#ssrf

gateway_proxy_handler in MLflow before 3.1.0 lacks gateway_path validation.

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ In certain places, powsybl-core XML parsing is vulnerable to an XXE attack and in on place also to an SSRF attack. This allows an attacker to elevate their privileges to read files that they do not have permissions to, including sensitive files on the system. The vulnerable class is `com.powsybl.commons.xml.XmlReader` which is considered to be untrusted in use cases where untrusted users can submit their XML to the vulnerable methods. This can be a multi-tenant application that hosts many different users perhaps with different privilege levels. #### Am I impacted? You are vulnerable if you allow untrusted users to import untrusted CGMES or XIIDM network files. ### Patches com.powsybl:powsybl-commons:6.7.2 and higher ### References [powsybl-core v6.7.2](https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/releases/tag/v6.7.2)

urllib3 [supports](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.4.0/reference/contrib/emscripten.html) being used in a Pyodide runtime utilizing the [JavaScript Fetch API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Fetch_API) or falling back on [XMLHttpRequest](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/XMLHttpRequest). This means you can use Python libraries to make HTTP requests from your browser or Node.js. Additionally, urllib3 provides [a mechanism](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.4.0/user-guide.html#retrying-requests) to control redirects. However, the `retries` and `redirect` parameters are ignored with Pyodide; the runtime itself determines redirect behavior. ## Affected usages Any code which relies on urllib3 to control the number of redirects for an HTTP request in a Pyodide runtime. ## Impact Redirects are often used to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects may remain vul...

urllib3 handles redirects and retries using the same mechanism, which is controlled by the `Retry` object. The most common way to disable redirects is at the request level, as follows: ```python resp = urllib3.request("GET", "https://httpbin.org/redirect/1", redirect=False) print(resp.status) # 302 ``` However, it is also possible to disable redirects, for all requests, by instantiating a `PoolManager` and specifying `retries` in a way that disable redirects: ```python import urllib3 http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=0) # should raise MaxRetryError on redirect http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=urllib3.Retry(redirect=0)) # equivalent to the above http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=False) # should return the first response resp = http.request("GET", "https://httpbin.org/redirect/1") ``` However, the `retries` parameter is currently ignored, which means all the above examples don't disable redirects. ## Affected usages Passing `retries` on `PoolManager` instantiation to disab...

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package. The vulnerability stems from an unimplemented feature in the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next, which allowed unauthenticated users to proxy arbitrary remote content via the `/_next/image` endpoint. This issue allowed attackers to load remote resources from arbitrary hosts under the victim site’s domain for any site deployed using the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. For example: `https://victim-site.com/_next/image?url=https://attacker.com`. In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site’s domain (`victim-site.com`), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services. ### Impact - SSRF via unrestricted remote URL loading - Arbitrary remote content loading - Potential internal service exposure or phishing risks through domain abuse ### Mitigation The following mitigations have been put in...

### Summary Missing checks allow for SSRF to specific targets using the TestWfsPost enpoint. ### Mitigation To manage the proxy base value as a system administrator, use the parameter ``PROXY_BASE_URL`` to provide a non-empty value that cannot be overridden by the user interface or incoming request.[thomsmith](https://github.com/thomsmith). ### Resolution The TestWfsPost has been replaced in GeoServer 2.25.2 and GeoServer 2.24.4 with a JavaScript [Demo Requests](https://docs.geoserver.org/latest/en/user/configuration/demos/index.html#demo-requests) page to test OGC Web Services. ### References * [CVE-2024-29198](https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/security/advisories/GHSA-5gw5-jccf-6hxw) Unauthenticated SSRF via TestWfsPost

## Summary GeoServer Web Feature Service (WFS) web service was found to be vulnerable to GeoTools CVE-2025-30220 XML External Entity (XXE) processing attack. It is possible to trigger the parsing of external DTDs and entities, bypassing standard entity resolvers. This allows for Out-of-Band (OOB) data exfiltration of local files accessible by the GeoServer process, and Service Side Request Forgery (SSRF). ## Details While direct entity resolution is managed by application property ENTITY_RESOLUTION_ALLOWLIST for XML Parsing, this restriction was not being used by the GeoTools library when building an in-memory XSD Library Schema representation. This bypasses GeoServer's AllowListEntityResolver enabling XXE attacks. ## PoC No public PoC is provided but this vulnerability has been confirmed to be exploitable through WFS service. ## Impact * Information Disclosure: This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem that a...

### Summary The Coverage rest api `/workspaces/{workspaceName}/coveragestores/{storeName}/{method}.{format}` allow to upload file with a specified url (with {method} equals 'url') with no restrict. ### Details The Coverage rest api `/workspaces/{workspaceName}/coveragestores/{storeName}/{method}.{format}` allow to upload file with a specified url (with {method} equals 'url'). But this url has not been check with [URL Checks feature](https://docs.geoserver.org/latest/en/user/security/urlchecks.html#url-checks). For example, should add the code below to check fileURL: ```java URLCheckers.confirm(fileURL) ``` The vulnerable code was [RESTUtils.java](https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/blob/main/src/rest/src/main/java/org/geoserver/rest/util/RESTUtils.java#L176) ### Impact This vulnerability presents the opportunity for Server Side Request Forgery. ### References - https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11468 - https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11717

### Summary An improper URI validation vulnerability exists that enables an unauthorized attacker to perform XML External Entities (XEE) attack, then send GET request to any HTTP server. Attacker can abuse this to scan internal networks and gain information about them then exploit further. Moreover, attacker can read limited `.xsd` file on system. ### Details By default, GeoServer use `PreventLocalEntityResolver` class from GeoTools to filter out malicious URIs in XML entities before resolving them. The URI must match the regex `(?i)(jar:file|http|vfs)[^?#;]*\\.xsd`. But the regex leaves a chance for attackers to request to any HTTP server or limited file. ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: 1. Scan internal network to gain insight about it and exploit further. 2. SSRF to endpoint ends with `.xsd`. 3. Read limited `.xsd` file on system. ### Mitigation 1. Define the system property ``ENTITY_RESOLUTION_ALLOWLIST`` to limit the supported external schema locaitons. 2. The buil...

### Summary It possible to achieve Service Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the Demo request endpoint if Proxy Base URL has not been set. ### Details A unauthenticated user can supply a request that will be issued by the server. This can be used to enumerate internal networks and also in the case of cloud instances can be used to obtain sensitive data. ### Mitigation 1. When using GeoServer with a proxy, manage the proxy base value as a system administrator, use the application property ``PROXY_BASE_URL`` to provide a non-empty value that cannot be overridden by the user interface or incoming request. 2. When using GeoServer directly without a proxy, block all access to TestWfsPost by editing the web.xml file. Adding this block right before the end: ```xml <security-constraint> <web-resource-collection> <web-resource-name>BlockDemoRequests</web-resource-name> <url-pattern>/TestWfsPost/*</url-pattern> </web-resource-coll...