cryptographic hash algorithm is unkeyed, allowing a local attacker able to use the AF_ALG-based hash interface (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) and the SHA-3 hash algorithm (CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) to cause a kernel stack buffer overflow by executing a crafted sequence of system calls that encounter a missing SHA-3 initialization.

Use-after-free vulnerability in Samba 4.x before 4.7.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted SMB1 request.

September is here! The dash from the close of the call for papers to now has been amazing. We had nearly two hundred submissions spanning the gamut of security topics and presenters. The result is a solid schedule that will challenge and educate all attendees. On behalf of the content advisory board, I want to thank everyone who submitted a paper for consideration.

Introduction Introduction We are continuing our series of blog posts dissecting the exploits released by ShadowBrokers in April 2017. After the first two posts about the SMB exploits known as EternalChampion and EternalSynergy, we’ll move this time to analyze a different tool and we’ll focus on the exploit named EnglishmansDentist designed to target Exchange Server 2003.

Introduction Introduction We are continuing our series of blog posts dissecting the exploits released by ShadowBrokers in April 2017. After the first two posts about the SMB exploits known as EternalChampion and EternalSynergy, we’ll move this time to analyze a different tool and we’ll focus on the exploit named EnglishmansDentist designed to target Exchange Server 2003.